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ABSTRACT 
DIASPORIC IMPERIALISM 
JAPAN’S ASIA-PACIFIC MIGRATIONS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1868-1945 
Sidney Xu Lu 
Frederick Dickinson 
 
 This dissertation argues that the Japanese modern nation was formed not only from 
the inside but also from the outside, through nationalizing Japanese emigrants around the 
Pacific Rim. The study examines critical roles of Japanese overseas emigrants in shaping 
the ideologies and social movements in the Japanese empire. It discusses how the efforts 
made by Japanese thinkers and social educators in nationalizing these dispersed and 
marginal subjects were crucial to the creation of Japanese modernity.  
  This study defines Japanese imperialism as “diasporic” in three dimensions. First, 
it illustrates the close and dynamic connections Japanese migration to the empire’s Asian 
colonies and to other parts of the world. In particular, it highlights the important yet 
unexpected ways in which Japanese American migration influenced and transformed 
Japan’s colonial expansion in Asia. Second, the study examines how the Japanese 
diasporic communities on both sides of the Pacific shaped the Japanese nation and empire 
at home. Third, from a more theoretical level, it explores the dual identity of Japanese 
imperialism between colonizer and the colonized. By examining flows and linkages 
between Japanese colonial migration in Asia and Japanese labor migration to America, 
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this study charts the evolving trajectory of Japan as a colored empire in the cultural and 
political space between Asia and the West.  
This dissertation is a study of the Japanese empire from the angle of Japan’s global 
migration. It challenges the separation between the nation-based narrative of modern 
Japan and the history of Japanese overseas migration. It also moves beyond the territory-
based study of the Japanese empire by bridging the disciplinary divide between Japanese 
colonial history and Japanese American history and brings a transnational and global 
perspective to our understanding of the Japanese empire.  
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Introduction 
The Japanese Empire Between Asia and the West 
 
         The new modern world of the nineteenth century that Japan found itself thrust into 
was both postnationalist and postindustrial, as Peter Duus has astutely observed. 1 Meiji 
Japan's simultaneous process of nation-making and empire-building took place in a 
Social Darwinist world order established by western powers. Initially a victim of the 
expansion of the western powers, Japan hastily initiated the territorial expansion of its 
own as a means of self-preservation and protection. Within a few decades this strategy 
appeared to be successful: by the time Japan was able to free itself of the shackles of its 
unequal treaties and form an alliance with the United Kingdom, the empire already had 
annexed Okinawa and Taiwan and imposed its own unequal treaties on Korea and China. 
As Fred Dickinson's most recent study demonstrates, Japanese politicians, social activists 
and opinion leaders successfully took advantages of the changes to the global order 
brought by World War I. By embracing the new international discourse marked by 
pacifism and democracy, Japan actively participated in the activities of the League of 
Nations as one of its four permanent members and grew into a global imperial power. 2 
   Despite these successes, Japan's efforts to join the club of modern empires were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
         1 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 3. 
2 Frederick Dickinson, World War I and the Triumph of a New Japan, 1919-1930 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
2	  	  
	  
undermined by its involvement in the global capitalist economy. Due to the economic 
imbalance between Japan and the western powers, many Japanese laborers were drawn 
into the global market as migrant labor. 3 Just like other Asian migrants, a large number 
of Japanese men and women migrated to Hawaii, North and South Americas, and 
Southeast Asia to meet local demands for cheap labor. Japanese politicians and social 
leaders worried these emigrants, most of whom were from the bottom strata of Japanese 
society, would present an "uncivilized" image of the nation to foreigners. Such anxiety 
grew further with the rise of Japanese exclusion campaigns in the United States. To deal 
with this issue, Japanese national leaders began to control the outflows of emigration as 
well as sponsored programs to prepare emigrants before their departure. Japanese 
government also called for racial equality between Japanese and the Caucasians in the 
diplomatic arena. These efforts led to Japan's abortive proposal of a "racial equality 
clause" in the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1919 as well as its failed attempts in 
limiting anti-Japanese sentiment in the US, from the end of 19th century to 1924.  
     In recent decades, scholars have explored these seemingly contradictory 
components of Japanese imperialism. Peter Duus defines the Japanese empire as mimetic, 
arguing that Japan’s process of nation-making and imperial expansion depended 
significantly on the technologies, economics and international political order established 
by western imperialism. Through a similar but more specific angle, Robert Eskildsen 
examines the ways the Japanese print media portrayed the imperial army's expedition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History and Transnationalism in Japanese 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 18-19. 
3	  	  
	  
Taiwan in 1874, revealing how the Japanese public legitimized the military expedition as 
the empire's efforts to bring western civilization to the "savages" on the island. He argues 
that Japan's mimicry of western imperialism served as a straightforward justification of 
the empire's expansion in Asia. By scrutinizing the literary works produced in the 
Japanese empire, Robert Tierney explores Japanese intellectuals' ambivalent feelings 
toward western imperialism: although they admired western civilization and material 
power and eagerly desired to be a part of it, they also felt aggrieved at white racism. 
Tierney thus presents us with a fractured sense of the Japanese identity as a colored 
colonizer. 4 
   Incorporating the insights of previous scholarship, this study aims to further 
historicize the process of Japan's identity formation as a colored empire. How did the 
Japanese empire grow from the geopolitical and cultural discordance between Asia and 
the West in different time periods? In what ways did Japan's encounters with westerners 
and their Asian "inferiors" shape and reshape Japanese national identity? How did white 
racism and the Japanese exclusion in the US in particular, impact Japan’s colonial 
expansion in Asia?  
   This dissertation aims to answer these questions within the context of Japanese 
overseas migration. It examines how Japanese intellectuals and social activists of 
different political and philosophical leanings in different phases of the empire associated 
their agendas for Japan’s nation-making and empire-building with Japanese migration to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
        4 Robert Tierney, Tropics of Savagery: The Culture of Japanese Empire in Comparative Frame 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 19-20  
4	  	  
	  
both Asia and the US. In order to accomplish this goal, this study brings together two 
conventionally separate disciplines in the study of Japanese history: the study of Japanese 
colonialism in Asia and the study of the Japanese diaspora in other parts of the world. 
 
Diaspora and Imperialism 
          Just as the study of diaspora and the study of imperialism are seldom mentioned in 
the same breath, research on Japanese overseas migration and Japanese imperialism is 
often viewed as mutually incompatible. While scholars still debate the exact definition 
and scope of its application,5 the study of diaspora typically examines the lives of 
minority groups (ethnic minorities in particular) who were displaced, but maintain a 
connection to "a prior home."6  In recent years, transnational approaches to the study of 
diaspora have transformed the field of American ethnic studies, which originally emerged 
during the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Its main aim was to raise the ethnic 
consciousness of racial minorities at the margins of American society. More specifically, 
scholars of African American history, Latin American history and Asian American 
history have produced seminal works that have explored the complexity of ethnic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Comparing Diasporas: A Review Essay,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies 8:3 
(Winter 1999): 260-261. 
6 Ibid, 261. 
5	  	  
	  
consciousness and identity formation of ethnic minorities in the US, examining both their 
ties with the lands of their origin as well as their integration into American society.7  
          While not often referred to as part of the Japanese diaspora, Japanese immigrants to 
the US, who began migrating to the country in the late 19th century, now categorized as 
Japanese Americans, constitute a major ethnic group among minorities in American 
society. Historians of the Japanese American experience have been exploring various 
aspects of Japanese American life, spanning the generation of the early exclusion period 
to that of the internment camps during World War II. Through their ongoing efforts have 
made significant contributions to our understanding of the victimization of Japanese 
immigrants under white racism, as well as the responsibility the US, both state and 
society, has in avoiding similar tragedies in the future. However, as with other subfields 
in ethnic studies, the approaches to Japanese American history have also begun to change 
under the influence of diaspora studies. Recent historians have demonstrated how the 
transnational ties of Japanese immigrants to their homeland, both material and mental, 
have served as crucial resources for their daily struggles with local racism in the US.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
         7 For example, see Paul Gilroy's 1993 seminal work, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double 
Consciousness, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), George Sanchez, Becoming 
Mexican American: Ethnicity, Culture, and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles (Oxford University, 
1995), Madeline Y. Hsu, Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and 
Migration Between the United States and Southern China, 1882-1943 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), Emory Elliott, “Diversity in the United States and Abroad: What Does It 
Mean When American Studies Is Transnational?” American Quarterly 59:1 (2007): 1–22. 
         8 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, Yuji Ichioka, “Japanese Immigrant Nationalism: The 
Issei and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1941,” California History 6:3, (1990): 260-275, Duncan 
Ryūken Williams and Tomoe Moriya, eds., Issei Buddhism in the Americas (University of Illinois 
Press, 2010). Brian Hayashi, “For the Sake of Our Japanese Brethren”: Assimilation, 
6	  	  
	  
          Given the minority and margin-oriented focus of diaspora studies, as most 
European ethnic groups in the US are generally not considered diasporic communities,9 
Japanese colonial migration to the empire's Asian colonies are also generally not 
categorized as diasporic. Although Japanese settlers were a minority group in the 
colonies in terms of population size, they usually lived at the top of the racial hierarchy 
and enjoyed the military and political support of the colonial authorities. While they 
maintained a certain distance from the military as well as their colonial governments and 
were sometimes victims of Japanese imperialism themselves, they were at the same time 
colonizers who were involved in the construction of colonies on a daily basis. Recent 
studies on the Japanese empire also have reflected a scholarly shift from uncovering the 
responsibilities of the Japanese military and imperial state in victimizing the people of 
both Japan and its colonies to a discussion of the agency of common Japanese, both in the 
colonies and at home, especially those who participated in the process of empire-
building.  Scholars in recent years have produced salient research examining the 
complexity of Japanese migration in the colonies. The work of Louise Young 
demonstrates that Japanese local elites and peasants welcomed and actively participated 
in the imperial government's project of mass migration to Manchuria, seeing it as an 
opportunity to solve the various problems that then plagued the Japanese home islands.10 
Jun Uchida reveals the various ways in which Japanese colonialism penetrated the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nationalism, and Protestantism Among the Japanese of Los Angeles, 1895-1942 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995). 
9 William Safran, “Comparing Diasporas: A Review Essay,” 261. 
10 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 307-398. 
7	  	  
	  
Korean Peninsula through Japanese settlers. Conceptualizing the settlers as "brokers of 
empire," she demonstrates how these migrants managed to live in the political and 
cultural space between the Koreans and the colonial government and how they negotiated 
their interests and power with both sides.11 
          This sharp contrast between the scholarly focuses and paradigms of narration in 
Japanese American history and that of Japanese colonial history mirrors a similar 
disciplinary split among Japanese scholars in the study of Japan’s worldwide migration. 
While the study of Japanese colonial settlers is submerged in the field of Shokumin 
Kenkyū (colonial studies), the story of Japanese migration to areas outside of the Japanese 
empire belongs to the domain of Imin Kenyū (migration studies). Similar to their 
American counterparts, Japanese scholars in both fields have produced new and valuable 
research. However, the disciplinary boundaries remain, with the narrative limits already 
set for historians. For example, in a recent review article on Japanese migration 
historiography, Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro laments that this academic separation has in 
previous literature oversimplified the stories of Japanese emigrants: those who settled in 
the empire's Asian colonies have been seen as the victimizers of imperialism, while those 
who migrated to areas outside of the empire have been labeled as victims of white racism 
and exclusionism.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-1945 
(Massachusetts and Landon: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), 5-8. 
12 Sakaguchi Mitsuhiro, “Nihon Iminshi Kenkyū no Shatei,” Nihonshi Kenkyu 500 (2004):139. 
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          The existing analytical paradigms in these two fields are absolutely necessary for 
our understanding of the different aspects of worldwide Japanese migration. They also 
continue to provide important implications for the present. The continuing debate on in 
what ways and who should be responsible for Japanese colonialism and the wars in Asia 
is crucial for our understanding of Japan's current relations with other Asian nations. 
Similarly, the question of how to compensate the sufferers of Japanese American 
internment during World War II as well as the ultimate lesson to be derived from this 
historical tragedy in general are important starting points in the discussion of racial 
politics in contemporary American society.  
          However, these paradigms are no longer sufficient by themselves. Recent 
innovative works emerging from both fields have revealed new ways for grasping the 
complexity of Japanese colonialism by bridging and comparing Japanese colonialism in 
Asia with Japanese immigration to the US. In one of his recent articles, Eiichiro Azuma 
illustrates the ways in which the Japanese imperial state appropriated the invented 
legends of Japanese immigrants in North America to propagate its project of mass 
migration to Manchuria. Takashi Fujitani, on the other hand, examines and compares 
racial politics in Japan and America through the lens of the Korean soldiers in the 
Japanese military and Japanese American soldiers in the American military. He reveals 
the unexpected convergence between Japan and the United States in terms of their 
encompassing and multi-ethnic racial discourses during the Pacific War.  
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     These approaches of looking at Japanese American migration and Japanese 
colonial history together have challenged the disciplinary boundaries in both two fields, 
as well as the nation-based paradigms of history writing in general. These innovative 
approaches in English-language scholarship also echo a simultaneous methodological 
shift in Japanese academic circles. Thanks to the wide acceptance of transnational (ekkyō 
or toransunashōnnaru) approaches among Japanese scholars in recent years, there has 
been a sizable and growing literature that challenges nation-based writing in Japanese 
migration history. Although the past few decades saw few responses to the call made by 
pioneer historians Kimura Kenji and Araragi Shinzō in the late 1970s to re-conceptualize 
the history of Japanese overseas into a discussion of Japanese migrants both inside and 
outside of the Japanese empire,13 their insights have recently gained increasing support. 
Discarding the epistemology behind the labels of colonial migration (shokumin) and 
emigration (imin), Okabe Makio redefines all Japanese overseas by the end of World War 
II as emigrants (imin), offering a unified and coherent narrative of worldwide Japanese 
migration. Instead of using political and racial hierarchies in host countries to categorize 
Japanese migration, he periodizes Japanese overseas migration before 1945 into four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 As early as 1979, Kimura Kenji had pointed out the need to re-conceptualize Japanese overseas 
migration in order to include Japanese migrants both inside and outside of the empire into the 
discussion. Kimura Kenji, “Meijiki Nihonjin no Kaigai Shinshutsu to Imin/Kyoryūmin Seisaku 
(2),” Shōkei Ronshū 36, (1979): 95-118. Since then Kimura has also produced trailblazing works 
that discuss Japanese migration to Asia and other parts of the world. See for example, Kimura 
Kenji, “Kindai Nihon no Imin/Shokumin Katsudō to Chūkanzō,” Rekishigaku Kenkyū 613 
(1990):135-143, “Senzenki no Kaigai Yūhi to Shisōteki Keifu: Chiba Toyoji to Ashiado to 
Ohōsaku o Megutte,” Kenkyū Nenpō Keizaigaku 53:4 (1992): 553-564. Araragi Shinzō mentions 
that since the 1980s he has called for scholarly attention on the connected structures between 
Japanese migration to Asia and to Brazil, but the call had few responses. Araragi Shinzō, “Senzen 
no Kaigai Imin to Shokumin no Kanren Kōzō,” Iwanami Kōza: Ajia Taiheiyō Sensō, vol.4 
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006), 3-5. 
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phases based on the social status of migrants and the Japanese government’s degree of 
involvement.14 More recently, Yoshida Ryō has edited two volumes, examining the 
history of Japanese American education, contributed to by scholars of Japanese and 
Japanese American history from both the US and Japan. This collaborative scholarship 
explores how the dual-national and ethnic identities of Japanese Americans of different 
generations was formed under a variety of Japanese education networks between Japan 
and the US from the late 19th century to the outbreak of the Pacific War.15 
        These border-crossing efforts of American and Japanese scholars recently converged 
in a symposium in July 2013 jointly hosted by Kyoto University and the Association of 
Asian American Studies Japan Section. Entitled "Between and Beyond Two Empires 
(Ajia to amerika no 'teikoku' o koete)," it invited both scholars of American ethnic studies 
and the Japanese empire, in the US and Japan, such as Eiichiro Azuma, Araragi Shinzō 
and Edward Park. The symposium discussed recent new approaches in the study of 
imperialism and racial theories, transcending the boundaries of Japanese and American 
national histories.  
        This innovative scholarship on Japanese migration history recently produced by 
American and Japanese researchers has offered new interpretations on Japanese 
colonialism and racial struggles on both sides of the Pacific. More importantly, by 
synthesizing Japanese migration inside and outside of the Japanese empire, these studies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Okabe Makio, Umi o Watatta Nihonjin (Tokyo: Yamagawa Shuppansha, 2002) 
15 Yoshida Ryō, ed., Amerika Nihonjin Imin no Ekkyō Kyōikushi (Tokyo: Nihon Toshō Sentā, 
2005), Amerika Nikkei Nisei to Ekkyō Kyōiku: 1930 Nendai o Shu ni shite (Tokyo: Fuji 
Shuppan, 2012). 
11	  	  
	  
urge us to ask new questions about Japanese overseas migration and imperial expansion: 
What did the Japanese global diaspora mean for the Japanese empire?  How does a 
general narrative of the Japanese diaspora change our understanding of the Japanese 
empire? How does the transnational approach in the study of the Japanese empire 
contribute to our knowledge of modern imperialism and world history in general?  
        Therefore, the time is ripe for a new framework to study the Japanese empire, a 
framework which offers a coherent narrative of worldwide Japanese migration in relation 
to Japanese empire-building; one that allows scholars to transcend the empire's territorial 
boundaries so that the organizations and people involved in migration campaigns both 
inside and outside of the empire can be examined thoroughly; one that provides us an 
unique angle for critiquing western modernity by relocating the Japanese empire in a 
space between diaspora and expansion, the colonized and the imperial, and the subaltern 
and the progressive in global history.  
 
Diasporic imperialism  
          As a modest attempt to explore this transnational framework, this study uses the 
concept of diasporic imperialism to reconceive of the Japanese empire in three theoretical 
aspects. First of all, the word "diasporic" highlights the migration-centered focus and the 
global scope of this examination. The study discusses the central role of Japanese global 
migration in Japanese empire building. It holistically examines the Japanese people, men 
and women, rich and poor, elite and common, who migrated to areas both inside and 
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outside of the empire's territories at each phase of the empire’s development. This 
approach allows us to find the connections between Japanese communities in different 
geographical locations around the world. In particular, this study sheds new light on the 
history of Japanese colonialism by showing how Japanese colonial expansion in Asia was 
profoundly influenced by Japanese American migration. 
   The relationship between the Japanese colonial empire in Asia and Japanese 
migration to America was just one type of connection in the nexus of the global Japanese 
diaspora. Japanese migration to Brazil, Peru and Mexico, for example, was also closely 
tied to both Japanese imperial expansion in Asia and Japanese immigration to America. 
In this study, I will focus on the connections between the migrations to Asia and the US 
with the aim of synthesizing the efforts of recent scholars in both Asian area studies and 
Asian American studies. It also challenges the disciplinary divide between these two 
fields. Area studies, as Bruce Cummings and Sylvia Yanagisako jointly point out, has 
been shaped by the ideologies of the Cold War and American Orientalism. In this mode 
of scholarship, the scholar identifies and studies a particular geographical location or a 
group of people with a similar cultural/ethnic origin that is typically thought of as inferior 
to that of the West. Asian American studies, on the other hand, emerged to challenge the 
hegemony of white racism in the US.16 Yet as Yanagisako further argues, the nation-
based framework in Asian American studies tends to distinguish the "Asian American" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Bruce Cumings, “Boundary Displacement: The State, the Foundations, and Area Studies during 
and after the Cold War,” 261-302. Sylvia Yanagisako, “Asian Exclusion Acts,” 175-189, in Sasao 
Miyoshi and H.D. Harootunian, eds., Learning places: the Afterlives of Area Studies (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2002) 
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from the "Asian." Its framework reinforces the geopolitical and cultural hierarchy 
between the West and Asia that underpins the original teleology of Asian area studies. 
This research, more specifically, explores the stories of Japanese social leaders, 
intellectuals, and the migrants themselves, whose lives connect Japanese history with 
Japanese American history beyond and below the boundaries of the national histories of 
these two Pacific empires. It endeavors to challenge the resonance created between the 
national history framework and the Cold War paradigm of knowledge production in both 
Asian area studies and Asian American studies.  
          Secondly, and more concretely, the adjective "diasporic" also indicates domestic 
significance of Japanese overseas emigrants. It illustrates the ways in which the Japanese 
empire was not only shaped from the inside but also from the outside and explores how 
Japanese overseas migration shaped and transformed the empire at home. In particular, it 
demonstrates that the different opinions and campaigns of the national thinkers and social 
activists of Japan for controlling the Japanese overseas was closely associated and at 
times drove the formation of the national subject in the Japanese imperial metropolis.  
          According the changes of domestic discourse on overseas migration, the history of 
Japan’s diasporic imperialism can be divided into three stages: the era of open-endedness 
(the 1868 to the 1910s), the era of permanent settlement (the 1910s to the 1930s), and the 
era of homecoming (the 1930s to 1945). The era of open-endedness was marked by a 
diversity of migration patterns and choices. For example, although agreeing on the 
necessity of Japanese migration to America for Japan’s national development, advocates 
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for migration in the government and society alike had open-ended expectations on the 
nature of its development. Except for a small number of political exiles and government-
funded students, the majority of Japanese emigrants in this era were self-supported 
student-laborers.17 While they were expected to achieve personal success in the US and 
win Japan recognition as a partner equal to the western powers, Japanese migration 
pundits also believed that these migrants would be extremely beneficial to Japan, 
regardless if they decided to eventually return to Japan or settle in the US. This discourse 
changed dramatically in the era of permanent settlement, when the mainstream discourse 
on migration shifted from open-ended expectations to a single requirement: permanently 
settling abroad. The sojourning mentality of the emigrants was criticized as backward and 
insular, and was particularly attributed as the main reason for American anti-Japanese 
sentiment. This strategy of permanent settlement was adopted for the empire’s 
subsequent migration campaigns to Latin America as well as Manchuria. The discourse 
changed again in the era of homecoming, which observed a re-appreciation of the 
sojourning identity of the Japanese overseas outside of the empire in general and 
Japanese Americans in particular as well as the integration of them into the ideologies of 
Japanese imperial expansion in the mainstream migrant discourses of the day. By 
celebrating the ideological return of the Japanese overseas, state officials and migration 
advocates reinvented migrant stories to mobilize common peasants in domestic Japan to 
participate in the imperial government's project of mass migration to Manchuria.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Yuji Ichioka, The Issei: The World of the First Generation Japanese Immigrations, 1885-1924 
(New York and London: The Free Press, 1988), 7-8, 16. 
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          Placing these diasporic lives at the core of the Japanese empire-building process, 
this study argues against the leading discourse in the Japanese academy and public, which 
portrays Japanese overseas emigrants, the grassroots in particular, as people abandoned 
by the nation (kimin). Emerging in the 1980s, the kimin discourse attacks the Japanese 
government for abandoning its own subjects at different historical moments and in 
different ways.  The studies on kimin is important for sure, since it adds to our 
understanding of how the lives of common Japanese were traumatized by state power in 
its pursuit of maintaining the wellbeing of the empire. However, this analytical paradigm 
also gives people the impression that overseas migrants, once abandoned and out of the 
country, no longer had any connection to Japan. It not only oversimplifies the 
relationship between overseas Japanese and the Japanese homeland, but it also reinforces 
the nation-centered narrative prevalent in Japanese history. This assumption thus prevents 
us from examining the role of overseas Japanese in the Japanese nation-making and 
empire building process. Through the notion of diasporic imperialism, this study, instead, 
aims to reveal a more complicated relationship between Japanese communities abroad 
and the Japanese empire, in which the overseas Japanese are seldom discarded. Rather, 
they were considered crucial resources by Japanese policy makers and social leaders and 
were used in a variety of ways at different phases of the imperial expansion.  
          Although challenging the validity of kimin as an analytical model, the concept of 
“diasporic imperialism”, nevertheless, does not aim to emphasize the agency of Japanese 
overseas in Japan’s imperial expansion or simply to equate the entire diasporic population 
with the imperial apparatus. Studies on the Japanese empire have produced sophisticated 
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analyses that explore the labyrinth of tunnels that linked the lives of ordinary Japanese, in 
both the colonies and the metropole, to imperial expansion.18 Recent research on 
Japanese American history also contributes to our understanding of the complexity of 
Japanese American life by examining the meaning of the Japanese empire in the daily 
political and racial struggle of Japanese American immigrants. These analyses of 
emigrants’ agency have forced us to reassess the responsibility for Japanese colonialism 
and the wars in Asia on the one hand and to refine the narratives of Japanese American 
immigration on the other.  
          While the imperial motivations of overseas Japanese is an important theme worthy 
of further investigation, it is not the focus of this research. This study, instead, examines 
how overseas Japanese were viewed by domestic intellectuals and social leaders, through 
the prism of their imperial ideologies. It highlights the various ways they considered 
overseas migration as a strategy for imperial expansion and overseas emigrants as useful 
subjects of the empire at different periods of time. In other words, this study is not the 
story of the Japanese overseas, but a discussion on what these diasporic lives meant for 
the Japanese empire. 
          Moreover, the excitement of the domestic ideologues and social leaders in 
imagining the role of these emigrants, as well as their endeavor to integrate emigrants 
into the process of empire-building illustrated in this study can by no means undermine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For example, Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism and Jun Uchida, Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876-
1945. 
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the hardship and pains that these emigrants experienced. Most of the emigrants were from 
the social margins of Japanese society, leaving the homeland in order to free themselves 
from poverty. Those who settled in Hawaii and North America further fell prey to white 
racism and exclusionism. The history of Japanese American immigration from the late 
19th century to the end of World War II is such a rich reservoir of evidence of racial 
struggle that one does not even need to look at the tragedy of Japanese American wartime 
interment to be convinced of its presence. By questioning the idea of kimin and 
examining the links between Japanese overseas and the Japanese empire, this study 
explores the often-neglected layers of violence and subjugation that the Japanese 
diasporic population experienced. The concept “diasporic imperialism” indicates both the 
ways Japanese imperialism was shaped by Japan’s global diaspora and the ways the lives 
of Japanese overseas were forcefully integrated into the Japanese empire. 
          Last but not least, at a more theoretical level, the word "diasporic" is utilized to 
illustrate not only the double identity of Japanese imperialism, as both subjugator and 
subjugated, but also the process of how such an identity was shaped and reshaped by 
Japanese migrant encounters with both the West and Asia. As a late-coming imperial 
power, Japan initially took the strategy of imitating the western empires for both self-
defense and expansion. As prominent Japanese politician and social activist of the day, 
Abe Isoo, metaphorically mused, Japan was “the broker of civilization,” buying it from 
the American market and selling it to China and Korea.19 In Japan's power negotiation 
between the West and Asia, the role of Japanese immigration to America was particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Abe Isoo, Hokubei no Shin Nihon, (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1905), 124. 
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important. Seen as the representatives of Japan, Japanese emigrants were obliged to 
assimilate into the higher civilization of America as well as showcase the cultured and 
progressive image of the Japanese. This was in order to win Japan recognition from the 
western powers.  
          However, the Japanese empire was not white but colored. Its imitation of western 
imperialism was manifested by the ambivalence of “colonial mimicry” defined by Homi 
Bhabha: as a non-West, non-white power, Japan's desire to become an authentic modern 
empire could only be partially achieved under the West-dominated world order.20 Japan's 
success in expanding its political power in the international arena was constantly 
accompanied by racial disavowal. The decades long anti-Japanese campaigns in the US 
climaxed in the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924, which defined the Japanese as 
a race impossible for naturalization. Consequently, the act forbade all Japanese from 
migrating to the country. The Japanese public and politicians alike considered the 
enactment of the act as a moment of national humiliation.21 The influential political 
journal Diplomatic News (Gaikō Jihō), for example, periodically published articles to 
commemorate this event in the 1920s and 30s.22 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 86-88. 
21 Nancy Stalker has offered a comprehensive study on the immediate response of the Japanese 
public to the Immigration Act of 1924. Nancy Stalker, “Suicide, Boycotts and Embracing Tagore: 
The Japanese Popular Response to the 1924 US Immigration Exclusion Law,” Japanese Studies 
26: 2 (2006): 153-170. 
22 For example, see Inahara Katsuji, “Hainichi dai yon shūnen o mukau,” Gaikō Jihō 46:542 
(1927): 1-18, “Hainichi dai nana shūnen o mukau,” Gaikō Jihō 55:614 (1930), 11-44, “Hainichi 
imin hō dai hachi shūnen o mukau,” Gaikō jihō 59: 638 (1931), 24-45, Ōyama Ujirō, “Hainichi 
imin hō dai kyū shūnen,” Gaikō Jihō 63 (1932), 1-13, “Hainichi imin hō dai jūni shūnen,” Gaikō 
Jihō 75 (1935), 44-56, “Hainichi imin hō dai jūsan shūnen o tomurau,” Gaikō Jihō 79 (1936): 79-
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          More importantly, the exclusion of Japanese migration to the US was a crucial 
factor that transformed the development of Japanese imperialism. In response to the 
exclusion campaigns, Japanese thinkers started to invent ideologies for the establishment 
of Japan's own world order, a world order that entrusted the empire with the mission to 
lead all peoples of color to challenge and eventually overthrow the hypocritical and racist 
hegemony of the West.  Recent scholarship has shed new light on the history of wartime 
Japan, examining the ideologies behind its Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere as a 
valid attempt to overcome western modernity23. This study shows that Japan's ideological 
challenge to western imperialism actually started decades earlier. It grew out of Japanese 
intellectuals' critique of the anti-Japanese campaigns in the US in the first two decades of 
the 20th century. While anti-West hardliners, such as the thinkers affiliated with the 
Association of Politics and Education (Seikyōsha), had opposed Western-leaning 
ideologies in the nation as early as the 1880s, their criticisms did not go as far as 
questioning western imperialism itself. Instead, they mainly reminded their fellow 
countrymen that the western powers were rivals, not friends, and that in order to wrestle 
with the West, Japan had to promote its own colonial expansion.24 It was in Japanese 
intellectuals' attacks on the anti-Japanese campaigns in the US in the 1910s and 20s, that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90, “Hainichi imin hō dai jūgo shūnen o tomurau,” Gaikō Jihō 87 (1938): 75-83, “Hainichi imin 
hō dai jūroku shūnen o tomurau,” Gaikō Jihō 91 (1939): 80-89. 
23 Richard Calichman, “Introduction: ‘Overcoming Modernity’: The Dissolution of Cultural 
Identity,” in Richard Calichman, ed., Overcoming Modernity: Cultural Identity in Wartime Japan 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), Sakai Naoki, Isomae Jun’ichi, eds., “Kindai no 
Chōkoku” to Kyoto Gakuha: Kindaisei, Teikoku, Fuhensei (Tokyo: Ibunsha, 2010). 
24 For example, Nagasawa Betten argued that the Mongolian race, represented by the Japanese, 
and the Aryan race were doom to have a war with each other. He urged the Japanese to prepare 
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shuzoku,” Nihonjin, no. 7 (1894): 11-16. 
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they began to delineate the hypocrisy between the West’s idealistic humanistic slogans 
and actual racial discrimination.25 They thus began to use the principles of co-existence 
and co-prosperity to promote Japan's own imperialism, that fundamentally departed from 
the West. 26 
          Just as simply defining overseas Japanese as either victims of white racism or 
colonizers in Asia fails to capture the complexity of migrants' lives, defining Japanese 
overseas as "diasporic" by no means aims to generalize the multi-layered encounters that 
the Japanese migrant had in different parts of the world. However, Japanese diasporic 
lives were linked together via their ties with the Japanese empire and continuously 
shaped its evolution. More specifically, Japanese thinkers and social reformers viewed 
the emigrants, inside and outside the empire alike, as equally valuable for the empire. 
Their ideas and campaigns to nationalize the Japanese overseas, particularly the rural 
poor, were closely associated with their projects of reforming domestic Japan and their 
plans for how the empire should expand.   
Organization and Sources 
          Japan's global migration involved a variety of people and groups, such as 
intellectuals, policy makers, social activists, migrant agents and organizations, as well as 
the migrants themselves. The diasporic nature of Japanese imperialism, accordingly, was 
manifested in a variety of dimensions. To highlight the dimensions in which the empire 
was shaped in the nexus of the Japanese diaspora, the chapters that follow are organized 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Yamamoto Miono, Shokumin Seisaku Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1920), 158. 
26 Kojima Ken, Shokumin Seisaku (Tokyo: Shōkasha, 1927), 12-13. 
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thematically instead of chronologically. This study discusses the central role of Japanese 
global migration, which shaped and transformed the history of the Japanese empire 
through four aspects, including national subject formation, the ideologies of empire-
building, women-related social movements, and the ideas and practice of a specific 
migration organization’s campaigns. This endeavor involves both the approaches of 
intellectual and social history.  
          Chapter one and two delve into the debates of Japanese intellectuals, examining 
how they viewed Japanese overseas migration in general and Japanese immigration to 
America in particular, as well as their connection to the Japanese nation-making and 
empire-building process. Chapter one probes how overseas emigration was perceived as 
essential to the project of Japanese nation-building from the 1860s to the 1920s. It 
illustrates the different ways that Japanese ideologues, educators, religious leaders, and 
government officials placed Japanese diasporic communities at the center of their 
political agendas for reforming and reconstructing Japan.  
          While chapter one demonstrates how the formation of Japanese national identity 
was shaped by overseas migration, Chapter two, through a more focused lens, examines 
how Japanese American migration influenced the Japanese colonial empire in Asia from 
the end of the 19th century to the end of the Pacific War. It demonstrates that the Japanese 
exclusion movement in the US altered Japanese intellectual's ways of categorizing 
Japan's global diaspora. Through the divergence and convergence between the terms 
22	  	  
	  
emigration (imin) and colonial migration (shokumin), Japanese immigration to America 
shaped Japanese colonial ideologies in Asia.  
         While chapters one and two analyze Japan's diasporic imperialism from the 
perspective of the intelligentsia, chapters three and four take the perspectives of social 
activists, by examining their women centered campaigns. They show that the Japanese 
diaspora affected specific social and political movements as much as domestic 
intellectual debates. The diaspora involved and changed various lives in the empire: men 
as much as women, elites as much as commoners, the rich as much as the poor, the vocal 
as much as the voiceless, the powerful as much as the powerless. Chapter three examines 
the close relationship between Japanese overseas prostitution and the prostitution 
abolition movement in domestic Japan from the 1880s to the 1920s. It argues that middle 
class Japanese abolitionists’ anxiety to eliminate the “shameful” Japanese expatriate 
prostitutes around the world drove their abolition campaigns in domestic Japan in 
important and unexpected ways.  
          Chapter four examines the education campaigns of social reformers that targeted 
Japanese rural emigrant women in both Manchuria and California in the first two decades 
of the 20th century. These campaigns, aiming to discipline women in Japanese diasporic 
communities and cultivate them as “civilized” subjects representing ideal Japanese 
womanhood, I argue, transformed the women’s education movement in domestic Japan 
in the 1910s and ’20s. Moreover, by creating a series of institutions and ideologies, these 
campaigns paved the ground for the state’s mass migration policy in the late 1930s, 
23	  	  
	  
which mobilized and exported women from across the nation to Manchuria on an 
unprecedented scale. 
          Chapter five, also the final chapter, turns to the story of the Japanese Striving 
Society, an important migrant agent and education organization. Established in 1897, the 
Japanese Striving Society existed throughout the history of the Japanese empire. It not 
only witnessed but was also involved in a variety of different migration campaigns at 
different historical moments, such as migration to America from the late 19th century to 
the 1920s, migration to Latin America from the 1920s to 1930s, and the mass migration 
to the Asian continent from the late 1930s to 1945. Its past thus mirrors the general 
history of overseas migration in the time of the Japanese empire. Examining the changes 
in migration strategies between the two presidents of the JSS, Shimanuki Hyōdaiyū and 
Nagata Shigeshi, this chapter chronicles the three phases of the domestic discourse on 
Japanese American migration from the 1880s to 1945. The brief conclusion in the end of 
recapitulates the main points on the nature of Japan's diasporic imperialism discussed in 
previous chapters. 
 
 What will eventually emerge from these multidimensional analyses is a story of 
Japanese nation-making and empire-building that is more decentralized and complicated 
than the narratives derived from nation-centered, territory-bound perspectives. The story 
chronicles the invention, reproduction, manipulation, and dissemination of the emigrant-
centered discourse of nation-making and imperial expansion that took place from 1868 to 
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1945. It illustrates that the modern Japanese nation was not only formed from the inside 
but also from the outside, and that the empire was built not only by people in Japan 
proper but also by the dispersed and disenfranchised lives of men and women in and even 
beyond the peripheries of the empire. This dissertation further integrates Japan’s 
experience into our understanding of the relationship between the nation state and 
international migration, between nationalism and transnationalism, and between the ideas 
of boundedness and the ideals of transcendence in the global age. 
    My efforts to capture the “diasporic” dimension of Japanese modernity have led 
my research beyond the documents housed in key governmental archives in Japan. I also 
utilize the archives of Japanese emigrant organizations, the journals of Japanese social 
reform groups, the documents of overseas Japanese and Japanese Christian missionaries 
to probe how the activities of Japanese social reformers and educators in controlling 
overseas emigrants was intrinsically connected to their domestic social campaigns. I 
supplement these sources by incorporating newspapers and memoirs by overseas 
Japanese from a range of geographical sites including China, the United States, 
(California and Hawaii) and Latin America.  
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Chapter 1 
Japanese Global Migration and the National Subject Formation in 
Domestic Japan, 1868-1924 
 
        On June 7th, 2006, Tokyo District Court dismissed the lawsuit of a group of 
overseas Japanese demanding state compensations. They migrated to the Dominican 
Republic under Japanese government initiative in the 1950s but encountered unexpected 
hardship settling in local society and did not receive the benefits the Japanese 
government had promised. While admitting the Japanese government’s legal 
responsibility for the suffering of these emigrants, the court rejected their appeal by 
arguing that their charge passed the valid schedule period. Despite this sentence, Premier 
Koizumi announced that the government would compensate all the Japanese who 
migrated to the Dominican Republic in 1956 a certain amount of money between 500,000 
to 2,000,000 Japanese yen for the hardship they experienced due to the government’s 
mistake. This sentence and announcement called into end a two-decade-long struggle of 
Dominican Japanese to demand Japanese government’s responsibility and apology for its 
tragic emigration policy in the 1950s. 
        The appeal of Dominican Japanese for the government’s compensation, since its 
emergence in the late 1980s, was widely reported by mass media and increasingly drew 
public attention in Japan. It not only exposed a long forgotten failure of state-initiated 
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emigration right after World War Two, but also triggered public dissatisfaction with the 
Japanese government’s ability and willingness to take care of its own people.1 Since the 
late 1980s, Japanese scholars, too, produced numerous works uncovering the painful 
experience of Japanese overseas emigrants in general and of those who migrated to the 
Dominican Republic in the 1950s in particular.2  Reports in the mass media and scholarly 
works in the academy converged into a chorus that described the Japanese overseas as 
kimin (people abandoned by the nation), and narrated the emigrant history of modern 
Japan as a story of the Japanese state’s irresponsibility in dumping its own people by 
migrating them aboard and its readiness to sacrifice their lives for its own interests.  
Imano and Takahashi’s monograph, Dominika imin wa kimin datta, in particular, 
parallels the story of Dominican Japanese in the postwar era with various painful 
experiences of Japanese emigrants around the world, such as in Hawaii, Brazil, and even 
Manchuria, before World War Two.3 It weaves all these stories into a grand narrative of 
Japanese overseas migration since the Meiji era, a narrative that portrays the Japanese 
government as abandoning its people overseas out of Malthusian anxiety.  
        To be sure, many Japanese who migrated overseas from the early Meiji era to the 
1970s were indeed abandoned by the nation. Their migration was encouraged by the 
government out of the fear of overpopulation. Most of them were either impoverished 
and failed to survive in Japanese society due to financial difficulties or social outcasts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  For mass media coverage and reports on Dominican Japanese case, see Imano Tamikiko and 
Takahashi Yukihara, Dominika Imin Wa Kimin Datta, (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1993) p.268, 270 
and 271. 
2  For such scholarship, see Dominika Imin Wa Kimin Datta, 267-268. 
3 Ibid. 
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such as burakumin,4 or both, who were considered useless, if not troublesome, for the 
nation anyway. Moreover, after the Asia-Pacific War, many of those who were mobilized 
to support Japan’s expansion by migrating to the empire’s colonies, became domestic 
“other” that the general Japanese people tried to isolate from when they returned to 
Japan.5 In different periods of time and in various ways, these emigrants were abandoned 
by the Japanese government and marginalized by the society. Studies in explaining how 
and why this historical tragedy happened are absolutely necessary, which not only offer 
an important critique of Japanese imperialism but also urge the Japanese government and 
social groups at present to seek ways to compensate these emigrants and their 
descendants for the sufferings.  
        Emerging from the studies on these abandoned emigrants, the assumption that “imin 
wa kimin datta (emigrants were abandoned people)” was adopted as an analytical 
paradigm in understanding the history of Japanese emigration.  Following the Dominican 
Japanese lawsuits in the late 1980s, it became a leading discourse in the narratives of 
Japanese overseas migration in both Japanese academia and the public. The problem of 
this discourse is that it ahistorically reduced the relations between Japan and the Japanese 
overseas into a tragedy of desertion, a story of how these people were discarded by their 
home country. It prevented us from understanding the complexity of the relations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Endoh Toake, Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America (Urbana and 
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 142-143, 156, and Andrea Geiger, Subverting 
Exclusion: Transpacific Encounters with Race, Caste, and Borders, 1885-1928 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2011), 1-14. 
5 Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 18. 
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between the Japanese overseas communities and the Japanese nation and empire.  
        This kimin discourse fitted in well with the existing disciplinary separation in Japan 
in the study of Japanese emigrant history since the end of the World War II: the 
separation of the study of shokumin (colonial migration) and that of imin (emigration). 
The former focused on Japanese migrations to the areas inside of the empire’s formal 
territories and the spheres of influence in Asia. The latter, on the other hand, was mainly 
interested in the migrations to the areas outside of the empire’s Asian territories, such as 
Hawaii, North and South Americas. This separation was reinforced by the contrasting 
analytical paradigms these two fields generally adopted. The study of shokumin, seeing 
Japan’s migrations in Asia part of the empire’s expansion, has understood them in the 
frameworks on colonialism and imperialism. The study of imin, on the contrary, assumed 
the migrations to other parts of the world had few, if any, relations with the empire or its 
expansion. The discourse of kimin, highlighting the Japanese government’s ignorance and 
inability in taking care of its subjects abroad, further isolates the study of imin in general 
and Japanese American migration in particular from the study of Japanese colonialism. 
        This chapter places the discourse of kimin as the center of critique. The importance 
of Japanese overseas in the nationalist and imperialist ideologies in modern Japan, this 
chapter will illustrate, belies the sufficiency of the kimin discourse for us to grasp the 
complexity in the history of Japanese emigration.  Instead of kimin, I argue that from the 
beginning of the Meiji era through 1945, debates around two questions occupied the 
center of emigrant ideologies: how to integrate the overseas Japanese into Japan’s nation-
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building project and how to make use of Japanese emigrants for the empire’s expansion. 
While “abandoning” was absolutely one way in which the Japanese overseas were treated 
by the nation in the past, Japanese overseas as a group of people and overseas emigration 
as a way of national and imperial expansion never disappeared in the main national and 
social discourses of the day. In other words, in the mainstream national and imperial 
ideologies in modern Japan, the overseas Japanese were not seen as abandoned, but as a 
particularly important group of the national subjects occupying the frontiers of the 
empire’s expansion. Furthermore, the ways of defining and representing them vis-à-vis 
the nation and empire tied to and sometimes drove the course of the national subject 
formation in domestic Japan.  
        Toake Endoh successfully challenges the discourse of kimin by showing that 
Japanese emigrations to Latin America both before and right after World War Two were 
carefully planned projects of the state to “kill two birds with one stone.” By sending the 
Okinawans, Burakumins, laid-off mine laborers, and the rural poor to Latin America, 
Endoh argues, the state relieved domestic political and economical conflicts on the one 
hand and exported Japanese human resources for trans-Pacific expansion on the other 
hand.6 This chapter aims to further question the kimin discourse by looking beyond the 
conceptual boundaries of the state. Overseas emigration in pre-war Japan included both 
government-initiated projects and volunteer outflows. Even for those who migrated under 
the plans and sponsorship of the Japanese government, such as the emigrants in Latin 
America, their significance for domestic Japan went far beyond of fulfilling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Toake Endoh, Exporting Japan, 77-78, 138-169. 
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government’s goals of decompression and expansion. Not only governmental officials 
but also social educators and thinkers at each phase of the empire proposed and strove to 
materialize different agendas on overseas emigration for different purposes.  
        The bulk of this chapter thus will elaborate the importance of emigrants in the 
constructions of national and imperial discourses by Japanese national thinkers and social 
leaders, many of whom did not (directly at least) belong to the realm of state. It also 
illustrates that the national thinkers’ agendas and plans on how to nationalize and make 
use of overseas emigrants as well as their explanations on why and where Japan should 
export emigrants were closely tied, and sometimes central, to their ideologies of nation-
making and empire-building.  
 
The Emigration to Asia and Fukuzawa Yukichi’s Invention of Japanese Nationality  
         Malthusianism was received by Japanese intellectuals and policy makers in the late 
19th century hand in hand with Social Darwinism.7 For many of them, population growth 
had potential for both national crisis and success in racial competition. As historian 
Hyung Gu Lynn insightfully observes, during the first decade after Malthusianism was 
introduced to Japan in 1871, the pressure of overpopulation and ideas of emigration were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lynn, Hyung Gu. “Malthusian Dreams, Colonial Imaginary: The Oriental Development 
Company and Japanese Emigration to Korea,” In Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., 
Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies (New York: Taylor 
and Francis, 2005), 25-40. 
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still far from each other.8 The projects of emigration, instead, were initially argued based 
on the concerns of national defense, development of borderlands and short-term 
economical reasons. It was the opportunity of Japan’s imperial expansion and the demand 
of spaces for racial competition that enabled overseas emigration to become a solution to 
overpopulation.  
         In a few articles penned in 1896, a year after the empire seized Taiwan, Fukuzawa 
Yukichi stressed the importance of space for the survival of a nation. According to the 
rule of biology, Fukuzawa argued, a species always had a quantitative limitation over its 
propagation within a certain space. “There is a limitation on how many golden fish can be 
breed in a pond. In order to raise more, [the breeder] either needs to enlarge the pond or 
to build a new one.”9 “The same is true for human beings,” he continued. Listing the 
national demographical data from 1874 to 1884, he showed that the Japanese population 
was increasing annually at the rate of almost 400,000. “On the one hand, Japan’s territory 
is limited, and on the other hand, the population grows in such a rapid speed. Under this 
situation, sooner or later the population will reach the quantitative limit and stop 
reproducing.”10  
        However, population growth, Fukuzawa reminded his readers, was also crucial for a 
nation’s prosperity. “There is no nation in human history that achieved substantial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid, 27. 
9  Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa Zenshū, vol. 15 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1961), 347. 
10 Ibid, 350. 
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success with insufficient population.”11 Once the population stoped growing, he warned, 
the nation started declining. To keep growing in national power, it was necessary to 
secure the continuing reproduction of the population and prepare to avoid situations that 
stoped population growth. The domestic population of England, Fukuzawa pointed out, 
was even smaller than Japan. The unmatched prestige and power it achieved around the 
world depended on the vibrant reproductivity of the Anglo-Saxon race. “Due to the 
limitation of the domestic territory, they either conquer foreign lands with force or 
explore them as their colonies, and conduct programs to export people there. [The 
success of UK now] is a result of conducting such policies for hundreds of years.”12 
          Fukuzawa believed that Japan should follow the example of the UK and prepare 
for overseas emigration.13 For him, migrating people overseas was far from abandoning 
them due to domestic population pressure. It was, instead, a strategy for national 
prosperity. These emigrants were a long-term resource for the nation, who would 
contribute to Japan not only by bringing back their savings but also by smoothing the 
political and economical relations between Japan and the host nations.14  
         The agenda of overseas emigration was also an essential part of Fukuzawa’s 
blueprint to construct Japanese nationality (kokutai). He believed that besides 
authentication of the imperial line, it was necessary for Japan to have a kokutai, “a race of 
people of similar feelings, the creation of a distinction between fellow countrymen and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid, 351 
12 Ibid, 351. 
13  Ibid, 351. 
14  Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa Yukichi zenshū, vol. 9. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1960), 459-
460. 
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foreigners, the fostering of more cordial and stronger bonds with one’s countrymen than 
with foreigners.”15 Such sentiment of kokutai, Fukuzawa argued, “may originate in 
similarity of physical characteristics, or religion, or language, or geography. Although the 
reason may differ from country to country, the most important factor is for a race of 
people to pass through a series of social forms and share a common past.”16  
        Fukuzawa’s characterization of such Japaneseness is closely tied to emigration. He 
described common Japanese people as settled and not willing to travel around. Instead of 
taking adventures, he argued, “they like enjoying peaceful family life.”17 He further 
pointed out that while some people believed that the Japanese were not suitable for 
emigration based on their character, this was a misleading perception. Comparing the 
character of the French and the British, he argued that while the French liked taking 
adventures and traveling around, and did not have strong ties with family, the British, on 
the other hand, were more satisfied with family life and getting settled. Because of such a 
character, the British colonial expansion was much more successful than the French, 
since they were willing to settle wherever they went, and established families and 
communities there. The Japanese people, whose character was closer to the British, were 
thus the ideal people for colonial expansion. 18 
        Fukuzawa invented the Japanese nationality not only to ground his call for overseas 
emigration but also to secure these emigrants as a permanent resource of the nation. A 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Naoki Sakai, Brett de Bary, Iyotani Toshio, eds., Deconstructing Nationality (Ithaca: Cornell 
University, 2005), 3. 
16 Ibid, 4. 
17 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa zenshū, vol. 15, 354. 
18 Fukuzawa Yukichi, Fukuzawa zenshū, vol. 15, 352-354. 
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key to maintaining the emigrants’ loyalty to Japan, argued Fukuzawa, was to export 
Japanese native religions with them. Building Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines could 
guarantee that they would not lose their original view and ties with Japan and settle in 
foreign lands comfortably.19 Fukuzawa also proposed that Japanese government should 
expand Japan’s sea routes and send emigrants out by Japan’s own ships. The native ships, 
he believed, were more convenient than foreign ships, and could provide emigrants a 
sense of home and help them keep their original Japanese life styles and also their ties 
with Japan and each other. He further stressed the necessity of using national power and 
resource to protect these emigrants. As he argued, 
Spending money to protect people’s emigration may seem useless for now. But 
in the future, the development of lands [by the emigrants] will lead to the increase 
of local productivity and population and the prosperity of trade between [the 
hosting societies] and Japan, the benefit [for Japan] can hardly be calculated… It is 
just like sowing the seeds of prosperity. Since we can surely expect lush harvests 
after the seeds take some time to sprout and grow, we should absolutely not be 
stingy [in protecting the emigrants].20  
 
        It is through this metaphor of farmer and seeds that the dispersed lives of the 
overseas emigrants were associated with the nation. Fukuzawa’s construction of Japanese 
nationality and representation of the Japanese as an expansive race just like the British 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Ibid, 361-62. 
20  Ibid, 374. 
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further legitimized the empire’s expansion through emigration. It facilitated Japan’s 
mission of “spreading civilization” following the example of the western powers. By 
comparing Japan with the British empire, Fukuzawa reproduced the imperial hierarchy 
between the West and Japan and applied it in Japan’s relationship with the rest part of the 
world.21 He further pointed out that unenlightened and unexplored places in China, 
Korea, Southeast Asia, and even as far as South America and Africa could all be 
destination of Japanese emigrants.22 The program of emigration, he further stressed, was 
not merely to migrate people, but also to export custom and language. For example, he 
suggested that in migrant destinations, it is essential that Japanese emigrants keep 
speaking Japanese themselves not just for convenience, but also to make local people 
speak Japanese so as to expand Japan’s power around the world. 
 
The Emigration to Hawaii and North America and the making of Japanese national 
essence 
       The fondness of western learning and fever of westernization, advocated by 
Fukuzawa, was followed by strong nativist backlashes in the end of the 19th century. 
Under the disappointment with the government’s failure to revise Japan’s unequal treaties 
with western powers, hard-liners, represented by organizations such as Seikyōsha (The 
Society of Politics and Education), proposed a different way of national development. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Fukuzawa Yukichi, “On De-Asianization,” Meiji Japan Through Contemporary Sources, vol. 
II (Tokyo: Yunesuko Higashi Ajia Bunka Kenkyū Sentā, 1964), 129-133. 
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Instead of kokutai, ideologues of Seikyōsha translated the term nationality as kokusui 
(national essence). The importation of western values, they argued, might lead Japan to 
lose its ideological independence. Instead, Japan should pursue national independence 
and prosperity based on kokusui, Japan’s own value and culture.23 These Seikyōsha 
thinkers’ plans for Japanese empire building and their ideas of the relationship between 
nation and individuals were also developed based on Japanese emigrant experience of the 
day.  
        Emigration was a crucial resource to promote the Seikyōsha thinkers’ version of 
national education. While they believed in the central role of Japanese tradition and 
culture in the development of the nation, they did not deny the overall necessity of 
western learning. Advocating national essence, a Seikyōsha thinker Shiga Shigetaka 
argued, “does not mean that we want to completely maintain all the old elements in 
Japanese tradition. Instead, we propose to use the national essence as the container to 
digest the elements imported from the West and assimilate them into the body of 
Japanese culture.”24 Emigrant experience was an ideal way of such cultural digestion. To 
promote Japanese labor migration to Hawaii, Shiga argued that in addition to solving 
domestic population pressure and bringing the nation remittance from abroad, Hawaiian 
emigration was particularly useful to train and educate the lower and working class 
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Japanese. On the one hand, this emigration could familiarize them with standardized and 
regulated working methods used in the west. It would eventually enhance the overall 
quality of the Japanese working class. On the other hand, the emigrant experience would 
enlighten them with knowledge of the outside world and stimulate their spirit for 
overseas expedition.25   
        Shiga further believed that the fate of Japan’s modernization relied on the 
independent spirit of individual Japanese, who respected other nations and cultures 
without losing the self-dignity and patriotism as Japanese by maintaining the particular 
virtues of Japanese tradition and culture.26 In order to mold Japanese nationals with this 
independent spirit, as Shiga indicated, it was imperative to reform Japan’s current 
national education system. Meiji government’s national education policy, he argued, was 
inconsistent at best. Its shift from complete westernization to complete nativist education 
led to both disorders in education system and the failure to make contributions to the 
nation. Such shift, Shiga pointed out, could only produce narrow-minded subjects 
(shinmin), not nationals (kokumin) with independent spirits.27  
       It was, however, through the educational issue of Japanese emigrants in Hawaii that 
Shiga launched his direct attack on the Meiji government’s education policy and 
proposed his solution.28 In 1903, Japanese government decided to apply the government-
issued textbooks for elementary schools in domestic Japan to the elementary schools in 	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Japanese communities in Hawaii. 29 Opposing this policy, Shiga argued, “Japan’s original 
educational ideology is narrow, stubborn and insular, [as a result,] Japanese were not told 
about foreign affairs. They are, instead, generally selfish and never think about making 
any contributions to that land (Hawaii).”30  Such insular education, conducted among 
Japanese immigrants in Hawaii through the government-issued textbooks, Shiga 
believed, was the fundamental problem that caused the anti-Japanese campaigns in the 
US.31 In other words, the exclusion of Japanese immigrants in the US signified the failure 
of Japan’s contemporary national education. 
        Instead of using the textbooks issued by the Japanese government, Shiga proposed 
that the education of Japanese emigrants in Hawaii should combine the values of both 
Japan and the West. “The essence of western civilization, such as the application of 
technologies, machines, omission of tiresome etiquette, and habits of time keeping and 
living a regulated life, can be used to remedy the biggest shortcoming of the Japanese.”32 
Shiga further argued, 
As it is well known, Japan is geographically located at the joint point of the East 
and the West. In particular, the Japanese emigrants in Hawaii, who live in the West 
with the bodies of the East, should select and embody the advantages of both the 
East and the West and become the pioneers of reconciling eastern and western 
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civilizations.33  
 
Therefore, for Shiga, combining the elements of eastern and western civilizations 
was not just an educational plan for Japanese emigrant education in Hawaii. More 
importantly, it was also the blueprint of Japanese national education, which produces the 
ideal Japanese nationals with “independent spirits.” The Japanese emigrants in Hawaii, 
accordingly, were the pioneers of this education.  
       While admitting the nationalist elements in Shiga’s idea of national essence, 
historian Okita Yukuji celebrates his proposal of combining eastern and western 
civilizations in Japanese national education as a significant attempt toward Japan’s 
internationalization, dwarfing other “narrow-minded” nationalistic ideologies of the 
day.34 However, it is still necessary for us to put Shiga’s plan of national education into 
the context of his ideology of national essence, which emerged under the assumption of 
the competition among nations and races. His “cosmopolitan” agenda of education 
reform was, after all, designed to create ideal Japanese nationals (kokumin) and to serve 
his plan of Japan’s empire building through emigration.  
        It is also worth noting that American exclusion of Japanese immigrants was not 
merely translated into the failure of Japanese national education. It also convinced 
Seikyōsha thinkers that Japan’s equal partnership with the western powers would not be 
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obtained through diplomatic negotiation or friendship, but could only be achieved 
through Japan’s own colonial expansion.35 Such necessity of colonial expansion was 
grounded by the perceived emergency to prepare for racial competition with the West, 
Japan’s colonial emigration was a crucial step in the attempt to win this competition.  
        In his letter to Shiga Shigetaka, Nagasawa Betten, another Seikyōsha ideologue 
studied at Stanford University in 1891, argued based on his observation in California, 
      While the competition between nations is apparent, the competition between 
races still remains invisible. For the apparent, people take it seriously and get 
prepared for it. But for the invisible, only experts can see it and thus few efforts are 
made for the preparation. Moreover, the most important point lies not in the former 
but the latter…Living among people of other races, my sense of the emergency (of 
preparing for racial competition) increases day by day.  So the emergent task now, 
as you has advocated, is to promote our national essence on the one hand, and to 
inspire our countrymen's spirit of outward expansion on the other hand.36 
 
         Nagasawa’s perception of racial competition, however, was not simply that the 
Japanese should combat equally with all other races in the world. Instead, it entailed the 
rivalry of the Japanese with the white/Aryan races on the one hand and Japan’s leadership 
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among the yellow races on the other hand. Such racial ideology was substantially formed 
through his observation of Asian immigrant communities in the US and his responses to 
American exclusion campaigns of the Chinese and Japanese immigrants.  
        In several articles in Ajia, the official journal of Seikyōsha, Nagasawa analyzed the 
social and political reasons behind American exclusion of the Japanese immigrants. He 
argued that most of the advocates of Japanese exclusion were new immigrants from 
Germany, Spain, and Ireland, who lost in the battle of survival in their home countries 
before migrating to the US. Due to their lack of education, they did not really know about 
Japan, even considering Japan a part of China.  
         In order to change his domestic readers’ negative image of Japanese immigrants in 
the US, Nagasawa described the “success” of Japanese immigrants in the US by the 
comparison with the local Chinese immigrants. While the Chinese were mostly the slaves 
of money, respecting nothing other than profits, he argued, the majority of the Japanese 
were diligent students and businessmen with good morality and decent character. While 
there were a small number of Japanese immigrants conducting shameful behaviors such 
as getting drunk, frequenting brothels, or gambling, most of them were decent people, 
making progress in their study and business and earning respect from local Americans. 37 
In order to maintain such a progressive image of the Japanese race, Nagasawa further 
urged the Japanese government to pay close attention to the quality of Japanese emigrants 
to the US, and issue passports to them selectively. Otherwise, he warned, it may lead to 	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the passage of anti-Japanese acts, just like the Chinese exclusion Act, which would 
become a national shame for Japan.38 
        To reinforce the hierarchy and difference between the Japanese and Chinese, he 
penned a series of essays in Ajia, titled “Sōkō Yōmakai” (literally meaning “Ogre Street 
in San Francisco”), depicting the “uncivilized” and “backward” life of the Chinese 
immigrants in San Francisco’s Chinatown, a life filled with prostitution, gambling, 
fortune telling, dirty food, contract killing and other crimes. 39 Defining the Chinese as 
against the trend of human progress, Nagasawa concluded, “the future of the Chinese, no 
matter in terms of their survival, their trade, their physical labor, or their development of 
language, is indeed a subject to research. Since this research will make sure to prevent the 
emergence of such a strange phenomena in the end of the twentieth century.” 
       The future of the Japanese, on the contrary, was to lead the yellow races to win the 
racial competition with Aryans. As the pioneers of the yellow races, it was also their 
responsibility (shimei) to do so.40 “Even if it turns out that our race is not as competitive 
as the Aryan race,” Nagasawa positively perceived, 
 We can still catch up within a period of time…Colonial migration is the most 
effective way to prepare for racial competition, compared with improving 
education, strengthening national defense, increasing industrialization or expanding 
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sea routes,…. Once our fellow Japanese live and settle throughout the world, it 
doubtlessly means that we triumph in the racial competition.41  
 
        The government, argued Nagasawa, should take its responsibility to protect the 
emigrants abroad in order to materialize their contribution to the nation. After the 
monarchy of Hawaii Kingdom was overthrown by American residents in the island in 
1893, Nagasawa urged the Japanese government to send a special diplomat with full 
capacity to Hawaii to negotiate with the newly established republic government in the 
island for the suffrage of the Japanese emigrants there. Given the Japanese population of 
20,000 on the island, Nagasawa argued, a few Japanese congressmen or even ministers 
would emerge after five or six generations if the Japanese had suffrage in Hawaii. It 
would not only substantially enhance the power and interests of the Japanese on the 
island, but also transform Hawaii into a station of Japan’s colonial expansion, from which 
the Japanese could further expand to Australia, Mexico, and South America.42  
         
Post-WWI Internationalism and Japan’s “Peaceful” Expansion 
       World War I not only transformed the global imperial discourse, but also led Japan 
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into a process of “national reinvention,” to borrow a word from Frederick Dickinson.43  
While Woodrow Wilson failed to persuade the American Congress of the benefits for the 
United States to join the League of Nations, his ideas of internationalism, pacifism, and 
economism were fully accepted as the core of the new imperial world order.44 Japan’s 
participation in the War and the Peace Conference in Paris afterwards convinced an 
increasing number of Japanese politicians and opinion leaders of the necessity to embrace 
the new world order, characterized by the spirit of international “trust and cooperation.” 
45 As Baron Makino Shinken, Japan’s representative for the Peace Conference, concluded 
shortly before he departed for Paris, “Today it is a worldwide trend to honor pacifism and 
reject oppression. Everywhere in the world the so-called Americanism is advanced, and 
conditions have definitely altered from the days of the old diplomacy.” The new 
diplomacy, as he saw it, followed the principles of “fair play, justice and 
humanitarianism.” 46 
      Japanese leaders, meanwhile, understood that competition would never stop in the 
new world order.47 Yet Seikyōsha hard-liners’ theories of brutal racial competition and 
calls for aggressive expansion were losing their popularity. The voices of Kokusaishugi 
(internationalism), marked by the ideas of Japan’s peaceful expansion through its 
cooperation and reconciliation with western powers, gained an increasing audience in 	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both government and the public. But just like their Seikyōsha opponents, advocates of 
kokusaishugi, too, closely associated this internationalist discourse with their agendas of 
Japan’s nation-making and versions of Japanese national identity. As Frederick 
Dickinson insightfully observes, seizing the transformation of global imperial discourse 
during World War I as “a golden opportunity,” Japanese party politicians like Kato 
Takaaki and Hara Takashi advocated the economy-oriented, pro-Wilsonism diplomacy to 
support their domestic political battle against the rule of Meiji oligarchs.48 Such change in 
foreign policy, therefore, had substantial impact on Japanese ruling elites on the whole in 
the 1920s in their plans of national development. Politicians and bureaucrats were 
repeatedly arguing for the importance of “ producing and selling superior merchandise” 
to contribute to “the common welfare of mankind” and the necessity of abandoning the 
outdated mentality of “emotionalism, irrationalism and traditionalism.”49 Even top 
military officials, such as Matsui Iwane, proposed in 1923 to substitute “economic 
conquest for military invasion, financial influence for military control,” and achieve 
Japan’s success under the slogans of international “friendship” and “cooperation.” 50 
        Similar to their Seikyōsha opponents, many Japanese ideologues of internationalism 
also saw overseas emigration as an essential part of their blueprints for national 
development. As Nitobe Inazō, a prominent scholar of colonial studies and an influential 
internationalist in Japan, argued in 1919,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Frederick Dickinson, War and National Reinvention, 245-246. 
49 Akira Iriye, “The Failure of Economic Expansionism: 1918-1931,” 245. 
50 Ibid, 245. 
46	  	  
	  
 
        While it is needless to say that our nation is a small island nation surrounded 
by sea, our countrymen lack the ideas of overseas development even compared with 
continent peoples. The indifference of our fellow Japanese toward the world aboard 
resulted from the sakoku (closing country) policy adopted by previous politicians 
that forbade people from going overseas. However, we now have to throw away 
such insularity, cultivate the spirit of internationalism and try to leap a great step 
forward for overseas development…In planning our overseas development, we can 
never dispense with the issue of colonial migration. Since the two were closely 
associated with each other. 51 
 
        Similar to Nagaswa Betten, Nitobe opposed exporting people abroad unselectively. 
He believed that some of the emigrants, such as prostitutes, exposed Japan’s “national 
shame” on the international stage. “The emigrants that I admire are those already have 
decent social status in Japan and migrate overseas not because of their wrong doings at 
home but because of the goal to establish their careers abroad.”52 Echoing Nitobe, Inoue 
Masaji, the manager of the Japanese South Asia Company also believed that people with 
outstanding records in schools or their careers should be selected for overseas 
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emigration.53 He further encouraged the youth of Japan to achieve their success aboard 
instead of at home, since the hardship of life abroad would enable them to abolish the 
mind of insularity, temper their willpowers and strengthen their spirits. 54 Overseas 
emigration, Inoue believed, was a necessary experience to train the next generation of 
Japanese nationals for the nation’s global expansion. 55 
       Since this internationalism was grounded by the reconciliation and cooperation 
between Japan and the imperial powers in the West in general and the US in particular, 
Japanese emigrants on the American western coast were seen as the symbol of Japan-US 
partnership. As Ōguma Shigenobu argued in 1917,56 their settlement in the US would not 
only promote bilateral trade between Japan and America, but also “eliminate the 
misunderstandings between the two nations and conflicts between the two peoples” and 
enhance the friendship of the two nations so as to contribute to the peace of the world and 
the happiness of mankind.57  
        These emigrants were, more importantly, the national subjects standing in the 
forefront of Japan’s internationalization. They were seen as the “face” of the nation and 
their future would determine the fate of Japan’s overseas expansion. As early as 1905, 
right after Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Abe Isoo, a parliamentarian 
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politician and social reformer, even considered Japanese emigration to the US as 
establishing a new Japan on the other side of the Pacific. Abe argued, Japan was “the 
broker of civilization,” buying it from the American market and then selling it to China 
and Korea and it is natural for the Japanese to hold a base at the western end of the 
American continent.58 Just as America has the mission to spread the blessing of 
civilization to Japan, “Japan, accordingly, has the obligation to export this blessing to the 
Asian continent.”59 In this way, Japan’s expansion on both sides of the Pacific was 
justified through its acceptance of the global hierarchy arranged by the degree of 
westernization and modernization.  
        Since Japanese settlement in the United States was so crucial for the 
internationalists’ plans of Japan’s national development and imperial expansion, how to 
explain and deal with the American anti-Japanese sentiment since the beginning of the 
twentieth century became an emergent issue. Moreover, as Oguma Eiiji astutely points 
out, Japanese intellectuals of the day had to tackle the two-layered racism of 
“discriminating while being discriminated against.” On the one hand, as a non-white 
nation Japan was sending emigrants to the US who were deprived of the rights to acquire 
citizenship based on their race. On the other hand the Japanese empire held colonies in 
Asia such as Taiwan and Korea, facing the task of internalizing or assimilating the 
different racial groups in the colonies. 60 This contradiction left some Japanese 
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internationalist thinkers attempting to integrate their solutions to these two racial issues, 
calling for the racial equality between Japanese immigrants and white Americans and at 
the same time justifying Japan’s racial policies toward the Koreans and Taiwanese.  
         Having studied in the United States and United Kingdom and worked as a professor 
at Meiji University, Uehara Etsujirō was elected to the House of Representatives in the 
Imperial Diet in 1917 and became a democratic politician. He believed that white racism 
was not the main reason for the anti-Japanese sentiment. The sentiment, argued Uehara, 
instead resulted from the traditionalism and insularity of the Japanese immigrants 
themselves. They lived together, completely separate from white American communities. 
Many of them did not pay attention to local culture and affairs and had no intention to 
become permanent residents or citizens. Japanese immigrants’ failure of being 
assimilated to the American society was rooted in their insularity. While Uemura’s 
solution to the anti-Japanese sentiment was simply that Japanese immigrants should 
abandon their living patterns and assimilate into the American society, the Japanese 
immigrants’ insularity and feudal mind-set, he argued, originated from the traditionalism 
and autocracy of the Japanese political system. 61 By criticizing the “narrow minds” of 
Japanese immigrants, Uehara was problematizing the contemporary Japanese political 
system itself. His proposal of Japanese immigrants’ assimilation to the American society, 
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accordingly, suggested his call to reform Japan through American political principles. 62 
         Democracy, meantime, according to Uehara, would help to assimilate the Koreans 
into the Japanese empire. Japan’s colonial governance of Korea through “military force 
and police authority” was “out of step with world posture.” He believed that Japanese 
racial prejudice against the Koreans, too, resulted from the remnants of feudalism in 
Japan. A democratic political system in the empire would eliminate all distinctions and 
allow the Koreans who “lagged behind” to advance in step with the Japanese. 63 Thus, 
Uehara’s global hierarchy of nation and race was based on the degree of modernization 
and democratization. In his ranking of the United States⎯Japan⎯Korea, 
democratization of the Japanese political system would not only enable Japanese 
immigrants to assimilate into white American society but also legitimize and refine 
Japanese imperial rule in Korea.  
        If Uehara considered the issue of Japanese exclusion in the US an emergent call for 
democratizing the Japanese empire, Harada Tasuku, another passionate advocator of 
internationalism, believed the American anti-Japanese sentiment symbolized the failure 
of not only Japan’s political system but also its traditional morality. While teaching at the 
University of Hawaii as a professor of Japanese history and East Asian religions, Harada 
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Shibuzawa Ei’ichi, a prominent Japanese businessmen and opinion leader.64 In the 
pamphlet that he wrote after the investigation, Harada suggested that Japanese 
immigrants should work hard to assimilate into American society by learning English and 
respecting the American culture and political system. They should give up the mindset of 
sojourning and prepare to settle permanently by changing the “unhealthy” and 
“unbalanced” life styles. 65 Further, he urged, the Japanese government should abandon 
the policies of “militarism” and “imperialism,” “improve Japan’s cultural and social 
facilities…,” “raise people’s status” and “eliminate any evidence showing that Japan is 
living a life isolated from the world.” 66 
        Harada’s advice to Japanese immigrant communities and Japanese government 
policies was closely tied to his proposal of reforming Japan’s national morality, which 
Harada called Japan’s “third restoration.” Harada saw the new era brought by the end of 
World War One as the third turning point in Japanese history following the Taika Reform 
and the Meiji Restoration.” In the essay “The Third Restoration” published in Nippu Jiji, 
a major Japanese immigrant newspaper in Hawaii in 1922, “The current restoration is not 
merely driven by the request in domestic Japan, but driven by the general trend of the 
world.”67 In order to achieve the political goal of democracy at home and pacifism abroad, 
Harada proposed, Japan had to change the nation-centered principles in its national 
education system into individual-centered principles. To achieve this transformation, it 
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should reward “progressive moral doctrines following the trend of the common course of 
humankind and spirits that respect individualism.”68 The completion of the “third 
restoration,” therefore, was attributed to the internationalization of the nation-centered 
Japanese morality. 69 
       It is not a coincidence that Harada’s call for this new national “restoration” was 
voiced via a Japanese immigrant newspaper in Hawaii. As Okita Yukuji has insightfully 
pointed out, Harada’s plan to reform Japan’s national education should be understood 
through his experience of dealing with the anti-Japanese sentiment in the US. His ideas of 
transforming Japanese national morality, proposed when he was teaching at the 
University of Hawaii as a professor, were developed hand in hand with his efforts to 
integrate Japanese immigrant education in Hawaii into the American national education 
system. 70 
        As an enthusiastic Christian educator, Harada believed that the internalization of 
Japan should be achieved by Christian universalism. He argued, “We must adopt a 
universal religion that transcends the national boundaries and have the broad mind to 
adopt the religion that benefits general human beings, no matter if it is domestic or 
foreign, no matter which race it originally belonged to. Such a mind is particularly 
necessary for the people of an expanding nation [like us], since we cannot use an ethnic 
religion that only works for Japan to civilize people in other nations. From now on, our 
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national religion has to be the one that can best demonstrate the sense of humanity.”71 
Christianity, a universal religion, thus was a perfect fit for the Japanese, an expansive 
people. 
        This Christian internationalism was, in other words, just a way to achieve his goal of 
promoting Japan’s national expansion and fostering its national consciousness. Such an 
ideology of internationalism as means and nationalism as ends was further testified to by 
his efforts to negotiate Christian belief and Japanese nationalism centered on the emperor 
system. He contended, 
                 Our nation has to be based on universal justice, and I believe that Christianity 
is the best religion to demonstrate our universal justice. I do not think there are any 
contradictions between Christianity and the spirit to obey the intent of His 
Majesty’s Rescripts.  Christians in Japan are faithful followers of Jesus Christ and 
at the same time the loyal subjects of His Majesty and patriots of Japan. 72  
  
         Many Japanese Christians of the day, just like Harada, believed Christianity should 
become the core of Japan’s new national identity. In their evangelical projects for Japan, 
the Japanese overseas, once again, became an important target to begin with. The 
following section will elaborate how these Christian thinkers and missionaries tied their 
evangelical campaigns on Japanese emigrants abroad to their eventual goal of 
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Christianizing the nation at home.  
 
Japanese Christian Missions in Hawaii, Taiwan and California and Their Ambitions 
at Home 
        Japanese Christians started to send evangelical missions abroad in the late 19th 
century. Their initial targets for conversion were exclusively Japanese emigrants.73 Like 
the early Japanese overseas emigrants who planned to return home after making enough 
money, the Japanese Christian missionaries who went abroad to convert them had a 
similar sojourning mentality. These overseas missions, they believed, would finally bring 
God’s gospels back to Japan.  As Okabe Jirō, a missionary preaching among Japanese 
contract laborers in Hawaii, voiced his ambitions at home from abroad in 1891, “Being a 
villager of an isolated island in Hawaii, I feel the ultimate happiness in observing the 
transformation of our countrymen. Because if we cannot change this isolated island in 
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Hawaii, we cannot change Japan.”74 
       The significance of the Christian missions abroad was not only considered in terms 
of conducting evangelical campaigns, but also in terms of forming Japanese national 
consciousness and bringing the national education to the overseas emigrants. Another 
Japanese missionary, Okumura Takie, lamented in 1895,  
                 While the education system in our nation has been widely extended and 
schools have been established in even very isolated areas in domestic Japan, it is 
unfortunate that the thirty thousand emigrants and their four hundred children [in 
Hawaii], who were also fellow imperial subjects, cannot have such favor…If they 
do not read the motherland’s language, do not learn the motherland’s etiquette, how 
can they understand the motherland’s history and geography? ”75  
 
        To prevent these emigrants and their children from losing the identity as “imperial 
subjects,” with the support of the local Japanese consulate and Japanese businessmen, 
Okumura established a Japanese language school for the emigrants’ children in Honolulu 
in 1896 and managed it for decades. 76  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Kirisutokyō Shinbun 435 (November, 1891), cited from Sugii Rokurō, Kaigai Imin to Nihon 
Kirisutokyōkai no Kenkyū, (Kyoto: Doshisha Daigaku Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, 1987), 11. 
75 Ibid, 11. 
76 Okumura Takie, Onchō Nanajū Nen (Kyoto: Naigai Shuppan Insatsu Kabushiki Geisha, 1937), 
35-37. It should be pointed out that the educational principle of Okumura’s school was shifted 
from cultivating “imperial subjects” of Japan to teaching Japanese language to the American 
citizens with Japanese origins during the competition with local Japanese Buddhist schools since 
the late 1900s. Okumura began to criticize the “pure Japanese national education” of the latter, 
56	  	  
	  
         In a similar way, when Japan seized Taiwan after defeating the Qing Empire in 
1895, a prominent Christian church leader Uemura Masahisa wrote an article to promote 
Japanese Christian missions to the island. He believed that Japan’s colonization of 
Taiwan was the will of God and following the trend of human progression. Meantime, he 
also considered the seizure of Taiwan a great obligation for the Japanese in the future. He 
pointed out, “Under the gaze of other nations, the Japanese are receiving the test from 
God on how to explore and civilize Taiwan. Do our fellow countrymen have the 
qualification to assimilate other races and to constitute a great contribution to the 
progress and happiness of human beings through our own power? ”77 Though Japanese 
Christians were still small in number and weak in power, he urged them to follow the call 
to conduct missionary works in Taiwan, becoming the pioneers in promoting “progress,” 
“justice” and “truth” on the island.78 The initial target of their missions, Uemura believed, 
should be the Japanese colonizers. Since once converted, they would become good 
examples and then bring God’s gospels to the colonized. However, the most important 
task of these Taiwan missions, Uemura added, was not to spread the words of God, but to 
teach the Japanese colonizers to love the nation and devote themselves to serve the 
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nation.79 
         On the other side of the Pacific, the Japanese ethnic Christian churches also played 
an important role in the social and moral education of the local Japanese communities. 
Considering American anti-Japanese sentiment as Japan’s national shame, the churches 
formed the Christian Missionary Union (Kirisutokyōto Dōmei Dendōdan), a cross-
denominational association to address this issue. The union believed that a main reason 
for the Japanese exclusion in the US was moral corruption in Japanese communities such 
as activities involving gambling and prostitution. They thus conducted temperance 
campaigns among Japanese immigrants on the American West Coast.80 Along with the 
intensification of the anti-Japanese sentiment in California, the union actively 
participated in the Enlightenment Movement (Keihatsu Undō) initiated by the Japanese 
American Association (Zaibei Nihonjin Kai).81 The goal of the movement was to appease 
the sentiment by “enlightening” Japanese immigrants with civilized social and moral 
values. It urged them to assimilate into the American society on the one hand and exhibit 
the assimilability of the Japanese race to white Americans, correcting their 
“misunderstandings” of the Japanese immigrants on the other hand.  
         As Yoshida Ryō insightfully points out, the union’s activities of “enlightening” 
Japanese immigrants in the US were closely tied to the Christian evangelical campaigns 	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in domestic Japan. The union sent missionaries back to Japan, who collaborated with 
domestic Christians by holding lectures around the nation to introduce the issue of 
Japanese exclusion in the US. These lectures promoted Christian evangelical campaigns 
in Japan by concluding that Christianity was the only solution to the Japanese American 
exclusion.82  
        On the other hand, the union invited domestic Christian leaders, such as Tsunajima 
Kakichi, Kanamori Michitomo and Ebina Danjō, to come to the US and deliver speeches 
to Japanese immigrants.83 In particular, Kanamori, a leader of the Japanese Salvation 
Army, who was invited to come to the US in 1915, conducted a successful evangelical 
tour among the immigrants. He applied this experience to his domestic evangelical 
campaigns afterward and achieved great success.84 Kanamori’s mission in Japanese 
American communities and his missions in domestic Japan were further tied together 
through his vision of Japanese immigrants as the pioneers of Japanese overseas expansion. 
As he stated upon the conclusion of his mission in the United States,  
        Our fellow countrymen’s society in the United States is the frontier for the 
expansion of our Yamato spirit. Our fellow countrymen in the United States are the 
pioneers of Japanese people’s development. They are the examples of our nation. In 
the same way, my mission in America will be an example for my evangelical 
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campaigns among the 60 million countrymen in the motherland.85  
 
        The director of the union, Kobayashi Seisuke, further praised Kanamori’s tour for 
“not only using Christian salvation to rescue the heart of Japanese immigrants but also 
becoming the ‘fuse’ for turning Japan into the kingdom of God.”86 
 
Nationalism and Internationalism in Japan’s Emigrant Expansion 
        Whether Fukuzawa’s construction of Japan’s nationality, or Seikyōsha ideologues’ 
adoration of national essence, or the internationalists’ promotion of reforming Japan’s 
education through the principles of universal humanism, different Japanese thinkers from 
the late 19th century to the first two decades of the 20th century integrated their plans of 
overseas emigration into their agendas of Japanese nation making and empire building. 
The Japanese overseas emigrants were far from being abandoned or neglected by 
mainstream thinkers in Japan of the day. In fact, where in the world to export emigrants 
and how to educate and make use of them for the nation were crucial to their plans of 
forming and reforming Japan’s national identity. 
        Scrutinizing the emigrant thoughts of different thinkers also enables us to see the 
intrinsic connections and uniformity between the seemingly contradictory ideologies such 
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as Kokusuishugi and Kokusaishugi. The former, propagated by Seikyōsha thinkers, 
enthroned Japanese cultural particularity and considered it core to the reconstruction of 
Japan’s national identity. The nation united and empowered by its cultural essence, they 
believed, would better compete with western imperial powers and expand globally. The 
latter, advocated by the internationalists, on the other hand, proposed to reform the nation 
and facilitate its expansion through reconciliation and cooperation with western powers 
under the principles of pacifism and humanism. Both trends of thoughts, however, aimed 
to solidify and strengthen the imagination of the national community by giving the nation 
a new identity. This is why two influential books which attempting to define the 
distinctive essence of the “Japaneseness,” Nihon Fūkei Ron (The Study of the Japanese 
Landscape) (1894) and Bushido (1900) coming out at the turn of the twentieth century 
were written by prominent thinkers from both sides, Shiga Shigetaka and Nitobe Inazō, 
respectively. Both schools considered Japan’s global expansion the ultimate goal, though 
how to achieve it varied. For thinkers of Kokusuishugi and kokusaishugi alike, Japanese 
overseas emigrants were the pioneers of the national expansion. Whether fighting in the 
forefront of national and racial competition or living in the frontier of internationalization, 
their fate was directly tied to the fate of Japan.  
        Both Shiga Shigetaka and Harada Tasuku read Japanese exclusion in the United 
States as a failure of the existing framework of Japan’s national education. The old 
paradigm, they believed, was narrow-minded, insular, and had proved incapable of 
producing competent national subjects for Japan’s survival and expansion in the new era. 
Occupying the crossroads of East and West, Japanese overseas settlement in either 
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Hawaii or the American West, they argued, epitomized Japan’s geopolitical position 
between Asia and the West. Shiga and Harada alike thus proposed to reform the 
education of Japanese immigrants in the United States so that their new types of 
education (though Shiga and Harada differed in their specific plans) would mold the 
Japanese immigrants as loyal, patriotic and at the same time open-minded and 
cosmopolitan subjects of the Japanese nation. These frameworks of education, they 
proposed, should then be transplanted to domestic Japan as models for its national 
education. These successfully educated Japanese immigrants in the United States, in 
other words, should be the ideal Japanese nationals in the new era.  
        Whether it was Seikyōsha thinkers’ theory of racial competition or the 
internationalists’ plan of eliminating racial distinctions through democratization, both 
accepted linearity of human progress based on the western model of civilization and 
modernization. Nagaswa Betten’s call for Japan’s equal rivalry with the Aryans went 
hand in hand with his assumption of Japan’s racial priority and leadership in Asia. 
Uehara Etsujirō proposed to democratize Japan’s political system in order to appease 
American anti-Japanese sentiment on the one hand and assimilate the Koreans into the 
Japanese empire on the other hand. The ideas of Nagasawa and Uehara united under their 
agreement with the global hierarchy of race and nation produced by the Western model of 
human development, in which Japan’s equal partnership/rivalry with the United States (or 
western powers in general) and the racial/cultural precedence of the Japanese over the 
Chinese and Koreans were two sides of one coin.  
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        Therefore, while the discourse of internationalism in Japan in the early 20th century 
advocated the values of pacifism and humanism, it did not tend to transcend national 
boundaries in reality. Adopting the universalistic principle and rhetoric, the 
internationalists sought to find new ways to further strengthen Japan’s national identity 
and buttress the empire’s global expansion. This is why the ideologies of nationalism 
centered on Japan’s cultural essence and internationalism emphasizing on the nation’s 
reconciliation with western powers converged in unexpected ways.  
       While sharing the goals of strengthening Japan’s national identity and its global 
expansion and agreeing on the central role of Japanese overseas emigrants in reforming 
the nation, thinkers of kokusuishugi and kokusaishugi competed with each other on their 
solutions to the Japanese exclusion in the United States.  From promoting national 
essence to advocating internationalism, from democratizing Japanese empire to 
Christianizing Japanese people in both Japan and overseas, however, none of their 
agendas succeeded in preventing the enactment of the Immigrant Act in 1924, which 
closed the American door permanently to any Japanese emigrants afterward. How did 
Japanese thinkers integrate this institutionalization of Japanese exclusion into their 
national ideologies? How did the exclusion change their plans for Japan’s overseas 
expansion in the decades to come? What, in general, did Japanese American immigration 
mean for the Japanese empire in Asia? These questions will be answered in next chapter.
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Chapter 2 
Between Imin and Shokumin 
Shifting Meanings of Japanese American immigration for Japan’s 
Colonial Empire in Asia 
 
        Recent transnational approaches in Japanese American history have deepened our 
understanding of both white racism and Japanese immigrant nationalism. By comparing 
the stories of Japanese American soldiers in the United States with those of Korean 
soldiers in the Japanese empire, Takashi Fujitani shows that mainstream racial discourse 
in both Pacific empires shifted from exclusion to inclusion during the Asia-Pacific War. 
By offering national membership to ethnic minorities, both empires strove to maximize 
their human resources for total war.1 Eiichiro Azuma highlights the interstitial nature of 
Japanese American life. He shows how issei (first generation Japanese Americans) 
leaders mobilized their connections with Japan and embraced Japanese nationalism to 
strengthen their communities against white racism and exclusion.2   
        While drawing on the transnational perspectives in these works, this chapter 
highlights not the lives of Japanese migrants in the US but the shifting meanings of 
Japanese American immigration for Japan’s empire in Asia. These emigrants living 
outside the formal bounds of the Japanese empire were a constant source of contrasting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire, 21-30.  
2 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, 6-9. 
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representations of Japan and Japan’s relationship to both Asia and the West. 
Divergence and convergence of emigration and colonial migration, late 19th century 
to the 1910s 
        As Azuma has astutely observed, the western concepts of “emigration”  (imin) and 
“colonial migration” (shokumin) were used interchangeably by many Meiji intellectuals 
to make sense of Japan’s nascent national expansion.3 Japan colonized Hokkaido, 
Okinawa and Taiwan while participating in the global capitalist economy by sending 
labor migrants overseas. The conceptual convergence of “emigration” and “colonial 
migration,” as Azuma illustrates, was particularly prevalent in Japanese American 
migration at the turn of the 20th century, as both people in Japan and in Japanese 
communities in the United States called the Japanese Americans “colonists” instead of 
“immigrants.”4  Such convergence was a product of both official population control and 
popular emigrant ideology that combined individual success abroad with national 
prosperity at home. Government officials and intellectuals viewed Japanese migrant 
laborers to Hawaii and the United States as similar to the surplus population that had 
migrated to Hokkaido and other territorial frontiers in earlier decades.5 Japanese 
advocates of mass emigration to the United States also embraced the colonialist discourse 
to further their nationalist agenda.6 As Abe Isoo proposed in 1905, the Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid, 18.  
4 Ibid, 17-18. 
5 Ibid, 18. 
6 Ibid, 18.  For three types of Japanese colonial thinking that muddled the boundaries between 
emigration and colonial migration, see Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development,” 
1193-94. Between Two Empires, 20-24. 
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government and people should work together to establish a “new Japan” in the American 
West by dispatching more Japanese there.7 
        While many thinkers viewed colonial migration in the Japanese empire and Japanese 
labor migration to the US interchangeably, others sought to distinguish “emigration” and 
“colonial migration.” While the two terms converged in the promotion of Japanese 
migration to the United States, Japanese intellectuals’ response to Japanese American 
exclusion highlighted a distinction between the two. From the 1900s to the 1930s, 
Japanese intellectuals participated in a complex debate to define, separate and combine 
the terms “emigration” and “colonial migration.” This debate unfolded simultaneously 
with an effort to define Japanese emigration elsewhere within the context of Japanese 
expansion in Asia. Japanese colonial thinkers attempted to integrate Japanese 
communities in the US into the grand narrative of Japanese global expansion. Reviewing 
this debate sheds light not only on the evolution of Japanese colonial ideologies.  It also 
demonstrates how Japanese migration across the Pacific shaped and transformed 
Japanese colonialism in Asia.  
          
 Divergence 
        In the 1890s, a growing number of local newspapers in California expressed fear of 
Japanese “invasion” by noting the parallels between Japanese immigrants and Chinese 
immigrants who had been excluded from the United States in 1882. Japanese male 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Abe Isoo, Hokubei no shin nihon, 119. 
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immigrants were described as being interested only in financial gain with little intention 
of long-term residence. The female immigrants were believed to be engaged in 
prostitution.8 Viewing such American sentiment as contrary to Japan’s claim of equal 
status with the West, some Japanese intellectuals started to detach Japanese American 
migration from mainstream Japanese expansion. Japanese American migration was 
labeled “imin” (emigration) and was contrasted sharply with “shokumin” (colonial 
migration), the desirable form of overseas migration.   
        Renowned politician and journalist Shimada Saburō complained in 1900 that Japan 
only exported uneducated laborers and shameful prostitutes and that the Japanese people 
did not yet understand the true meaning of “colonial migration.” “Emigrants” like 
laborers and prostitutes who stayed abroad temporarily were not, as some believed, 
pioneers of Japanese colonization. On the contrary, they threatened Japan’s real colonial 
future by sullying the image of the Japanese people.9  
        While Shimada distinguished “emigration” and “colonial migration” on grounds of 
temporary or permanent residency, scholar of colonial studies Yamauchi Ken made a 
distinction based on political affiliation. He described colonial migration as a particular 
type of emigration in which the host society was politically affiliated with the country of 
origin.10 Japanese American migration did not, therefore, qualify as colonial migration.11 
Only colonial migration, Yamauchi argued, could make Japan strong in the 20th century. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, 36. 
9 Shimada Saburō, Shokumin Shinron (Tokyo: Keiseisha, 1900), 143-146.  
10 Yamauchi Ken, Shokumin Seisaku Hanron (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1908), 26. 
11 Ibid, 49. 
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12 
        Under the lead of former foreign minister Enomoto Takeaki, a group of prominent 
politicians, bureaucrats, influential journalists and entrepreneurs established the Colonial 
Association (Shokumin Kyōkai) in 1894. As indicated by the title, the association hoped 
to replace Japan’s contract labor migration to Hawaii and North America with colonial 
migration. It defined contract labor migration as “teiki imin” (temporary migration) and 
permanent overseas settlement as “teijū shokumin”(settler colonization). The association 
believed that while temporary migration could bring short-term benefit, it could not meet 
long term national goals. “Settler colonization,” on the other hand, would solve Japan’s 
population problem, expand the nation’s sea routes, promote international trade and 
transform the insular outlook of the Japanese people into a united and outward-looking 
spirit.13 To promote permanent Japanese settlement overseas, the association sponsored a 
series of investigative tours and expeditions and held public lectures and speeches to 
disseminate information abroad.14 While the Colonial Association’s horizons were 
worldwide, it viewed Latin America and, in particular, Mexico, with special interest. 
Association president Enomoto considered Mexico a land of potential untouched by 
western imperial power. In the context of anti-Japanese campaigns in Hawaii and the US, 
Mexico seemed an ideal option for Japanese migration without the risk of incurring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid, 2. 
13 “Shokumin Kyōkai Setsuritsu Shuisho,” Shokumin Kyōkai Hōkoku, vol.1, reprinted, (Tokyo: 
Fuji Shuppan,1986): 105-107. 
14 Kodama Masaaki, Shokumin Kyōkai Hōkoku Kaisetsu, Sōmokuji, Sakuyin (Tokyo: Fuji 
Shuppan, 1987), 12-13. 
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western wrath.15 Enomoto even began a private campaign to purchase Mexican land and 
promote permanent Japanese peasant settlement, but the crusade failed because of poor 
timing and financial difficulties. 16 
 
 Convergence 
        If many in Japan worried about the status of Japanese migrants abroad, there were 
also optimists who believed that Japanese “manifest destiny” could be realized in the 
American west. Scholar of Chinese studies Uchida Tetsusaburō argued in 1894 that 
Japanese immigrants could learn the lesson of Chinese exclusion and become respected 
laborers in the US.17 As long as they maintained their social virtues and demonstrated 
diligence and special skills, Uchida believed, Japanese immigrants, whether permanent or 
temporary, could attain this respect.18 Uchida used the terms emigration (imin/ijū) and 
colonial migration (shokumin) interchangeably to describe Japanese migration around the 
world, including North and South America, Hawaii, and Australia.19 He viewed North 
America as a particularly promising destination for Japanese migration because of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid, 8-9.  
16 Daniel Masterson, Japanese in Latin America (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois 
Press, 2003), 27-28.  
17 Uchida Tetsusaborō, Kita Taiheiyō Engan Shokumin Saku (Tokyo: Aikawa Ryūmondō, 1894), 
reprinted in Okuizumi Eisaburō, Shoki Zaibei Nihonjin no Kiroku/Hokubei Hen (Tokyo: Bunsei 
Shoin, 2009), 14-20. 
18 Ibid, 34-35. 
19 Ibid, 2-3.  
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mild climate and rich farmland and anticipated substantial Japanese economic gain from 
the migration.20 
        While optimists saw Japanese migration to the US as emigration, not colonial 
migration, they valued emigration as important preparation for colonial migration. Tōgō 
Minoru, a colonial thinker and politician who once served in the Japanese colonial 
government in Taiwan, saw Japanese American migration as a necessary step for Japan’s 
worldwide development. Drawing upon the definition of emigration in the Japanese civil 
code, he noted that emigration referred only to temporary Japanese labor migration to 
countries other than China and Korea. Echoing Shimada and Yamauchi, Tōgō believed 
that emigration was temporary in nature and did not require political affiliation or cultural 
hierarchy between Japan and the receiving countries. Colonial migration, by contrast, 
required permanent Japanese settlement and political dependence by the host country on 
Japan.21 Unlike Shimada and Yamauchi who considered emigration useless, Tōgō was 
pragmatic. While admitting that emigration differed fundamentally from the agrarian 
colonial migration that he promoted, Tōgō argued that both types of migration were 
closely related. In particular, for an empire with few colonies such as Japan, overseas 
emigration was a useful experiment that would lead to colonial migration in the future. 
        In addition to the economic and experimental benefits of migration, some viewed 
Japanese settlement in the US as crucial evidence of Japan’s cultural ascendency in Asia 
and an important rationale for Japanese colonial expansion. This view was particularly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid, 33. 
21 Tōgō Minoru, Nihon Shokumin Ron (Tokyo: Bunbudō, 1906), 254-256. 
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strong among internationalists in Japan and within Japanese American communities, 
groups that fully embraced the Western world order and its accompanying racial 
hierarchies. In the face of racial discrimination in California, Christian church leaders in 
Japanese American communities encouraged Japanese immigrants to remain in the 
United States and endure the misery. They urged Japanese Americans to work hard to 
assimilate into American society, since assimilability would decide Japan’s national 
destiny and future global development. As a Japanese American Christian leader argued 
in 1913, 
    “Our fellow brethren are now at a turning point. [Whether our race 
will] prosper or perish depends on your decision. Alas, beloved fellow 
brethren, please bear this hardship. We should not leave this place (the 
United States) even if we have to bite rocks. How can we face people in 
our motherland in such an embarrassing situation? Do not leave here 
even if our bones are crushed, so that the colonialism of our Yamato race 
will blossom. This is both the mandate of heaven and the voice of the 
earth. ”22 
 
         In addition to determining Japan’s national destiny, Japanese immigrants’ 
assimilability was seen as a gauge of Japanese civilization. Successful assimilation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 K.K, “Kikaken Mondai to Dōhō no Shōrai,” Shin Ten Chi (September 1, 1913): 4-5, cited from 
Sakaguchi Mitsuru, “Hainichi Mondai to Taihenyō Engan Nihonjin Kirisutokyōdan,” in Doshisha 
Jinbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo, ed., Hokubei Nihonjin Kirisutokyō Undōshi, (Tokyo: PMC Shuppan 
Gabushiki Gaisha, 1991), 253. 
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offered critical evidence of Japan’s membership in the club of “first-class nations” 
(iddōkoku) and a superior position for the Japanese race in the global racial hierarchy. 
Such superiortity would further empower Japan’s colonial expansion: 
       “Our Wars against the Qing and the Russian Empire were 
competitions to win global leadership by military force. Our Yamato race 
has now arrived at an era to compete for world supremacy through 
peaceful conflict. This is a time to test our power in Manchuria, Korea, the 
Philippines, Hawaii and California. Most importantly, with the opening of 
the Panama Canal, immigrants from all over the world flow to the 
American Pacific Coast and compete with each other. We Japanese 
immigrants should face this difficulty and achieve our true development 
by assimilating well into American society.”23 
 
         Not all colonial thinkers agreed to use “emigration” and “colonial migration” to 
divide Japan’s overseas settlements. Pragmatists invented terms such as “overseas 
development” (kaigai hatten) to generalize various forms of migration and to dilute their 
differences. Instead of attributing anti-Japanese sentiment in the US to a specific 
migration pattern, the Japanese Youth Education Association (Nihon Seinen Kyōikukai) 
emphasized the quality of emigrants. Japan, according to the education association, 
should dispatch people with broad knowledge and excellent morality to realize the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid, 249. 
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empire’s worldwide development.24 Japanese subjects should migrate to any country that 
recognized global justice and international law and accepted Japanese settlers, including 
North and South America, Australia, Hawaii, Southeast Asia, Korea and China. 
        Another pragmatic thinker, Kakinishi Tōichirō, agreed with the idea of migrating 
Japanese to all parts of the world. He even refused to use the term “colony” to describe 
areas that Japan had newly conquered, such as Taiwan and Korea:  
       Those who lived in these places, either Chinese or Koreans, differed 
from the Japanese not only in languages and customs but also in over a 
thousand years of history and geography. Nor are there enough Japanese 
immigrants yet. If we look at content instead of theory, these places should 
not be considered the same as Japan proper...Instead, they should be more 
properly called overseas areas (kaigai).25 
 
         The term “overseas areas” was thus used to signify all suitable locations for 
Japanese migration outside of the nation. The central issue in overseas migration, 
Kakinishi believed, was not sovereignty, distance, the pattern of settlement, or length of 
stay, but the coherence of national and individual interests. For him, overseas migration 
aimed not simply to diffuse population pressures or to enable individuals to run 
businesses and achieve personal happiness. It should be a national project involving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Nihon Seinen Kyōikukai, Kaigai Yūhi (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1918), 2.  
25 Kaikinishi Tōichirō, Kaigai Seikatsu Dan (Tokyo: Daiseidō, 1914), 1-2. 
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military, economic and political factors.26 
 
Japanese American Exclusion and Japan’s Ideological Departure from Western 
Imperialism in the 1920s 
        The early 1920s brought an intensification of anti-Japanese campaigns in the US. 
While the 1913 Alien Land Law deprived Japanese farmers in California of the right to 
own land, an updated version of the law in 1920 prohibited leasing land or owning stock 
in companies that acquired agricultural land. The Supreme Court decision on a famous 
lawsuit case “Takao Ozawa v.s. United States” in 1922 denied Japanese Americans 
“white” racial status and clarified their ineligibility for naturalization.27 Such anti-
Japanese campaigns culminated the Immigration Act of 1924 that shut American doors 
permanently to Japanese migration.  
        As Chapter one has illustrated, the 1910s and 20s witnessed the boom of 
internationalism in Japan that called for reconciliation and cooperation with western 
powers. However, the intensification of anti-Japanese campaigns in the US during this 
time also stimulated an opposite trend of thoughts that foundamentally challenged 
western imperial ideologies. These criticisms of western imperialism had a far-reaching 
impact on colonial ideologies and colonial policy-making in the following decades.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid, 173-176.  
27 For the details of the debate on the court, see http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-
bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=260&invol=178 
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Demarcation of Imin and Shokumin 
        In 1921, a year after the enactment of the new Alien Land Law in California, Izumi 
Tetsu described how the terms of emigration and colonial migration had been confused. 
He observed that official pronouncements used only “emigration,” even to refer to 
Japanese colonial settlement in Korea and Taiwan.  In common parlance, by contrast, 
Japanese migration to North and South America and to Japanese exploration in 
Manchuria and Mongolia were all labeled “colonial migration.”28  
        Izumi insisted upon a distinction between emigration and colonial migration. While 
colonial migration meant “to permanently settle within the territory of one’s own nation,” 
emigration meant “to temporarily live in another nation’s territory.”29 One should not call 
part of a civilized nation’s territory the colony of another nation. Though not specifying 
the US, Izumi warned that calling migration to North and South Americas “colonial 
exploration” would infuriate nations in the regions.30 The restriction of the application of 
the term “colonial migration,” however, was accompanied by his appreciation of colonial 
migration as a more desirable migrant practice than emigration: The bulk of his book 
focused on discussing how to refine the empire’s colonial policy and to educate common 
Japanese subjects to deal effectively with indigenous peoples. 
         The Immigration Act of 1924 brought de facto Japanese exclusion, disillusioning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Izumi Tetsu, Shokuminchi Tōji Ron (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1921), 24-25. 
29 Ibid, 26-27. 
30 Ibid, 30-31. 
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even the most optimistic supporters of Japanese American settlement.  Sending Japan’s 
migrants to Latin American countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Brazil became a popular 
solution to the Malthusian anxiety of the nation.31 Some considered exclusion much more 
than a crisis of Japanese emigration. They viewed exclusion as a harbinger of future 
conflict between two Pacific empires. University of Commerce professor Hori Mitsuki 
argued that it threatened Japan’s legitimate overseas development and signified that the 
center of global racial competition had shifted to the Pacific Ocean. 32 Echoing Hori, Kita 
Reikichi, a professor at the Institute of Great Oriental Culture, saw exclusion as the 
product of American racism and imperialism. Viewing the US as Japan’ greatest potential 
enemy, he proposed sending Japan’s surplus population to South Manchuria, Korea, and 
Siberia. These settlers would establish Japanese strongholds in Asia beyond the reach of 
American military attack.33	  Japan could secure these settlements through alliances with 
Russia and China and eventually defeat the United States. 34   
        This shift in the geographic focus of migration once again spurred a distinction 
between “emigration” and “colonial migration.” Although Kita still used emigration as an 
all-encompassing term to describe Japanese overseas migration, he clearly eliminated the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See for example, Asami Torō, Kaigai Hatten no Jissai, (Tokyo: Hōbunkan, 1929). For a more 
detailed discussion of Japanese migration to Latin America from the 1910s to 1930s, see Toake 
Endoh, Exporting Japan: Politics of Emigration toward Latin America (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 2009). 
32  Okamoto Shiro, ed., Jūdai naru Kekka (Tokyo: Minyūsha, 1924), 128-129. 
33 Ibid, 58-59. 
34 Ibid, 60-62. Kanda Masao, a senator in the Imperial Diet voiced a similar agenda. He 
considered this exclusion not merely a shame of Japan but a shame of the entire Asia, and 
asserted that the exclusion act created a perfect timing for Japan to repair its relationship with 
China. He also argued that Japan should improve its colonial policy in Taiwan and Korea by 
respecting the opinions of people in these colonies. See Kanda Masao, “Hainichihō to Zen Ajia 
no Mondai,” Shokumin (August, 1924): 6-9. 
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US from his list of appropriate migration destinations. In 1927, prominent politician and 
former president of Meiji University, Kojima Ken declared that almost no one confused 
these two terms.35 More importantly, this distinction also accompanied a new trend in 
colonial analysis that questioned Japan’s blind obedience to western models and 
proposed a new model based on cooperation and co-prosperity among Japanese and other 
Asians.  
 
The Question of Assimilation and Critique of Western Imperialism   
       Prior to the 1920s, assimilation was proposed as a strategy in colonial Korea and 
Taiwan and celebrated as an ideal solution to anti-Japanese sentiment and to strengthen 
Japanese communities in the US. Although the details of each proposal varied, plans for 
Japanese assimilation in the US and assimilation of Asian peoples in Japanese colonies 
united in their acceptance of the global imperial and racial hierarchy established by 
western powers. 
        Believing that Japan’s future lay in the full adoption of western civilization, Abe 
Isoo considered Japanese immigrants’ assimilation to American society and Japanese 
colonial expansion two sides of the same coin. As he put it crudely in 1905, the goal of 
Japanese global expansion was to spread western civilization to the Asian continent. A 
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well-assimilated Japanese immigrant community in the American West helped Japan buy 
civilization in the US and sell it in China and Korea.36  
        Others, on the other hand, emphasized rivalry with the West and the empire’s Asian 
identity. Japanese American intellectual Ōishi Kiichi in 1916 proposed two types of 
assimilation: absolute (zettaiteki dōka) and relative (sōtaiteki dōka). While the former 
meant to “entirely discard one's original nationality/ethnicity when joining the other 
nation/ethnicity by upgrading or downgrading one’s ethnic status,” the latter called for 
“maintaining one's good (zenryō naru) original nationality/ethnicity and approaching the 
other nation/race by upgrading or downgrading one’s ethnic status.” 37 Based on his 
observations of immigrants in the US, Ōishi argued that while small or weak nations 
should allow their overseas populations to assimilate totally into local societies, it was not 
necessary for great nations like Japan to do so.38 If Japanese immigrants adopted total 
assimilation, it would mean abandonment of self-confidence and dignity as Japanese 
nationals 39 and would jeopardize Japan’s status as a great nation.40 Viewing Japan as the 
leader of Asia, Ōishi asked how it would affect the future of Asia, if the Japanese 
discarded their “spiritual civilization” (seishinteki bunmei) to assimilate with other 
nations. 41 Japanese immigrants should, rather, become model Japanese nationals first and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Abe Isoo, Hokubei no Shin Nihon, 124.  
37 Ōishi Kiichi, Nichibei Mondai Jitsuryoku Kaiketsu Saku, (Tokyo: Sankōdō, 1916), 228.  
38 Ibid, 212.  
39 Ibid, 232.  
40 Ibid, 17. 
41 Ibid, 226. 
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then obey the political and social customs of host nations.42 The fundamental solution to 
anti-Japanese sentiment, Ōishi argued, was for Japan to match American strength at both 
the individual and national levels.  Japanese Americans needed to maintain their pride, 
dignity and confidence as Japanese nationals and as people of the yellow race.43 Overseas 
expansion would facilitate Japan’s position as an equal of the US.44  
        Ōishi did not indicate whether Korea’s overseas population should be “absolutely” 
assimilated into host societies. But the mainstream opinion among colonial scholars and 
strategists in Japan in the 1910s was to meld Korea entirely into Japanese culture and 
identity,45 an idea very close to what Ōishi described as absolute assimilation. Japanese 
colonial thinkers stressed that this assimilation was based on Japanese-Korean racial 
affinity. Both former Prime Minister Ōkuma Shigenobu and president of the Japanese 
Youth Education Association Sawayanagi Seitarō in 1910 believed that since Japanese 
and Koreans belonged to the same ethnicity, Japanese assimilation of Koreans would 
surpass assimilation projects of western empires in other parts of the world.46  
 
        Facing an intensification of anti-Japanese campaigns in the US, however, an 
increasing number of Japanese intellectuals in the 1920s understood that assimilation 
could not stop Japanese exclusion in the US. Such disillusion was accompanied by strong 	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43 Ibid, 213. 
44 Ibid, 19. 
45 Oguma Eiji, Nihonjin no Kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen Shokuminchi Shihai kara 
Fuki Undõ made (Tokyo: Shiyōsha, 1998), 161-166. 
46 Ibid, 162. 
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criticism of assimilation policies in Japan’s Asian colonies.47 Some Japanese thinkers 
began proposing more inclusive colonial policies that respected the social and cultural 
traditions of indigenous peoples and offered them political rights and economic interests. 
        Izumi Tetsu in 1921 identified two schools of colonial thought: assimilationism and 
non-assimilationism.48  Assimilationism, which France had adopted in Southeast Asia 
from the mid-19th century, Izumi believed, was centered on the metropole. Copying the 
institutions and political structures of the metropole in the colonies, assimilationism 
imposed severe financial burdens on the empire and showed no respect for native cultures 
and customs. Izumi criticized Japanese assimilationism in Taiwan, Korea and Karafuto, 
and argued that imposing Japanese culture and customs only spurred resentment among 
indigenous peoples. He urged adoption of non-assimilationism to respect and preserve the 
social and cultural traditions of the colonies. Contrary to assimilationism, non-
assimilationism was colony-centered and would provide financial aid to develop 
indigenous economies and political rights.  
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        Five years later, leading scholar of colonial studies Yanaihara Tadao proposed a 
more nuanced scheme. He divided colonial policies into three categories: subjugation, 
assimilation and autonomy. Colonial powers had adopted these three policies in 
succession over time. Subjugation, as practiced in late 18th century Martinique by the 
French, gave no thought to improving the lives of colonial peoples but aimed exclusively 
to promote the political and economic interests of the metropole. 49 In response to the 
exhaustion of colonial resources, rise of rebellion and spread of the spirit of equality with 
the French Revolution, colonial powers began protecting the interests of native peoples. 
French policy after the era of subjugation followed one of two models: assimilation or 
autonomy. Echoing Izumi, Yanaihara believed that assimilation, while appearing to grant 
equality to colonies, ignored actual differences between groups of people.50 As a result, it 
only suppressed the social life of indigenous populations and spurred resistance to 
colonial rule. By contrast, autonomy respected the particularity of colonies and promoted 
their autonomous development.51 Celebrating autonomy as the best strategy to maintain 
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Japan’s colonial empire, Yanaihara, along with Izumi, urged the granting of full political 
participation in the Japanese empire to the peoples of Korea and Taiwan.52  
        The critique of assimilation not only enabled Japanese intellectuals to examine the 
empire’s colonial policies but to challenge western models of imperial expansion.  
Joining the attack on assimilationism, Yamamoto Miono, another prominent colonial 
thinker, stressed the gap between humanistic slogans and the crude reality of western 
imperialism. Modern imperialism was rooted not in humanistic impulses but in the 
realistic aim of economic expansion.53 Modern colonial expansion derived principally 
from the desire to protect capital from political and social instability in colonized areas. 
Yamamoto argued that the language of humanism was simply used to conceal this reality 
and justify colonial expansion. Thus, racial discrimination and mistreatment of 
indigenous people were common in the history of modern imperialism. 54  
        Kojima Ken identified World War I as a turning point for colonialism. Initially 
expecting that the spread of ideas of self-determination and establishment of the Mandate 
system after the war would transform colonial thought,55 he eventually lamented:  
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        “The US was the most vocal promoter of justice, humanity and self-
determination, championed the end of militarism and initiated the League 
of Nations. But it eventually refused to endorse the Peace Treaty and has 
not yet joined the League of Nations. European powers, too, resumed their 
competition for colonies right after signing the treaty. As a result, the 
principle of self-determination was nothing more than rhetoric. ”56 
 
          Kojima thus believed that “the Japanese should liberate Asian people from the 
abuse of the white race and achieve the great goal of racial equality and reconciliation 
between East and West…” 57  
          To carry out this mission, Japanese colonialism should be built on mutual respect 
and equality between the Japanese and colonial peoples. Both racial prejudice and neglect 
of indigenous cultures would threaten colonial rule. Japanese policy, Kojima argued, 
should not be misled by shortsighted profit but be grounded in humanism with the aim to 
achieve co-existence and co-prosperity. 58  
         The terminological convergence of emigration and colonial migration in the late 
19th century and the early 20th century enabled Japanese intellectuals to build a logical 
ground for the empire’s expansion in Asia on Japanese settlement in the US. The divorce 
of these two terms in the 1920s, on the other hand, provided some thinkers an easy 	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solution for reconciling the humiliation caused by the Japanese exclusion in the US and 
the legitimacy of the empire’s colonial rule in Asia. These attacks on Japan’s previous 
colonial policy were resulted less from the self-reflections on their previous agendas than 
from their efforts to look for a new form of expansive ideology and to disassociate Japan 
from the West. The idea of assimilation was considered evidence of the hypocritical 
nature of western empires, which justified their colonial expansions around the world 
under the name of humanism but discriminated against and abused indigenous peoples in 
reality. Under this terminological separation, the decades long story of Japanese 
American migration since the late 19th century thus seemed to be reduced to the year of 
1924. In other words, for some thinkers of the day, the history of Japanese immigration to 
the US became the history of Japanese exclusion. Japanese American immigration was 
positioned as no more than a failure of assimilationism and further evidence of the 
hypocrisy of western imperialism, from which the Japanese empire should dissociate.  
 
The Invention of “Overseas Brethren:” Integrating Japanese American Migration 
into the History of Japanese Overseas Expansion, 1920s-1945 
        In contrast to the position of separating Japanese American migration from Japanese 
colonial expansion in Asia, other thinkers continued to assert that Japanese American 
migration was critical for the development of the Japanese empire. The various ideas of 
linking Japanese American experience with Japan’s following projects of emigration and 
colonial migration started winning an increasing number of supporters and audience in 
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Japan. Beginning from the late 1920s, this position gained an increasing number of 
supporters. For these thinkers, ironically, Japan’s ideological departure from the West, 
and the US in particular, involved a new narrative for integrating Japanese American 
experience into the discourse of Japanese overseas expansion. Particularly in the 1930s 
and 40s, along with the intensification of Japan’s wars and expansion in the Asian 
continent, how Japanese American experience, in the past, present and future, could be 
used for the empire became a central debate among the leading scholars of the day. 
Accompanying this debate, the expressions “overseas development” (kaigai hatten) and 
“emigration/colonial migration” (ishokumin) that tended to encompass colonial migration 
and emigration gained more popularity than the terms colonial migration and emigration 
themselves. How Japanese American settlement was associated with Japanese colonial 
expansion in Asia from the 1920s to the end of the Asia-Pacific War and how the terms 
of colonial migration and overseas development were used and defined will be the 
focuses of examination in the remaining part of this chapter.  
 
Japan’s “Overseas Development” and the Lessons of Japanese American Migration 
        Right after the 1924 Act, the Japanese American experience was associated with 
Japanese colonialism in Asia, first and foremost, as a lesson of failure, that urged the 
empire to revise its policies and ideologies of overseas expansion. While thinkers varied 
in terms of their accounts on what exactly the failure was, the representations of the 
failure all tied to specific agendas they proposed for the future.  In the issue of the journal 
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Shokumin that appeared right after the 1924 Act, the first article, authored by the editor of 
the journal Naitō Hideo, called for a fundamental reformation of Japan’s policies in 
overseas emigration. Naitō worried that the Japanese exclusion in the US might damage 
the interest of the Japanese public in overseas expansion. He therefore numerated several 
crises facing Japan at the time, such as overpopulation, food shortage and rural poverty, 
and warned his readers the urgency of addressing these issues. Naitō considered colonial 
migration and emigration equally as the key solutions to the current “deadlock 
(ikizumari).” He reflected this in his language use by deploying the expressions 
“emigration/colonial migration” and “overseas development” to blur the boundaries 
between colonial migration and emigration. Further, he attributed the Japanese American 
exclusion to the backwardness of the Japanese government’s emigration policies. To 
change these policies, he suggested the unification of the departments on colonial 
migration and emigration in the government, which to that point fell into the Home 
Ministry and Foreign Ministry respectively. By establishing a ministry in charge of both 
colonial migration and emigration, Naitō argued, the Japanese government could put all 
necessary resources together and work more efficiently in promoting overseas 
expansion.59  
       Twelve years later, in 1936, Iriye Toraji, a Japanese government employee who 
authored a massive study that narrated different waves of the Japanese overseas 
emigration from Meiji to early Showa, echoed Naitō’s explanation of Japanese American 
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exclusion. If Naitō’s criticism of Japanese government’s inept migration policy provided 
him the logical foundation to call for the reformation on the migration related policies 
and institutions in the Japanese government, Iriye’s account of the “failure of the 
Japanese government” had another purpose. The story in the 1920s served as a foil to the 
new image of Japanese government in 1936, with full-fledged political capacity and 
military power in protecting its subjects abroad. Writing on the eve of the Japanese 
government’s launch of its project to migrate one million households to Manchuria, Iriye 
aimed to reassure his readers that the mass migration to Manchuria was well planned and 
guarded by the imperial government. 60  
        Some, on the other hand, attributed the failure of the Japanese American experience 
to Japanese emigrants’ sojourning (dekasegi) mentality and their primitive emotion 
toward homeland. For example, Ōtsuka Yoshimi pointed out in 1933 that many Japanese 
Americans before 1924 considered themselves as migrant workers: They aimed to 
eventually return to Japan after earning a certain amount of money. Because of this 
sojourning mentality, they lived in the US as foreigners and never thought to get settled 
or make any contribution to local society.61  
        This sojourning mentality, Ōtsuka pointed out, came from the Japanese people’s 
love for homeland. Yet, he further argued that such love for homeland was natural. It 
grew from one’s instinct of loving his own life, since the homeland was a combination of 
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the social and natural relations surrounding a human being. In other words, the love for 
homeland was an immediate extension of the love for oneself. This love for homeland, 
Ōtsuka continued, was also the foundation of the love for one’s nation and the love for 
mankind. While Japanese people’s love for homeland was the deepest in the world, 
Ōtsuka believed, it so far was still in its primitive form. For him, the failed Japanese 
American experience before 1924 acted liked a display window, which had fully exposed 
the problems of such primitivity, such as insular pride in one’s homeland, biased love for 
one’s prefecture, and exclusive dependence on prefecture ties.62 Such a primitive form of 
love, he concluded, could not give the Japanese Americans a strong consciousness of 
collectivity and ethnicity, and hence resulted in the failure of the Japanese American 
migration.  
        This discussion of the Japanese American experience served as a setup for Ōtsuka to 
propose his agenda for Japanese migration to Manchuria in the 1930s.63 A strong 
advocator of Manchurian migration, Ōtsuka reasoned that mass migration to Manchuria 
could both fulfill Japan’s obligation of civilizing its backward neighbors and solve 
Japan’s problem of overpopulation.64 The lesson of Japanese American migration could 
be a scientific guidance leading to the success of the following migration in Manchuria. 
Ōtsuka proposed to transform the Japanese people’s current primitive form of the love for 
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homeland into a scientific one.65 At the center of this scientific version of the homeland 
love were the rational migration planning and the expansion of the homeland. 66 Ōtsuka 
argued that the failed migrations in the recent past were generally driven by emotion, in 
which people’s decisions of migration were blinded by rumors of other migrants’ 
success.67 To ensure a real success, the Japanese migration to Manchuria should be well 
planned in advance. In addition, Ōtsuka believed that another reason for the failure of 
Japanese American migration was that the emigrants were not able to carry homeland 
with them; He encouraged the Japanese emigrants to extend their sense of homeland to 
Manchuria, the destination of their migration. Instead of isolating themselves as 
foreigners, just as the Japanese Americans did in the US by mistake, the Japanese settlers 
in Manchuria should treat Manchuria as their home and be willing to adapt themselves to 
local culture and to contribute to local society.68 Only in this way, Ōtsuka believed, could 
Japanese people’s primitive form of the homeland love grow into a mature love for the 
Japanese nation and mankind.  
        Moreover, not everyone agreed that Japanese American migration should be 
announced as a failure by the 1924 Act. Some intellectuals even considered Japanese 
American settlement as an example of success that could be beneficiary for the Japanese 
empire in various ways. The agricultural development in Japanese America, in particular, 
was celebrated by some as a great achievement. Chiba Toyoji, a prolific writer and a 
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specialist in agriculture who migrated to Japanese Manchuria after his stay in California 
from 1906 to 1921, for example, proposed to migrate skillful Japanese American farmers 
to Manchuria in order to improve the local agriculture.69 During his stay in the US, Chiba 
served as a director of the Japanese Association of Agriculture in Central California and a 
journalist of agriculture in the Japanese American News Agency (Nichibei Shinbunsha), a 
major Japanese American news agency in California.70 In Manchuria, with his knowledge 
on agriculture gained in California, Chiba was involved in several organizations and 
programs in promoting local Japanese agriculture. Considering Manchuria a vast land 
with fertile earth and rich resources, Chiba believed that it would offer a perfect solution 
to Japan’s food shortage. Yet, he lamented that the agriculture in Japanese Manchuria 
was far from satisfactory, since the Japanese farmers there could not compete with local 
Chinese farmers and thus usually had to give up agriculture and switch to other careers.71 
On the other hand, Japanese American farmers, with their tenacity and diligence, 
successfully defeated local American farmers and Chinese farmers in the competition of 
agriculture in the US even under socially and politically unfavorable conditions. Thus, by 
migrating to Manchuria, Japanese American farmers could develop local agriculture with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Chiba Toyoji, “Wa ga Ryōshoku Mondai no Kaiketsu to Manshū Kaihatsusaku no Kōsin” (2), 
Shokumin 4: 2 (1925): 22-23. 
70 Kimura Kenji, “Senzenki no Kaigai Yūhi to Shisō teki Keifu: Chiba Toyoji no Ashiato to 
Chōsaku o Megutte,”  Kenkyū Nenpō Keizaigaku 53: 4 (March 1992): 33-34. 
71 Chiba Toyoji, “Wa ga Ryōshoku Mondai no Kaiketsu to Manshu Kaihatsusaku no Kōsin,” (1), 
Shokumin 4:1 (1925), 24-26. 
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their successful experiences in cultivating cotton, continental rice, and vegetables and 
their success with stockbreeding. 72 
        In addition to agriculture, some others believed that Japanese Americans had been 
making great contributions to Japan’s overseas development in the long run. Takayama 
Kin’ichi, an intellectual who traveled to the US many times between 1906 and 1925, 
asserted that it was too early to perceive Japanese American migration as a failure. He 
argued that one can only evaluate the forty years of Japanese American experience by 
keeping in mind that the white people’s settlement in American continents had four or 
five hundred years of history. The problems in Japanese American communities were real, 
but they were understandable since the Japanese people were previously enclosed in 
Japan by the Tokugawa regime for over three hundred years. He also used his own 
observation to show that the Japanese American communities were improving as time 
went by.73 Instead of simply seeing the Japanese Americans as losers due to the passage 
of alien land laws and the 1924 Act, Takayama urged his audience in Japan to take the 
responsibility to contribute to the ongoing success of their brethren in the US. With the 
high birth rate in Japanese American communities, they would substantially increase the 
Japanese overseas population in the eras of the second and the third generations. 74 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  Chiba Toyoji, “Wa ga ryōshoku mondai no kaiketsu to manshu kaihatsusaku no kōsin” (2), 22-
23. 
73 Takayama Kinichi, “Hikan ka Rakkan ka: Wa Taibei Imin no Shōrai,” Shokumin 4: 4 (1925): 
15.  Also see Takayama Kinichi, “Nananen Buri ni Otoroita: Zaibei Hōjin no Hatten, Shiatoru 
nite,” Shokumin 2: 2, 48-49.  
74 Takayama Kinichi, “Hikan ka Rakkan ka: Wa Taibei Imin no Shōrai,” 14-15. 
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        Whether it was a lesson calling reformation or a successful model to copy, the 
Japanese American experience up to 1924 was a constant source for ideological 
contestations. Japanese colonial thinkers and policy makers integrated this past into their 
competing narratives of the Japanese overseas development to rationalize their agendas 
for the empire’s future. Along with the representations of the Japanese American 
experience were the different ways of perceiving Japanese Americans as useful subjects 
of the empire. In addition to the wide use of the term “overseas development” (kaigai 
hatten) to describe both colonial migration (shokumin) and emigration (imin), colonial 
thinkers also began to adopt the expression of overseas brethren (kaigai hōjin/dōhō) to 
combine Japanese settlers in the empire’s Asian colonies with those settled in other parts 
of the world, in which the Japanese Americans were a particularly important group. 
   
Becoming “Overseas Brethren” 
        This integration of Japanese Americans into the genealogy of the Japanese “overseas 
brethren” around the world was originally initiated by the Japanese American issei 
leaders themselves. They assigned the Japanese Americans, particularly the first 
generation, to a particular position in this genealogy. Just two years after the passing of 
the 1924 Act in the US, a Japanese American intellectual Fujioka Shirō started to use the 
term “pioneers of Japanese development” to describe the Japanese American issei. He 
urged his domestic brethren not to forget their brethren on the other side of the Pacific, 
who endured American exclusion and misunderstandings of the people in domestic Japan 
92	  	  
	  
and established the base of Japanese settlement in the US.75  Not only did they always 
have the homeland in mind and generously send remittance, their development in 
America was also closely tied to the development of the Japanese empire. Japan’s 
national policy of “marching toward South (Nanshin),” Fujioka illustrated as an example, 
indicated the direction of the Japanese empire’s expansion in Asia as much as the 
Japanese Americans’ migration to Mexico.  
         Fujioka’s effort belonged to what Eiichiro Azuma defines as the Japanese American 
intellectuals’ collective project of “history making.”76 Under the hardship of racial 
discrimination and exclusion in the US, they embraced the colonial discourse of the 
Japanese empire to legitimize their presence in the US in the past and present. They 
invented their own story as a saga of the Japanese national pioneers in a foreign land, and 
recorded it as a crucial chapter in the grand narrative of Japanese overseas expansion. 
Associating their past with Japan, the Japanese American leaders sought respect from 
home and self-empowerment for the racial struggles in the local society rather than 
actually to facilitate the Japanese empire’s expansion on the other side of the Pacific. 77 
        While Japanese Americans’ diasporic identity formation did not directly involve 
imperialist intention, colonial thinkers and policy makers in Japan, on the other hand, 
welcomed this transnational discourse and appropriated it for their own blueprints of 
Japan’s imperial expansion. In the 1930s, when mass migration to Manchuria became a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Fujioka Shiro, Minzoku Hatten no Senkūsha (Tokyo: Dōbunsha, 1926), 3.  
76 Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires, Chapter 4, 89-110. 
77  Eichiro Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Japanese Development,” 1197.  
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much-needed necessity, the identity of the Japanese Americans as patriotic subjects of the 
empire became further emphasized. As Azuma has shown, in both Japanese academia 
and the popular culture, the first generation Japanese Americans were acclaimed as the 
pioneers of Japan’s overseas development and loyal subjects of the Japanese global 
empire under the ideology of “all the world united under the emperor” (hakkō ichiu). 
Exploring a wild land and fighting against white racism in the US, their stories not only 
mirrored the bright future of the Japanese mass migration to Manchuria but also became a 
successful example from which all the Japanese overseas settlers in following years 
should learn.78  
       If the issei Japanese Americans were represented as exemplary brethren of the 
empire in the past, the nisei (the second generation of the Japanese Americans) were 
considered useful subjects of the empire at present and for the future. Ōtsuka Yoshimi, 
for example, expected the nisei to avoid the issei’s selfishness and insularity and to 
strengthen the Japanese American society with the consciousness of collectivity and 
ethnicity.79 He believed that a strong Japanese society in the US under the leadership of 
the nisei could benefit the Japanese empire in two ways. First, it would become a 
compass in guiding the construction of Japanese communities in South America. Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Ibid, 1208-1214. 
79 Eiichiro Azuma, “1930 Nendai no Tokyo ni Okeru Nikei Amerikajin Nisei Ryūgaku Jigyō to 
Nihon Shokuminchi Shugi,” 26-28. 
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a booming Japanese American society would better serve as a stable source of remittance 
for domestic Japan.80 
       In addition to the pragmatic value of the Japanese American nisei argued by Ōtsuka, 
Kobayashi Masasuke, who led the Japanese Salvation Army in California for over thirty 
years, emphasized the ideological importance of the nisei. Writing in 1933, the year when 
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations due to the League’s opposition to Japan’s 
expansion in Manchuria, Kobayashi argued that the competitions in global expansion 
between the Japanese and the Americans incubated a detrimental crisis in the world: the 
clash between the Eastern and Western races. He claimed that the new “chosen people” 
was the nisei. While the issei had stood in the forefront of the Japanese expansion, 
exploring American wild land, enduring the persecution of exclusion, and fighting like 
warriors in the battlefield, the nisei were special since they were Americans in citizenship 
and Japanese in race. They could understand and speak for both the Americans and 
Japanese, a capacity that neither the white Americans nor people in domestic Japan could 
acquire. Since the ultimate happiness of mankind was based on the reconciliation 
between the Eastern and Western races in general and the Japanese and Americans in 
particular, the rapidly growing Japanese American nisei held the key to it.81  
       The Japanese American nisei were further called upon to appease the conflicts 
between Japan and the US after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. Different 
from Kobayashi’s more nuanced stance on the nisei’s dual belonging to Japan and the US, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Otsuka Yoshimi, Ishokumin to Kyōiku Mondai, 295. 
81 Kobayashi Masasuke, Nihon Minzoku no Sekaiteki Bōchō (Tokyo: Keigansha, 1933), 10-12. 
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Fujimura Nobuo, a director of the American department in Japan’s Foreign Ministry, 
proposed to further strengthen the Japanese racial and national consciousness of the nisei. 
Only through Japanese national pride and patriotism, Fujimura believed, could the nisei 
better represent the empire in the US and promote the friendship between these two 
countries. 82  
        To materialize these expectations, different social groups in Japan and the Japanese 
government alike sponsored a number of programs to encourage the Japanese American 
nisei to study in Japan. As Azuma’s study demonstrates, these programs varied according 
to the organizers’ different expectations of the nisei’s role. On the one hand, the Nichibei 
Home and the Keisen Jogakuin School, established by Japanese Buddhist educator 
Tsunemitsu Konen and Christian leader Kawai Michi respectively, aimed to develop the 
nisei’s dual identity as both racially Japanese and nationally Americans and considered 
the nisei’s duality the key to fostering collaborations between Japan and the US.83 On the 
other hand, Waseda International Institute, under the direct influence of the Japanese 
government, was a pro-Japan nisei incubator. It intended to mold the nisei into loyal 
subjects of the Japanese empire so that they could better fulfill their mission to speak for 
the empire in the US.  
        If there were competing ideas on how and to what extent the Japanese American 
issei and nisei should be associated with the empire in the 1920s and 30s, the discourse of 	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Zaigai Nihonjin no Tenbō (Tokyo: Imin Mondai Kenkyūkai, 1940), 162-163. 
83 Eiichiro Azuma, “The Pacific Era Has Arrived”: Transnational Education among Japanese 
Americans, 1932–1941, History of Education Quaterly 43: 1 (March 2003): 39-73. 
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integrating the Japanese Americans into the empire as loyal subjects became the 
dominating voice since the late 1930s. It was a time when Sino-Japanese War was 
intensified and the mobilization of every possible resource in the domestic and abroad 
became a necessity for the empire. The efforts of mobilizing the overseas Japanese in 
general and Japanese Americans in particular culminated in November 1940, when the 
Japanese government held the Tokyo Conference of the Overseas Japanese (Kaigai Dōhō 
Tokyo Daikai) to celebrate the 2, 600th Anniversary of the Japanese empire.  
        The conference was attended by Japanese representatives from all over the world. 
To downplay the boundaries between the Japanese inside and outside the empire’s 
political sphere, the representatives were divided into several sections, not by their types 
of political affiliation with the empire but by geography, including the sections of Hawaii, 
North America, Middle and South America, South Sea (Nan’yō), and East Asia.84 Konoe 
Fumimaro, the Premier of the imperial government chaired the conference and delivered 
the opening address and several Ministers also contributed with greeting remarks. In 
addition to holding exhibitions and speeches to glorify the sacrifices and achievements 
the overseas Japanese made abroad, the conference further award many figures in the 
Japanese overseas communities for their remarkable contributions to the empire. 85 As a 
representative from Hawaii, Fujimoto Isaku, told his fellow brethren back home through 
radio broadcasting from Tokyo,  
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        It has been 73 years since our brethren started to migrate abroad. 
During these years, out of our love for Japan, we worked as paving stones 
for the empire’s overseas expansion, struggling day and night. Yet we 
have been feeling extremely disappointed since we thought our 
motherland did not care about us and only saw us as abandoned people. 
However, it is the time now to correct this misperception.  
        Both the domestic government and public has recognized and 
appreciated our achievement in the past. I have observed it by my own 
eyes and ears. It gives me such a powerful impression that I will never 
forget in my life. All other overseas representatives have the same feeling. 
It is the biggest gain for all overseas brethren who come to visit the 
motherland this time. This feeling is also a souvenir that I am so honored 
to share with you!86 
 
        Certainly, such recognition and appreciation were not without their costs: the 
conference, after all, was held to mobilize all Japanese overseas to serve the empire as 
loyal subjects. As the speech of Primer Konoe made the logic clear, 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Fujimoto Isaku, “Hōshuku Shikiten Sanretsu no Kangeki,” in Ibid, 194. 
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        Looking into our history of overseas emigration/colonial migration 
that was weaved together through the blood and sweat of your forefathers, 
my appreciation was immeasurable. Yet it is now a turning point in the 
world…, when our empire takes the mission to bring the real justice, real 
happiness to the mankind based on the ideal that all the world is united 
under the emperor (hakkō ichiu)…It is also the time the empire expected 
your loyalty as subjects to get united and sacrifice for the emperor.87 
 
        Among these overseas Japanese, the Japanese Americans were considered 
particularly valuable, since they played a crucial role in representing both the past and 
future of the empire’s overseas development. The first generation Japanese emigrants 
who settled in Hawaii and the US proper were glorified as earliest examples of overseas 
expedition since Meiji Restoration. The second generation Japanese Americans, on the 
other hand, were valued as the ideal speakers for the empire in the West. In particular, as 
the tension between the Japanese empire and the US was intensified since the outbreak of 
Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese American nisei, who were imagined to have an 
intimate knowledge of both American and Japanese cultures and societies, were further 
expected to fulfill the mission to restore Japan’s relationship with the US.   
          The central role of the Japanese Americans in the empire’s campaign of mobilizing 
overseas Japanese could be further demonstrated in a radio drama that Japanese 	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Broadcasting Cooperation (NHK) broadcasted to all the domestic audience on November 
9, 1940, the day after the close of the Tokyo Conference of the Overseas Japanese. Titled 
“thousands of miles of waves,” the drama mainly depicted a conversation between 
several Japanese emigrants on a third class cabin of a ship bound overseas.88 
          The conversation took place when the ship encountered a storm on the sea. Among 
these passengers only one character’s identity was stated, who was a second generation 
Japanese American. He was depicted as a promising young man who just completed a 
three-year study in Japan while the nation was under the war with China. Proud of being 
a Japanese American, he decided to return to the US in this journey to carry on the great 
cause of his forefathers. After bestowing his approbation to this Japanese American nisei, 
another passenger said, “We were used to be called ‘emigrants’ (imin), but now it is time 
to entirely change this perception (of the domestic people). We went overseas, not to get 
rich but to explore the frontier of Japanese national development.” In this way, the 
overseas Japanese eventually shook off the negative label “emigrants” and became the 
respectful “overseas brethren,” the pioneers of the empire’s expansion. This sublimation 
in the drama was realized through a Japanese American’s affirmation of his loyalty to the 
empire by coming back to Japan for study when it was in a war and then returning to his 
own country to contribute to Japan from abroad.  
        This much-wanted recognition by the empire, however, was accompanied by a high 
demand on the Japanese overseas in the future. As the passenger continued, “Yet the true 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The drama’s script was authored by Yamashita Sōen, one of the directors of the Tokyo 
Conference of the Overseas Japanese. For the script of the show, see Ibid, 219-223. 
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overseas development of our nation will start from now!” After recounting the pains and 
sacrifices of the Japanese overseas in the past in different parts of the world, he reminded 
his audience that Japan now became the leader of East Asia and the overseas Japanese 
therefore had more responsibilities to support the empire’s mission. Since none of the 
passengers’ destination was indicated except the young Japanese American, audience 
could assume that the ship was bound for the US. Yet at the end of the drama, when a 
female passenger opened the radio in the cabinet, it played a song, “Patriotic March,” in a 
program that was broadcasted from Tokyo to China and South Sea. The direction of the 
radio broadcasting mirrored the orientation of the empire’s following expansion. But 
more importantly, the seemingly strange fact that the song broadcasted toward China and 
South Sea was received on the emigrant ship bound for America highlighted the ties 
between Japanese American immigration and the Japan’s colonialism in Asia. Indeed, as 
the drama revealed, the lives of the Japanese emigrants in the US, past, present, and 
future, could only become meaningful when they could contribute to Japan’s colonial 
empire on the other side of the Pacific. 
 
	 	 Among the nine characters on the ship appeared in the drama, four were women. 
Different from the image of the male characters, which was depicted uniformly as 
decisive, courageous and patriotic, the image of the female characters was more delicate: 
they were portrayed as physically and mentally weaker, but maintaining the potential to 
become as strong as their male counterparts. When the ship encountered the storm and 
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started shaking, three female characters on the ship began to complain. A young woman 
even burst into tears and started to regret her decision of giving up the peaceful life in 
Japan’s countryside to migrate overseas. Criticizing her weakness, her husband, a young 
man, encouraged her that they could only achieve success overseas by overcoming such 
hardship. In contrast to those women who complained, the other woman, who did not 
have a word in the drama, was giving birth to a baby on the ship. She was acclaimed by 
the young man as the evidence that the strong spirit existed in the blood of Japanese 
women.89 Echoing this young man’s compliment on Japanese female migrants, the 
Japanese American nisei also brought up the story of Okei, a fictional female figure in 
Japanese American history, celebrating her as a pioneer of Japanese overseas 
expansion.90  
        What role did women play in Japanese overseas migration? How was it different or 
associate with that of men? The following two chapters will delve into the world of 
Japanese female emigrants and examine the important ways in which these diasporic 
women mattered for the Japanese empire.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Ibid,  220. 
90 Ibid, 220. For how the story of Okei was invented and used, see Eichiro Azuma, “Pioneers of 
Overseas Japanese Development,“ 1200-06. 
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Chapter 3 
The Shame of Empire 
Japanese Overseas Prostitutes and Prostitution Abolition in Modern 
Japan, 1880s-1927  
      
        As part of the tide of migration, since the mid-nineteenth century a large number of 
impoverished Japanese women flowed into Manchuria, Siberia, Southeast Asia, Hawaii, 
and North America, and made a living through prostitution.1 In 1890, a Japanese 
prostitution abolitionist warned that Japanese prostitutes in the US were about to be 
deported. The abolitionist complained, “What a shame that a few of our countrywomen in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 While studies show that Japanese prostitutes existed abroad before the Meiji era, their 
prevalence in Southeast Asia, on the west coast of North America, and in Manchuria and China 
from the late nineteenth century was a direct result of Japan’s modernization and imperial 
expansion. Fujime Yuki argues that Japan’s military expansion in East Asia not only increased 
the demand for Japanese abroad but also aggravated rural poverty within Japan, thus driving more 
women to seek work abroad as prostitutes. See Fujime Yuki, “The licensed prostitution system 
and the prostitution abolition movement in modern Japan,” positions: east asia cultures critique 
5: 1 (1997): 146. Also see Karen Colligan-Taylor, “Translator’s Introduction” in Yamazaki 
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xviii-xxii. Bill Mihalopoulos, however, points out that the movement of young Japanese women 
into sex work occupations abroad was a spontaneous reaction by the rural poor to the radical 
social restructuring unfolding in Japan from the 1870s onwards as Japan became integrated into 
the capitalist world economy. See Bill Mihalopoulos, Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870-1930: 
Prostitutes, Emigration and Nation-building (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 1. 
The overseas prostitutes are more commonly known as “karayuki-san” in Japanese, which 
literally means “people who go to China,” though they actually went to various parts of the world. 
Japanese prostitution abolitionists of the day, with contempt, often called them “kaigai shogyōfu,” 
which literarily means “women of unsightly career abroad.” For the convenience of writing, I use 
the neutral term “overseas prostitutes.” 
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the US are treated and excluded just like the Chinese.”2 Fifteen years later, on the other 
side of the Pacific Ocean, following Japan’s 1905 military victory over Russia, an article 
in the prominent women’s journal Fujin Shinpō expressed a similar lament: 
“The empire’s new territory [in Manchuria] where our soldiers shed 
their blood and exposed their bones is now stained by these Japanese 
prostitutes… All women [in Japan] should stand up and abolish the 
licensed prostitution system, a system under which our fellow women’s 
social position can never be improved.”3 
 
Though in different contexts, the denunciation of Japanese prostitution in Manchuria 
and the United States was grounded by a shared concern: overseas prostitutes stained the 
reputation of the Japanese empire and race. Japanese abolitionists launched a series of 
campaigns to eradicate them from the final two decades of the nineteenth century. As the 
article in Fujin Shinpō indicates, the abolitionists tied the issue of overseas Japanese 
prostitution to the licensed prostitution system at home, in order to mobilize public 
opinion and support for their domestic abolitionist programs and goals. This chapter 
illustrates how the campaigns to abolish Japanese overseas prostitution were grounded in 
Japanese nationalism, and how they came to shape and at times drive the domestic anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 29 (September, 1890): 8. Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi was the official 
journal of the Japanese Woman’s Christian Temperance Union. The journal changed its name 
twice: it was called Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi (1888-1893), Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi (1893-1895), and 
Fujin Shinpō (1895- postwar era). 
3 Fujin Shinpō 99 (July, 1905): 4. 
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prostitution movement. In a larger sense, the story of these campaigns tells how Japanese 
overseas prostitutes, among the most marginalized and disqualified members of society, 
were involved in the process of nation- and empire-building in modern Japan. The time 
period of this analysis is between the 1880s (when Japanese overseas prostitution 
emerged as a key issue in the Japanese prostitution abolition discourse) and 1927 (when 
the Japanese government signed the League of Nations Convention to abolish the 
trafficking of women and children and the issue of overseas prostitution started to fade 
out of the public discourse). While historical narratives of modern Japan often contrast 
the Meiji, Taisho and Showa eras,4 I argue that the impact of overseas prostitution on 
prostitution abolition in domestic Japan and the nationalistic ideologies behind the 
abolition movement continued from mid-Meiji to early Showa. I parallel sources more 
than a decade apart in the analysis not only to support my arguments but also to illustrate 
this continuity. 
        Following a discussion of the literature, this chapter is divided into three sections. 
Section one challenges the existing chronology of the movement by examining criticism 
of and activities against overseas prostitutes in the early years of the abolition movement 
in both Manchuria and California. Attention will be paid to the shared racial anxieties of 
the two Japanese communities, which crystallized around the issue of expatriate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is impossible to generalize the characters in the narratives of each era, but historians’ concerns 
and debates in these three eras are usually quite different. For example, a major debate of Meiji 
has been on how to understand the establishment emperor system. The narrative of Taisho is 
marked by its concerns with the rise of bourgeois society and Japan’s engagement with the 
international order. A main focus in the studies of early Showa (to 1945) is to evaluate the 
Japanese empire, in terms of its relationship with colonies and its politics, ideologies and society 
during the total war. What these narratives often miss is the continuities between these eras.  
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prostitutes. Section two illustrates the unexpected ways in which campaigns against 
overseas prostitutes drove the movement against prostitution in Japan proper from the 
1880s to the 1910s. The third and final section probes the influence of overseas 
prostitution on the domestic abolition movement in the 1910s and early 1920s by 
investigating the social work and activities of the Kyūshū branch of the Japanese 
Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (JWCTU, or Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyofūkai in 
Japanese). 
 
For scholars in recent decades, a central issue in the history of the prostitution 
abolition movement has been how to explain its seemingly contradictory character. On 
the one hand there was a liberal, feminist endeavor to abolish prostitution and promote 
women’s rights. On the other there was a conservative moral reform movement, which 
not only advocated monogamy but also stressed women’s obligations at home as wives 
and mothers. The prostitution abolition movement was eventually transformed into the 
national purity campaign in the 1930s, tolerating licensed prostitution and manipulating 
sexual morality to support Japan’s imperial expansion. Using the notion of “social 
management,” Sheldon Garon perceptively describes the prostitution abolition movement 
as a constant collaboration between the state and abolition groups to maintain social 
cohesion and moral standards. It was through such collaboration that the abolition groups 
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sought to realize their liberal agendas.5 Thus, the partnership of some abolition activists 
and the imperial government in the ’30s was not an anomaly.6 Fujime Yuki shares 
Garon’s view. However, she sees the cause of collaboration between the state and 
abolitionists to be the bourgeois-based nature of the movement, showing that both liberal 
abolition campaigns of the ’20s and the shift toward national purity in the ’30s had their 
roots in Japanese middle-class-oriented “imperial feminism.”7 Different from the class-
based analyses by Garon and Fujime, Rumi Yasutake and Ann Davis, from a perspective 
of gender, remind us that the campaigns in the late 19th century were male dominated and 
that a large part of the anti-prostitution movement was led by male activists advocating 
female chastity and women’s domestic responsibility.8 Kurahashi Katsuhito further draws 
attention to the religious dimension of the movement by illustrating the leading roles 
played by Japanese Christian groups and how Christian ideals and morality shaped the 
movement. He argues that the purity-centered sexual morality of Japanese Protestants 
accounted for the movement’s conservative shift in the 1930s. Manako Ogawa looks at 
the transnational women’s movement, which had been spreading from the West to Japan 
from the late 19th century and substantially influenced the anti-prostitution movement in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The liberalism of the prostitution abolition movement lay in its association with the 
“emancipation” of the prostitutes on the one hand and promotion of women’s political rights on 
the other. 
6 Sheldon Garon, “The World’s Oldest Debate? Regulating Prostitution and Illicit Sexuality,” 
Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 88-114. 
7 Fujime Yuki, Sei no Rekishi Gaku: Kōshōseido, Dataizai Taisei kara Baishun Bōshiho, Yūsei 
Hōgoho Taisei e (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1997), 32-33. 
8 Rumi Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism: The United States, Japan, and Japanese 
Immigrant Communities in California, 1859-1920 (New York and London: New York University 
Press, 2004), 37-76. Ann Marie Lynn Davis, “Bodies, numbers, and empires: Representing ‘the 
prostitute’ in modern Japan (1850-1912),” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 2009, 198-236. 
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Japan. She shows that this transnational women’s movement was itself closely associated 
with Western imperialism and nationalism.9  
        Building on these studies, this chapter continues to explore the nature of the 
prostitution abolition movement in modern Japan. This chapter differentiates itself from 
the perspectives of state policy, class, religion, and the trans-Pacific flow of feminist 
ideas by integrating the story of the abolition movement with Japan’s experience of 
nation-making and empire-building. Andrew Gordon’s concept of “imperial democracy” 
is particularly useful in capturing the contradictory nature of social liberalism in modern 
Japan,10 as also embedded in the prostitution abolition movement, which committed to 
both imperial glory and wider political participation. This chapter deepens our 
understanding of such contradiction by unveiling how social reformists’ campaigns to 
abolish prostitution were driven by their desire to establish a civilized empire and 
cultivate a progressive Japanese racial self.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Manako Ogawa, “American Women’s Destiny, Asian Women’s Dignity: Trans-Pacific 
Activism of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 1886-1945,” Ph.D. Dissertation, 
University of Hawaii, 2004. 
10 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2011), 7-8. While Gordon coins the concept to describe the character of the 
labor movement and the political struggles of bourgeois parties in prewar Japan, the concept can 
be used to understand liberalism in imperial Japan in general.  
11 Recent scholars have insightfully illustrated that Japanese racism was much more complicated 
than the belief of the homogeneity of the Yamato race. In the recently published book Race for 
Empire, Takashi Fujitani demonstrates the convergence between Japan and the United States in 
terms of their encompassing and multi-ethnic racial discourses during the Pacific War. My 
analysis, on the other hand, focuses on the earlier period of the Japanese empire, when the purity 
of Yamato race was still the dominating discourse. Thus, the terms of race and racial self in this 
article do not include racial groups other than the Japanese, such as the Koreans and Chinese. 
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      This chapter is a story of the abolitionists, not of prostitution supporters or prostitutes 
themselves. To be sure, the abolitionists’ imperial and racial ideology was just one side of 
the debate on prostitution in prewar Japan. Supporters of prostitution, too, associated 
their political agendas with the well-being of the Japanese nation and empire. For 
example, progressive thinker Fukuzawa Yukichi argued that prostitution contributed to 
the nation by providing an indispensable outlet for the passion of men who could not 
marry due to poverty, which otherwise might threaten society’s security and stability.12 
Furthermore, he perceived Japanese overseas prostitutes as a “necessary evil” for the 
nation in two distinct ways. The women would enhance Japanese overseas expansion by 
meeting the sexual needs of Japanese single male emigrants abroad, who constituted the 
majority of the population in Japanese overseas communities in the early phase.13 
Moreover, their remittances back to Japan would promote domestic economic growth.14 
Licensed prostitution was also seen by some government officials as necessary not only 
to stabilize the Japanese “family system” and gender roles, but also to regulate the 
productivity of female sexuality, both of which ensured national prosperity.15 While the 
national and imperial ideology of Japanese prostitution supporters deserves careful 
investigation, this paper focuses on the nationalism and imperialism embedded in the 
abolition campaigns.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Hinkōron,” Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū, vol. 5 (Tokyo: Jiji Shinpōsha, 
1898), 24-29.  
13 Most of the Japanese overseas emigrants in the late nineteenth century were single male 
laborers. 
14 Fukuzawa Yukichi, “Jinmin no Ishoku to Shōfu no Dekasegi,” Fukuzawa Yukichi Zenshū, vol. 
15 (Tokyo, Iwanami Shuten, 1961), 362-363. 
15 Sheldon Garon, “The World’s Oldest Debate? Regulating Prostitution and Illicit Sexuality,” 
Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, 101-103. 
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       The prostitution abolition movement in modern Japan included a number of far-
reaching social and political campaigns, involving a variety of social groups, politicians, 
and government officials. The backbone of the abolitionists was the new middle class that 
emerged at the turn of the 20th century with Meiji Japan’s rapid industrialization and 
urbanization.16 Members of this new middle class occupied a wide political space of the 
nation, including educators, professionals, government bureaucrats, journalists, and urban 
office workers.17 Armed with newly acquired western social knowledge and an 
international discourse of progress, new middle class reformers strived to establish their 
own version of national development as the authoritative standard for the nation, in which 
the reform of public morality was a crucial element. Many of them converted to 
Protestant Christianity, receiving it not simply as a religious belief but as an ultimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a comprehensive study of this new middle class, see David Ambaras, “Social Knowledge, 
Cultural Capital and the New Middle Class in Japan, 1895-1912,” Journal of Japanese Studies 
24: 1 (Winter 1998). 
17 The analytical binary of “society” versus “state” can not fully grasp the diversity and 
complexity of this new middle class. Among its members were civil servants trained with 
professional knowledge in the government, politicians familiar with international political 
discourse, and educators with expertise in social works, and many were affiliated with or 
influential in both social groups and the state apparatus. The conceptual boundaries between state 
and society were thus blurred in these middle-class-based social reformation campaigns. 
However, this chapter still uses the terms “state” and “social groups” in order to grasp the power 
dynamics and political struggles in the abolition movement. As the following paragraphs will 
illustrate, while the Japanese government was deeply concerned about the overseas prostitutes’ 
possible damage to Japan’s national image, it made few efforts to stop prostitutes from going 
abroad until 1927, regardless of the repeated petitions by the JWCTU and the Purity Society. It is 
because the government was afraid of being accused of violating its citizens’ freedom on the 
international stage. See Bill Mihalopoulos, Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870-1930: Prostitutes, 
Emigration and Nation-building (Pickering & Chatto Ltd, 2011), 46-51. Supporters of 
prostitution in the government and Imperial Diet managed to maintain its legality until 1956. 
Social abolition groups, which had few political powers, on the other hand, attempted to utilize 
the overseas prostitution issue to persuade the government to take actions to abolish licensed 
prostitution in domestic Japan. Tying women’s chastity to national progress, it further aimed to 
widen women’s political participation in the nation. 
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ethical system to guide the entire nation.18 This chapter, accordingly, focuses on the ideas 
and practice of middle-class-based Protestant groups such as the JWCTU, the Purity 
Society (Kakuseikai), and the Japanese Salvation Army (Kyūseigun), the most vocal and 
politically active participants in the abolition campaigns. By excluding and eliminating 
the “other” – the “shameful,” “degenerated,” and “unpatriotic” prostitutes – the 
abolitionists not only redefined the bourgeois self, but attempted to achieve political 
power and nationalize their Christian-based sex morality. 
This chapter also challenges the established narrative of the prostitution abolition 
movement in modern Japan by linking the abolition of Japanese overseas prostitution 
with domestic abolition campaigns. Previous studies either neglect the campaigns to 
abolish Japanese overseas prostitution or see them as minor extensions of the Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The question of what is the means and ends is acute here. To clarify, I have no intension to 
claim Christianity is either just a means or an end, since the reasons behind religious conversions 
should be examined case by case and may not be generalized. What I focus on here is the political 
concerns behind the Christian conversion of some Japanese middle-class reformers in the specific 
historical context of the day. Yosuke Nirei has done a comprehensive analysis of this 
phenomenon. See Yosuke Nirei, “The Ethics of Empire: Protestant Thoughts, Moral Culture, and 
Imperialism in Meiji Japan,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 2004, 83-90. 
For example, Tokutomi Sohō believed that the solution to Japan’s national crisis in responding to 
western powers’ colonization was not the military but rather Christianity, which would endow 
Japanese people with the morality and spirit of freedom of Western civilization. Yosuke Nirei, 
“The Ethics of Empire: Protestant Thoughts, Moral Culture, and Imperialism in Meiji Japan,” pp. 
83-90. For a more detailed discussion of Christianity’s penetration into the new middle class, see 
David Ambaras, “Social Knowledge, Cultural Capital, and the New Middle Class in Japan, 1895-
1912,” 10-13. Because of the dramatic increase in new middle class conversion, the number of 
Japanese Christians grew from 35, 000 in 1894 to 75, 000 in 1909. Sumiya Mikio, Nihon 
Shihōnshugi to Kirisutokyō (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 1962), 27-28, cited from 
David Ambaras, “Social Knowledge, Cultural Capital, and the New Middle Class in Japan, 1895-
1912,” 12. As Ambaras further argues, while not all members of this new middle class were 
Christians, Protestant Christianity profoundly shaped their intellectual environment. Not only did 
many middle-class social activists and intellectuals graduate from Christian schools and colleges, 
but the religion appealed to college students in Japan in general due to its connections with 
western social knowledge and civilization. David Ambaras, “Social Knowledge, Cultural Capital, 
and the New Middle Class in Japan, 1895-1912,” 11-12. 
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anti-prostitution movement at home.19 I argue, instead, that concerns about Japanese 
prostitutes abroad not only marked the starting point of a nationwide anti-prostitution 
movement but also substantially drove and influenced the development of domestic 
abolition campaigns.  
Ann Stoler interprets modern European colonialism as a project that involves the 
building up of the Western bourgeois self. Her research delineates how the sexual 
practices of Western colonizers served as crucial levers for nation building and race 
affirmation for Europeans back home.20 In this chapter, I focus, through a similar prism, 
on the connections between Japanese anti-prostitution campaigns abroad and at home, to 
illustrate how imperial ideologies and racial discourses in the frontiers of empire came to 
shape the prostitution abolition movement in Japan proper. The chapter unveils the 
unexpected ways in which middle-class social reformers legitimized their agendas for 
sexual morality and expanded their abolition campaigns in Japan by manipulating the 
issue of prostitution abroad. 
          Japanese overseas prostitutes were not only among the most powerless members of 
Japanese society, they were also not usually considered part of the empire, like many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Major monographs, such as Fujime Yuki, Sei no Rekishi Gaku, Takemura Tamio, Haishō 
Undō: Kaku no Josei wa Dō Kaihōsareta ka (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1982) and Onozawa 
Akane, Kindai Nihon Shakai to Kōshō Seido: Minshūshi to Kokusai Kankeishi no Shiten kara 
(Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2010) only include a few pages on overseas campaigns, and do 
not have sufficient discussion on the complicated relationship between these and domestic 
movements. While Bill Mihalopoulos does observe the link between the two, the connection is 
not the center of his examination. See Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution 
and the Japanese Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” Gender & History 21:1 
(April, 2009). 
20 Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). 
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other men and women who left Japan for Hawaii, North and South America as laborers. 
By highlighting the diasporic dimension of the story of the abolition movement, I hope to 
show how women at and beyond the empire’s geographic and social peripheries 
transformed the metropolis and how the efforts made by Japanese social reformers in 
disciplining these dispersed and floating subjects were crucial to the creation of Japanese 
modernity. 
Japanese overseas prostitutes moved to many places around the Pacific Rim. They 
were all viewed by Japanese abolition groups as a problem. In the following paragraphs, 
my analysis will focus on abolitionists’ campaigns against Japanese prostitutes on the 
American West Coast and in Manchuria. Existing literature on these diasporic prostitutes 
is divided into two major narratives through which Japanese colonial history in East Asia 
(shokumin shi) and Japanese emigrant history in other areas of the world (imin shi) have 
been understood. Due to the disciplinary boundaries of national history and area studies, 
the studies of shokumin and imin have been separated until recently. While the story of 
imin usually falls in the domain of national history in host countries, such as the United 
States, Canada, and Singapore, with few connections to Japan, the life of shokumin has 
been submerged in the history of Japanese imperialism.  
        On the one hand, the narrative of Japanese prostitutes on the US Pacific Coast 
portrays the women either as pioneers who ran away to pursue personal freedom in the 
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new land or as victims of international human trafficking and racism.21 Japanese 
prostitutes in Manchuria, on the other hand, are described as casualties of Japanese 
colonial expansion as well as the precursors of Japanese comfort women.22 These nation-
based historical narratives are insufficient in an effort to grasp the relationship between 
Japanese overseas emigration and Japanese imperialism from a global perspective.  
This chapter examines the convergence of Japanese abolitionist campaigns to 
eradicate Japanese prostitution on both sides of the Pacific. Focusing on California and 
Manchuria, I argue that abolitionists’ criticism of Japanese prostitutes in these two areas 
represent the two major correlated paradigms of defining self and other in Japanese 
imperial and national ideologies.23 Denunciations of Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria, 
where the empire was expanding, tell us how “Japaneseness” was invented vis-à-vis the 
colonized. Criticism of their counterparts in North America, where Japanese immigrants 
were struggling with white racism, provides clues to how Japan’s racial self was defined 
in relation to Western imperial powers. Both of these paradigms were crucial for the 
formation of the modern Japanese nation and Japan’s “reproduction” of Western 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See, for example, Oharazeki Kazuhiro, “Japanese prostitutes in the Pacific Northwest, 1887-
1920,” Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New York at Binghamton, 2008, for the former, 
and Yuji Ichioka, “Ameyuki-san: Japanese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century America,” 
Amerasia Journal 4: 1 (1977): 1-21, for the latter. 
22 See, for example, Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai: Kyūshū no Ichi Chiiki 
Joseishi no Shikaku kara (1),” Kirisutokyō Shakai Mondai Kenkyū 29 (2002) for the former, and 
Kurahashi Masanao, “Jūgun Ianfu Zenshi: Nichiro Sensō no Baai,’ Rekishi Hyōron 467 (March, 
1993) for the latter. 
23 I do not mean to imply that diasporic prostitutes in other locations were less subject to the 
concern of or less criticized by Japanese abolitionists.  
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imperialism, to borrow a word from Ayako Kano.24 The nature of Japanese imperialism, I 
argue, cannot be fully understood unless it is gauged in relation to Asia and the West at 
the same time.  
 
The Shame of Empire: The Start of the Nation-wide Abolition Movement 
Scholars generally see the campaign against licensed prostitution in Gunma 
prefecture in the 1880s as the beginning of the Japanese anti-prostitution movement.25 
There is no denying that the Gunma campaign was one of the earliest endeavors to 
abolish licensed prostitution in Japan. As Fujime Yuki correctly points out, the “success” 
of the Gunma campaign was invoked as a model for later anti-prostitution activities.26 
But its impact on the movement, particularly in the 1880s and ‘90s, has been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ayako Kano, Acting Like A Woman in Modern Japan: Theater, Gender, and Nationalism (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001), 11. Kano’s concept of Japan’s “reproduction of imperialism” is threefold: 
first, “reproduction as replication,” indicating that Japan became an imperial power by copying 
western imperial aggressions in Asia; second, “reproduction as representation,” reflecting how 
Japanese imperialism was represented in the global discourse of imperialism dominated by the 
West; third, “reproduction as gendered labor,” pointing the ways in which “women’s bodies 
become involved in imperialism.” The second and third aspects of the “reproduction” are 
particularly illuminating for us to understand the nature of the prostitution abolition movement in 
modern Japan. 
25 From 1882, abolitionists initiated a series of petitions against prostitution to the local diet in 
Gunma Prefecture. After a struggle nearly two decades long between abolitionists and supporters 
of prostitution, the prefectural government announced in 1898 that it would abolish licensed 
prostitution. Both the prostitution abolition movement leaders of the day such as Itō Hidekichi 
and scholars such as Takemura Tamio and Fujime Yuki see the Gunma campaign as the starting 
point of the abolition movement. See Itō Hidekichi, Nihon Haishō Undōshi (Tokyo: Fuji 
Shuppan, 1995), Takemura Tamio, Haishō Undō, and Fujime Yuki, Sei no Rekishi Gaku. 
26 Fujime Yuki, Sei no Rekishi Gaku, 100-103. While Fujime insightfully questions the myth of 
the Gunma campaign’s success and argues that it neither eliminated prostitutes nor abolished the 
licensed prostitution system even at the local level, she agrees that the “success” was celebrated 
as an example by campaigns that followed. 
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overemphasized. While it may have inspired similar campaigns in other prefectures, its 
influence on the abolitionists’ lobbying campaigns at the national level was rather 
limited. Established in 1886, the JWCTU is considered to have been the main leader of 
the Japanese anti-prostitution movement by the 1910s.27 Directly following its 
establishment, it started submitting petitions to the central government and the Imperial 
Diet. It was these petitions that transformed the local abolition campaigns into a national 
movement. Yet in these anti-prostitution petitions, the union did not mention the Gunma 
case at all.28 
 While the union was not oblivious to the perils of domestic licensed prostitution,29 
its main focus in the beginning was on the issue of overseas prostitutes. It was the 
lobbying campaign to abolish Japanese overseas prostitutes, not their domestic 
counterparts, that was considered to be one of the union’s two major petition projects to 
the state shortly after its establishment.30 Since the JWCTU’s petitions to the state were 
seen as the starting point of the prostitution abolition movement at the national level, one 
can argue that the national movement did not simply grow out of the local anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The Purity Society, another important association leading the abolition movement, did not 
emerge until 1911. 
28 None of the Union’s earliest petitions as printed in Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi and Nihon 
Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai Hyakunenshi (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1986) mentioned Gunma’s 
abolition campaigns.  
29 A petition it submitted to the Imperial Diet in 1890 did call for abolition of domestic licensed 
prostitution. See Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai Hyakunenshi (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 
1986), 71-74. 
30 The other major petition project was to call for monogamy. Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai 
Hyakunenshi, 62-86. Kubushiro Ochimi, the Union’s leader in the 1930s, even recalled that the 
Union submitted the petition to abolish overseas prostitution to the Japanese government in 1886, 
a few years before the establishment of the Imperial Diet. Kubushiro Ochimi, “Kyōfūkai wa Nani 
o Motte Kokka ni Kōken suru ya,” Fujin Shinpō 233 (December 1916): 6.  
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prostitution campaigns in several prefectures, but was also triggered by the issue of 
Japanese overseas prostitutes.31  
Why, then, did the abolitionists draw attention to overseas prostitutes who were far 
away from Japan proper, while somehow putting aside domestic prostitution, which they 
were facing and fighting on a daily basis? How were overseas prostitutes related to the 
Japanese abolitionists’ agendas at home? What role did concerns about and campaigns 
against overseas prostitutes play in the overall prostitution abolition movement in modern 
Japan? To answer these questions, I will first analyze how these overseas prostitutes were 
perceived and problematized. 
Distinct contexts of Japanese encounters in Manchuria and the American West came 
to shape criticism of prostitutes in different ways. Japanese prostitutes in Northeast Asia 
were generally depicted as an obstacle to the colonial agenda. Following Japan’s victory 
in the Russo-Japanese War, an article in Fujin Shinpō lamented that with the increase of 
Japanese prostitutes in Northeast Asia, “the Japanese there began to meet with local 
contempt. Japanese pride in being a victorious nation was devastated by these women of 
unsightly career (shogyōfu).”32 In another article in Kakusei in 1911,33 Shibata Hakuyō, a 
Japanese abolitionist and social activist in Manchuria, complained: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The key word here is “also.” I do not deny the connections between Gumma abolition and the 
nationwide campaigns, but hope to show the crucial role of the overseas prostitution in triggering 
the national level abolition movement. 
32 “Aa, shogyōfu”, Fujin Shinpō 110 (June 1906): 2. 
33 Kakusei was the official journal of the Purity Society since its establishment in 1911. 
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[These prostitutes even] sold sex to the Korean and Chinese coolies 
who were derided (by our Japanese) as belonging to inferior races and 
barbarians…. Thirty thousand Japanese and fifty thousand Chinese live in 
Dairen. We should not forget that while there are one thousand prostitutes 
among the thirty thousand Japanese (at a ratio of 30:1) and four or five 
hundred pimps, among the fifty thousand Chinese there are only one 
hundred prostitutes (at a ratio of 500:1) and fifty or sixty pimps. In the 
face of this comparison, can we say that the Japanese [race] is better than 
the Chinese [race]?34  
 
Associating prostitution with racial inferiority, Shibata contended that the practices of 
Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria threatened the ideological foundation of Japan’s 
colonial rule: racial superiority. 
While Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria were portrayed as undermining Japanese 
racial superiority and moral advancement vis-à-vis their colonial subjects, their 
counterparts in America threatened the ideal of racial equality between Japanese and 
Americans from the 1880s to the 1910s. As previously mentioned, in 1890 a Japanese 
abolitionist in the US lamented that due to the issue of Japanese prostitution in the US, 
American authorities and the American public were beginning to treat the Japanese as an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Shibata Hakuyō, “Mankan ni okeru santantaru shugyōfu,” Kakusei 1: 5 (November 1911): 47-
49. 
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inferior race akin to the Chinese.35 Echoing this contention, in 1913, Inoue Orio, head of 
the Temperance Bureau of the Japanese Association in North America, more clearly 
attributed American anti-Japanese sentiment to the prevalence of Japanese prostitutes 
there: 
 
While our fellow Japanese [in the US] are struggling with the Alien 
Land Law,… if we stop doing things that Americans condemn, believe in 
the same God they believe in, get rid of all the Japanese women of 
unsightly career, and enhance our morality to the degree that it is worthy 
of their respect, success will be ours. The point is that it is not the 
Americans who exclude us, but ourselves.36  
 
Although these abolitionists were on opposite sides of the Pacific, their denunciations 
of Japanese prostitutes abroad were surprisingly similar. The prostitutes in both 
Manchuria and the US were labeled as “shame” (haji). The same language, moreover, 
was applied to Japanese prostitutes in other places around the world. In a petition to the 
Japanese government to eliminate overseas prostitution in 1892, the JWCTU stated, 
“They [the overseas prostitutes] have brought disgrace upon us in China, Shanghai, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Nan’yo, and North America – almost every area on the Pacific Rim… 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 29 (September, 1890): 8. 
36 Inoue Orio, “Sashi ni okeru kakuseigun no shōri,” Kakusei 3: 6 (June 1913): 15. 
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[They] have brought notoriety to our fellow Japanese and brought shame on, and in fact 
destroyed, our national prestige.”37 Mihalopoulos explains Japanese Protestants’ untiring 
campaigns against Japanese overseas prostitution as a hybrid mentality of samurai virtue, 
Confucian morality, and Protestant chastity.38 While the moral crusade might have been 
grounded in Japanese Protestants’ cultural traditions and religious ethics, we must further 
explore the meaning of “shame” in this particular historical context.39 
The “shame” of overseas prostitution came from the harm it caused on the 
representation of Japanese masculinity and racial progress. As Revathi Krishnaswamy 
observes in her silent study of British colonial literature in India, “the cult of masculinity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 “Hitan subeki ichi daimondai,” Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 48 (May 1892): 4-5, cited from 
Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to fujin kyōfūkai: Kyūshū no ichi chiiki joseishi no shikaku 
kara (1),” Kirisutokyō Shakai Mondai Kenkyū (2002): 29. The word “Nan’yo” literatarily means 
“South Sea.” It loosely included Micronesia, Melanesia, the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia 
from the Andaman Islands to Papua. See Mark R. Peattie, Nan’yō: The Rise and Fall of the 
Japanese in Micronesia, 1885-1945 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), xvii. 
38 Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution and the Japanese Woman's Christian 
Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” 21. 
39 To be sure, seeing prostitution as shame was not a priori but a social construction in Japan. It 
was invented by abolitionists to combat the arguments of prostitution defenders, such as 
considering it a Japanese “beautiful custom” to forestall male masturbation. See Sheldon Garon, 
“The World’s Oldest Debate? Regulating Prostitution and Illicit Sexuality,” 105. Akagawa 
Manabu has examines a series of different discourses over the debates between supporters and 
opponents of prostitution in Japan since the Meiji era. He shows that all of these discourses, 
including the language of “shame,” were social constructions. Anti-prostitution campaigns in 
modern Japan witnessed a variety of discursive contestations, such as the rhetoric of shame vs. 
the rhetoric of traditionalism, the argument of sex as labor vs. the denial of the commercialization 
of sex, and the call to liberalize women’s sexual rights vs. the argument of maintaining chastity 
inside marriage. Akagawa Manabu, “Baishun no Zen Aku wa Ika ni Katararete Kita ka,” Bessatsu 
Takarajima 224: Baishun Suru Nippon (Tokyo, Takarajimasha, 1995), 174-178.  While it is 
absolute necessary to understand the language of “shame” in the contestations of different 
arguments between prostitution supporters and abolitionists, it is not the focus of this article. The 
goal of this article, rather, is to further analyze the discourse of “shame” in particular. It aims to 
show how the idea of “shame” was constructed in the context of Japan’s imperial expansion and 
how Japanese abolitionists manipulated this discourse to connect the issue of overseas 
prostitution with their domestic campaigns.  
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rationalized imperial rule by equating and aggressive, muscular, chivalric model of 
manliness with racial, cultural, and moral superiority.”40 The presence of Japanese 
overseas prostitutes thus interrupted the imagined gap between the masculine Japanese 
and the oversexed and polygamous natives in Asia. Further, as an article in Tokyo Fujin 
Kyōfū Zasshi in 1892 complained, these women degraded their human value by taking 
the barbarous men of “inferior races” as their customers. They, therefore, had to be 
eliminated in order to “prevent [others] from judging Japanese national progress by these 
women and labeling Japanese people with the same ill repute as they have earned.”41  
The overseas prostitution became a “shame” further because it sabotaged the 
imagined superiority of Japanese national morality in which female chastity was a crucial 
principle. Since moral superiority was a key justification of the empire’s global 
expansion, these Japanese women, who were willing to trade sex for money under the 
gaze of others in foreign lands, were unbearably detrimental.  
 A 1906 article in Fujin Shinpō about Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria explicitly 
stated, 
Our victory in the Russo-Japanese War has brought pride to our 
empire… (and) it is important to recognize our nation’s profound 
responsibility to [improve] Manchurian culture. [However, ‘women of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Revathi Krishnaswamy, Effeminism: The Economy of Colonial Desire (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1998), 4. 
41 “Hitan subeki ichi daimondai,” Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 48 (May 1892): 4-5, cited from 
Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai: Kyūshū no Ichi Chiiki Joseishi no Shikaku 
kara (1),” Kirisutokyō Shakai Mondai Kenkyū (2002): 29. 
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unsightly career’ and pimps] have caused [local] resentment ever since we 
started civilizing the morality of the Manchurian men and women… To 
summarize: first, [the overseas prostitutes] have degraded the Japanese 
empire’s prestige; second, they give the impression that the level of our 
people’s morality is even lower than that of the Manchus’; third, they 
impede the robust expansion of our nation.42 
 
Echoing this logic, another article in Kakusei in 1919 attributed the anti-Japanese 
sentiment in the United States to the local Japanese prostitutes who presented the wrong 
image of Japanese morality to the American people. It further argued, 
 
In order to become a great nation, Japan should realize its great dream 
of expansion in the world. Now is the time to eliminate all 
misunderstandings about Japan in the world, and make the Japanese 
people welcome everywhere. [In order to achieve this goal,] it is 
necessary for the Japanese to enhance the civilization of the world. As a 
prerequisite to it, [we] must at least stop harming civilization, [as the 
women of unsightly career are doing].43 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 “Manshū Fujin Kyūsaikai,” Fujin Shinpō, 109 (May 1906): 3-4. 
43 Shimada Saburō, “Imin Mondai to Wa ga Fūzoku,” Kakusei 9: 11 (November 1919): 4. While 
these sources (1892, 1906, 1919) were years and even more than a decade apart, they all 
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Both the claims of masculinity and moral superiority illustrate that Japan’s 
expansion on both sides of the Pacific was grounded in its self-proclaimed status in the 
Western-dominated global hierarchy of race and civilization. Rather than from cultural or 
religious morality, it is from the refusal to be racially grouped with Asian inferiors, and 
the desire to be racially equal to white Americans, that the abolitionists derived their 
sense of “shame.” In other words, this “shame” was the result of anxiety over the 
constantly fluid boundaries between the civilized/uncivilized and rulers/ruled in Japan’s 
imperial expansion. As the central source of this anxiety, Japanese overseas prostitutes, 
who were spreading an “uncivilized image” of the empire and exposing the “inferiority of 
the Japanese race,”44 were imagined by the abolitionists as sabotaging the empire on both 
sides of the Pacific: they impeded the progress of Japanese colonial rule in Northeast 
Asia and the legitimacy of Japan’s trans-Pacific emigrant expansion to North America. 
Their criticism of overseas prostitutes in both Manchuria and North America was 
motivated by a desire to sustain this imagined racial and imperial status.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
considered Japanese overseas prostitutes sabotaging Japanese national image and its expansion in 
the world. The parallel of these sources also shows the continuity of the abolitionists’ nationalist 
ideologies in overseas prostitution abolition from the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth 
century. 
44  It should be pointed out that prostitution was not always portrayed as backward in modern 
Japan. As Ann Davis insightfully show, in end of Tokugawa and early Meiji, Japanese 
prostitution was taken as evidence to show that Japan was not an isolated nation but was pursuing 
the policy of “controlled openness.” Later, prostitution, however, came to be understood by many 
Japanese policy makers and social reformers as “uncivilized” for several reasons. For one thing, 
prostitution in Japan was seen as a practice of slavery, which showcased Japan’s backwardness to 
the westerners. For another, prostitution was also defined as the opposite side of the monogamy, 
bourgeois morality, women’s rights, all of which were key standard of “civilization and 
enlightenment.” See Takemura Tamio, Haishō Undō, 3-5, and Ann Davis, “Bodies, numbers, and 
empires: Representing ‘the prostitute’ in modern Japan (1850-1912),” p. 199. 
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From the Overseas to the Domestic, 1880s to 1910s 
The discourse of civilization and progress was by no means unique to the issue of 
Japanese overseas prostitutes. It served as an important engine for the domestic anti-
prostitution movement, as well. For Japanese abolitionists, women’s chastity was a key 
criterion of social cultivation and a requirement for the nation’s goal to join the club of 
enlightened powers in the world. Asai Saku, a founder of the JWCTU, maintained in 
1888 that at a time when nations were establishing relations with one another, prostitution 
disqualified Japan as a civilized nation even in name.45 By the 1920s, such discourse was 
continuously used by the abolitionists to rationalize their concerns. Arguing against the 
Japanese government’s plan to show a traditional Japanese geisha performance at the 
World Exhibition in Los Angeles, an article in Kakusei in 1915 contended that Japanese 
geisha institution, as a form of prostitution, represented “anti-civilization” and brought 
shame on Japan.46 Comparing the issue of women trafficking in China with licensed 
prostitution in Japan, another article in the journal lamented in 1914 that since both 
practices treated women as a commodity, the Japanese could not claim they were 
culturally superior to the Chinese.47 
        If the concerns and logic of problematizing Japanese prostitution both at home and 
abroad were grounded in nationalism and imperialism, why was Japanese prostitution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 “Kyōfūkai no mokuteki,” Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 1 (April 1888): 4. 
46 “Sōko hakurankai ni keigi shutsuensenmu tosu,” Kakusei 5: 2 (February 1915): 1. 
47 “Fujin shisō no kakumei (1),” Kakusei 4: 6 (June 1914): 3. 
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abroad initially chosen as the main issue by the abolition groups for a nationwide 
movement? As historian Prasenjit Duara has observed, while a nation’s claim of 
sovereignty is internal and territorial, nationalism “has never been fully comfortable as a 
self-contained, self-justifying, and self-glorifying ideology.”48 Comments from the non-
Japanese others, including both the “civilized” in the West and the “uncivilized” in Asia, 
were crucial sources for the construction of Japanese nationalist ideologies. 
 The gaze of others, including both the recognition of the civilized and its separation 
from the uncivilized, were crucial sources for the construction of Japanese nationalist 
ideologies. Japanese Protestant Christians were sensitive to the censure of Japanese 
prostitution by Western missionaries. They frequently published reports on Japanese 
prostitutes by American missionaries in their abolitionist journals, and took the 
missionaries’ call to eradicate the prostitutes as guidance to follow.49 An article penned 
by an American missionary in Fujin Shinpō even justified American bigotry toward 
Japanese immigrants by arguing that the Japanese should first eliminate Japanese 
prostitution on the West Coast if they wanted to become civilized and to be treated as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Prasenjit Duara, “Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945,” 
The American Historical Review 102: 4 (October 1997), 1032. 
49 To name a few: “Nihon no Ojoku,” Fujin Shinpō 1 (February 1895): 16-20; “Ōbeijin no Mitaru 
Nihon no Kōshō,” Kakusei 1: 2 (August 1911): 56-57., “Nihon no Reibun no Tameni Zaigai 
Shūgyōfu o Torishimare” and “Seshiru Shi no Keikoku,” Kakusei 3: 7 (July 1913), 9-11. 
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equals in the US.50 Statements about Japanese prostitutes made by such “uncivilized” 
people as the Chinese also served as warnings of the need for emergency action.51 
Unlike domestic prostitutes, whose presence was generally limited to areas in Japan 
few foreigners could access, overseas prostitutes were constantly exposed to the gaze of 
others. As abolitionist Ogata Sennosuke argued, “the domestic shame is [after all] the 
shame inside, and the more serious problem is the external shame of our nation.... 
Abolishing overseas prostitutes will allow us to maintain our national dignity and rights 
before foreign nations.”52 Japanese prostitutes who went to North America, Hawaii, and 
places in Southeast Asia under British colonial rule were seen as baring Japan’s 
inferiority to the world’s ruling powers. Japanese prostitutes in Korea, Manchuria and 
other parts of China, on the other hand, were accused of sabotaging the empire by selling 
sex indiscriminately, especially to the subjugated and unenlightened, thus undermining 
Japan’s hard fought gains in prestige and status in the world community of nations. 
I am not arguing that anxiety concerning the Japanese empire and race was the only 
engine of the abolition movement in modern Japan. As previous studies correctly 
observe, abolition was part of a broader bottom-up political movement for women’s 
rights and social stability, which successfully enlarged Japanese women’s political and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 “Nichibei Mondai ni Kanshite Nihon Kokumin no Hansei o Unagasu,” Fujin Shinpō 199 
(January 1914): 41-44. 
51 For example, at a public gathering on the issue of overseas prostitutes, Masutomi Masasuke’s 
speech was titled “Manshū ni okeru nihonjin shōfu ni taisuru eibeijin tokuni shinajin no seji,” 
which literally means “The words of the British and Americans and particularly the Chinese 
toward Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria,” Fujo Shinbun 317 (June 4, 1906): 2. 
52 Ogata Sennosuke, “Shugyōfu ni tsuite no shokkan,” Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 10 (February 1894): 
25-26. 
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social spheres.53 The movement also belonged to a middle-class-based political struggle, 
which aimed to build modern society by collaborating with the state and disciplining the 
urban and rural poor.54 And the movement was a result of certain religious groups’ 
philanthropic efforts to rescue and educate the poor and disenfranchised.55 The issue of 
overseas prostitution, accordingly, was not the only factor that influenced the abolition 
movement. In addition to response to state policies, the development of the movement 
was driven by economic downturns and an increase in Japanese military bases; both were 
factors in the substantial growth in the number of prostitutes and brothels in domestic 
Japan. Yet, it was in the context of Japan’s imperial expansion that anxiety over overseas 
prostitution came to frame Japan’s domestic abolition movement in substantial ways. The 
remainder of this chapter, accordingly, aims to identify the synergy between campaigns 
targeting overseas prostitutes and those targeting their domestic counterparts, and 
illustrates the ways in which the former shaped and propelled the latter. 
Besides making denunciations in anti-prostitution-related journals and newspapers, 
and submitting petitions to the government, a few Japanese Protestant overseas 
missionaries started to advocate abolishing Japanese prostitution in California and Hawaii 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See Mara Patessio, “The Creation of Public Spaces by Women in the Early Meiji Period and 
the Tokyo Fujin Kyōfūkai,” The International Journal of Asian Studies 3: 2 (2006), 155-182, 
Rumi Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism: The United States, Japan, and Japanese 
Immigrant Communities in California, 1859-1920, and Ann Davis, “Bodies, numbers, and 
empires: Representing "the prostitute" in modern Japan (1850--1912).” 
54 See Sheldon Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, and Fujime Yuki, Sei no Rekishi Gaku. 
55 See Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution and the Japanese Woman's 
Christian Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” Kurahashi Katsuhito, “1930 Nendai no Haishō 
Undo ni Tsuite: Kirisutokyō Joseishi no Tachiba” and Takemura Tamio, Haishō Undō. 
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as early as the last two decades of the 19th century.56 Organized abolition activities began 
in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. Masutomi Masasuke, a member of the 
Japanese Young Men’s Christian Association (JYMCA) who went to Manchuria on a 
comfort mission for the Japanese army,57 established the Manchuria Women’s Rescue in 
June, 1906.58 It was handed over to the Japanese Salvation Army after a few months, and 
was renamed the Salvation Army Dairen Women’s Home.59 The Home worked to abolish 
Japanese prostitution in Manchuria either by assisting the colonial government in 
extraditing the prostitutes to Japan or by providing them with professional education and 
resettling them in Japanese communities in other occupations.60 Abolitionists also carried 
out several missions to investigate the conditions of Japanese prostitutes abroad. In 1908, 
two leading abolitionists, Shimada Saburō and Abe Isoo, embarked on an investigation of 
Japanese prostitution in Manchuria. With the support of Itō Hidekichi, a Protestant 
bureaucrat in the Japanese South Manchuria Railway Company, they were apparently 
able to persuade more than twenty prostitutes they met during the trip to give up their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For the Japanese abolitionists’ activities in California, see “Beikoku Dokō no Nihon Fujo,” 
Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 28 (August 1890): 5-7, and for their activities in Hawaii, see Okumura 
Takie, Onchō Nanajū Nen. 
57 This comfort mission was carried out with cooperation between the Japanese government and 
the YMCA in Japan. Under the leadership of American missionaries, the YMCA in Japan tried to 
replicate the American YMCA’s successful campaigns to comfort American soldiers in the 
American Civil War and the Spanish-American War. Japanese YMCA members also hoped this 
mission would expand their work in both Japan and Manchuria. The Japanese government, on the 
other hand, aimed to use this Christian mission to show a civilized and progressive image of the 
empire to the Western powers. The JYMCA’s comfort mission involved delivering speeches of 
patriotism and Christianity to the soldiers and offering them haircuts, bathing facilities, and clean 
clothing. See Jon Thares Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in 
Japan, 1890-1930 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1998), 112-117. 
58 Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (1),” Kikkan Chūkoku 11 (Winter 
1987): 48. 
59 Ibid, 48. 
60 “Manshū dayori,” Toki no Koe 262 (November 15, 1906): 3. 
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work.61 The JWCTU also sponsored two expeditions, to Siberia in 1919 and Singapore in 
1927, to investigate Japanese prostitution there.62 
Admittedly, campaigns against overseas prostitution were much less effective and 
fruitful than the abolition movement in Japan proper. Due to the accessibility of financial 
and human resources, activities against domestic prostitution was, no doubt, more 
manageable, and thus received the most attention. Most criticism and activities were 
targeted at domestic prostitutes, and most of the human and financial resources were 
poured into domestic campaigns. Except at the beginning of the movement, most of the 
abolition groups’ publications, propaganda, and petitions to the government centered on 
domestic prostitution. It is probably this relative silence on overseas prostitution that has 
led to scholarly neglect. By focusing on the imperial and racial ideologies behind 
abolitionists’ strategies to launch and expand the movement, however, we can recognize 
the importance of overseas prostitutes for domestic abolition campaigns, which is both 
discursive and political. 
Fully aware of the national anxiety over images of the Japanese empire and race, 
abolitionists exploited overseas prostitution in different ways to propagate their own 
versions of public morality. As Sheldon Garon insightfully observes, Japanese abolition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Takemura Tamio, “Dairen Haishō Jishi (2),” Kitaha 28 (1982): 59-62. The information about 
this trip is based on Takemura’s interview with Itō Hidekichi’s son Itō Hidefumi. Also see 
Takemura Tamio, Haishō Undō, 30-33.  
62 For the expedition in Siberia and Manchuria, see Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: 
Prostitution and the Japanese Woman's Christian Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” p. 31. After 
this expedition, the JWCTU planned to sponsor an investigation of the issue in Southeast Asia, as 
well. See “Kaigai Shugyōfu Bōshikai,” Fujin Shinpō 267 (October 1919), 29. For the 
investigation in Singapore, see Itō Hidekichi, Nihon Haishō Undōshi, 294. 
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groups usually negotiated their agendas with the state to obtain its support.63 While its 
endorsement of licensed prostitution hardly changed before the end of World War II,64 
the state was deeply concerned about the damage expatriate prostitutes might cause to the 
empire’s international image. Examining diplomatic communications between the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese consuls around the world, Mihalopoulos has 
illustrated the various efforts made by the state to deal with the issue.65 Before the 
JWCTU submitted its first anti-prostitution petition to the Japanese government in 1886, 
a prominent politician, Minoura Katsundo, informed the union’s leader, Yajima Kajiko, 
that Japanese prostitution abroad was indeed a problem that concerned the state and 
assured her that the government would pay close attention to the petition.66 From its first 
issue in 1888, Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi, the official journal of the JWCTU, reported on 
various attempts by Japanese consuls in Hawaii, Shanghai, Manchuria, and California to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Sheldon Garon, “The World’s Oldest Debate? Regulating Prostitution and Illicit Sexuality,” 
Molding Japanese Minds, 88-114. 
64 Manako Ogawa has a comprehensive analysis on the reasons the Japanese state supported 
licensed prostitution. Manako Ogawa, “American Women’s Destiny, Asian Women’s Dignity: 
Trans-Pacific Activism of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union, 1886-1945,” 83-86. She 
argues that the state utilized the licensed prostitution system to control sexual transmitted diseases 
and social crimes, and to cultivate disciplined males as workers and soldiers for the nation’s 
modernization project. 
65 Bill Mihalopoulos, Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870-1930: Prostitutes, Emigration and 
Nation-building, 41-48. 
66 Yajima Kajiko, “Teisō Mondai no Engen,” Fujin Shinpō 233 (December 1916): 1-2, cited from 
Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai: Kyūshū no Ichi Chiiki Joseishi no Shikaku 
kara (1),” 26. Neither Minoura nor Yajima mentions why the government cared so much about 
the issue of overseas prostitutes. But given that Japan was making the effort to change the 
unequal treaties with the Western powers during that time, it is highly probable that the 
government was worried that these prostitutes might expose Japan’s “inferiority” to the Western 
powers and, thus, sabotage treaty negotiation. 
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eliminate Japanese prostitution.67 From its establishment in 1886, the JWCTU submitted 
petitions to the government annually until 1927, when the state signed the League of 
Nations Convention to abolish the trafficking of women and children.68 From the 
beginning, overseas prostitution was not just a major concern of the abolitionists; it was 
also an easier issue than the problem of domestic prostitution on which to persuade the 
state to take action.69  
By associating the issue of overseas prostitution with the issue of domestic 
prostitution, abolitionists attempted to legitimize and mobilize more support and 
resources for their campaigns at home from at least 1905. Accusing overseas prostitutes 
in Manchuria of bringing shame to the empire, an article in Fujin Shinpō in 1905 called 
on Japanese women to abolish the “inhuman licensed prostitution system” in Japan 
proper.70 In a petition delivered to the Home Minister in 1911, Yajima Kajiko argued that 
licensed prostitution in Japan was the source of Japanese women going abroad to engage 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For example, see “Letter from the JWCTU to the Japanese Consul in Hawaii, Andō Tarō,” 
Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū Zasshi 1 (April 1888): 12-13, “Nihon Fujin no Dekasegi,” Tokyo Fujin Kyōfū 
Zasshi 4 (July 1888): 26. 
68 Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution and the Japanese Woman's Christian 
Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” 26. 
69 As Mihalopoulos also correctly observes, the Japanese state’s concern over overseas prostitutes 
was ambiguous. On the one hand, it sought to pass laws to prevent them from going abroad. On 
the other hand, however, it had to provide the freedom of going abroad to its people in order to 
maintain the “civilized” image of the nation. Therefore, while the abolitionists kept sending 
petitions to the government and the government did consider the issue of overseas prostitutes 
seriously, the government did not take any substantial actions to eliminate them or stop them 
from going abroad. See Bill Mihalopoulos, Sex in Japan’s Globalization, 1870-1930: Prostitutes, 
Emigration and Nation-building, 46-51. 
70 “Senryōchi no Shugyōfu,” Fujin Shinpō 99 (July 1905): 4. In the 1930s, the abolitionists 
eventually comprised their agenda with the state by tolerating the licensed prostitution on the one 
hand and abolishing private prostitution on the other hand. See Garon, Molding the Japanese 
Minds, 106-111. But in the early stage of the abolition movement, the abolitionists considered the 
elimination of licensed prostitution their ultimate goal in domestic Japan.  
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in prostitution. She viewed overseas prostitutes as the diffusion of an evil domestic 
system. Yajima urged that the elimination of licensed prostitution at home was necessary 
to prevent overseas prostitutes from sabotaging the empire’s civilized image.71 In this 
way, campaigns for the abolition of overseas prostitution came to justify and empower 
campaigns against licensed prostitution.  
Public speeches and assemblies that purportedly concerned overseas prostitution 
typically promoted the organizers’ domestic agendas as well. At a gathering in Tokyo 
called “The Meeting to Discuss the Issue of Prostitutes in Manchuria and Korea” in 1906, 
attended by more than one thousand people, all three headline speeches by prominent 
abolitionists focused on prostitution at home. Japanese Salvation Army leader Yamamuro 
Gumpei’s address discussed how to persuade prostitutes to abandon the profession; Abe 
Isoo lectured on the relationship between instinctivism and prostitution; and Shimada 
Saburō’s speech stressed the connections between licensed prostitution and national 
morality.72 
Shared concerns about overseas prostitution among abolitionists also facilitated 
collaboration among abolition groups. The Japanese YMCA’s Manchuria Women’s 
Home was able to send some prostitutes back to Japan and resettle them in the Japanese 
Salvation Army’s Women’s Home and the JWCTU’s Women’s Relief Home in Tokyo.73 
It was at the public gathering in Tokyo to advocate the Manchuria Women’s Home, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Yajima Kajiko, “Kōshō Haishi ni Kansuru Chinjōsho, ” Kakusei 1: 2 (August 1911): 59. 
72 “Manshū Fujin Kyūsai Ensetsukai,” Fujin Shinpō 110 (June 1906): 8. 
73 “Manshū Shugyōfu Kyūsai Undō,” Fujo Shinbun 317 (June 4, 1906). According to this report, 
15 prostitutes were sent back and rehabilitated in Tokyo and another 15 prostitutes were resettled 
as employees of Dairen Telephone Exchange Company in Manchuria. 
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mentioned above, that the Japanese Salvation Army announced it would take over 
management of the Manchuria Women’s Home from the Japanese YMCA.74 Donations 
raised at this event, moreover, were given to the Japanese Salvation Army’s women’s 
relief section in Japan proper, not the Women’s Rescue Home in Manchuria.75 
One can also find close connections between these early experiences and 
collaboration in dealing with prostitution abroad, and the formation and activities of the 
Purity Society. Established in 1911, the Society was a male-dominated anti-prostitution 
association, in which abolitionists from different groups participated. It soon became the 
leading organization of abolition campaigns nationwide.  
As scholars have convincingly argued, the creation of the Society was based on the 
growth of the domestic abolition movement since the 19th century, in which abolitionists 
initiated local campaigns to call for relocating or shutting down brothel districts in urban 
areas. These campaigns reached their peak when a fire in April 1911 burned Yoshiwara, 
the most famous licensed district in Tokyo, into ash. Taking advantage of this incident, 
abolition groups such as the JWCTU, the Japanese Salvation Army, and the Japanese 
YMCA launched a joint campaign criticizing the state’s permission of prostitution on the 
one hand, and preventing the rebuilding of Yoshiwara on the other. While they failed to 
stop the resumption of brothel operations, it is through these campaigns that the Purity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 “Manshū fujin kyūsai ensetsukai,” Fujin Shinpō 110 (June 1906): 8, Kurahashi 
Masanao,“Manshū Fujin Kyūsaikai to Masutomi Masasuke” Rekishigaku Kenkyū 598 (October 
1989): 43. 
75 “Manshū fujin kyūsai ensetsukai,” Fujin Shinpō, 8. 
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Society, which directly aimed to abolish Japan’s licensed prostitution system, was 
established.76 
Intriguingly, however, most of the Society’s founders and leaders had experience 
dealing with overseas prostitutes. The president, Shimada Saburō, and one of its vice-
presidents, Abe Isoo, investigated Japanese prostitution in Manchuria in the 1900s.77 The 
other vice-president, Yajima Kajiko, had led the JWCTU to petition the government 
annually to abolish overseas prostitution since 1886.78 Both Shimada and Yajima saw 
overseas prostitution as the product of Japan’s licensed prostitution system at home. They 
argued that in order to eliminate this national shame and obstacle to Japanese overseas 
development, it was imperative to abolish the licensed system itself.79 Masutomi 
Masasuke, the acting director of the Purity Society from 1911, was also the founder of 
the Manchuria Women’s Home established in Dairen. Another director, Yamada Yajūro, 
served as manager of the Women’s Home in Manchuria from 1906 to 1910 before 
participating in the prostitution abolition movement in Japan .80 Itō Hidekichi, who 
became the acting director of the Purity Society in 1920 and a key leader of the anti-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Elizabeth Dorn Lublin, Reforming Japan: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in the 
Meiji Period (Vancouver/Toronto: UBC Press, 2010), 116-118. 
77 Takemura Tamio, “Dairen Haishō Jishi (2),” 59-62; also see Takemura Tamio, Haishō Undō, 
30-33. 
78 For a full list of Purity Society’s personnel, including the leaders and founders, see Kakusei 1: 2 
(August 1911): 69. 
79 For Shimada, see his speech in the opening ceremony of Kakuseikai. Shimada Saburō, 
“Kakuseikai Soshiki no Shoshi o Senmei Suru,” Shimada Saburō Zenshū, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Ryūki 
Shosha, 1989), 177-180. For Yajima, see Yajima Kajiko, “Kōshōhaishi ni kansuru chinjōsho,” 
Kakusei 1: 2 (August 1911): 59. 
80 Shibata Hakuyō, Yamada Yajūrō Shi Kinenshi (Dairen: Ōta Shinzō Shoten, 1939), 7. 
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prostitution movement in Japan in the ’20s and ’30s,81 began his crusade against 
prostitution in the 1900s working with Shimada Saburō and Abe Isoo to provide 
accommodation for women rescued from prostitution in Manchuria.82 Two other 
directors, Shimanuki Hyōdayū and Kozaki Chiyoko, did not take part directly in abolition 
activities abroad. They were, however, both active with women’s issues in Japanese 
communities in North America, and lobbied strongly against overseas prostitution.83  
 
Localizing the Problem: The JWCTU in Kyūshū, 1910s-1920s 
The impact of programs to eliminate overseas prostitution on the abolition 
movement in Japan continued through the 1910s and 1920s. Prostitution abolition 
campaigns were part of larger social and political movements advocating women’s rights 
and the modernization of public morality.84 Abolition leaders, accordingly, never failed to 
exploit the issue of overseas prostitution for their wider social and political ambitions. By 
identifying the districts Shimabara and Amakusa in Kyūshū as the source of overseas 
prostitution, the JWCTU managed to expand its abolition campaigns to Kyūshū. It also 	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successfully launched a series of campaigns for women’s education and formed alliances 
with local governments, schools, and other social groups. In addition to revealing how the 
domestic impact of overseas prostitution extended to the local level, the case of Kyūshū 
demonstrates how Japanese abolitionists referred to overseas prostitution to expand their 
domestic campaigns in the 1910s and 1920s. 
The JWCTU established branches in Nagasaki and Kumamoto in 1899, and there 
had been sporadic anti-prostitution activities in Kyūshū in the 1890s.85 However, there 
were no organized abolition campaigns on the island even after the JWCTU established 
its Kyūshū branch in 1913. Neither in 1913 nor in 1914 did the annual reports of the 
JWCTU’s Kyūshū branch mention any abolition campaigns.86 The Nagasaki and 
Kumamoto branches’ main focus was assisting evangelical missions of local churches 
and promoting alcohol prohibition.87  
An organized abolition movement eventually materialized in Kyūshū in 1915 in 
response to a perceived need to eliminate overseas prostitution. Proclaiming Shimabara 
and Amakusa in Kyūshū to be breeding grounds for overseas prostitutes, the JWCTU’s 
Kyūshū main branch began petitioning local authorities and communicating with local 
schools around Kyūshū to tackle prostitution.88 The branch invited Masutomi Masasuke 
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86 “Kyūshū ni okeru fujin kyōfūkai,” Fujin Shinpō 197 (November 1913): 24-27; “Dainikai 
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87 Ibid, 27-29. 
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Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai: Kyūshū no Ichi Chiiki Joseishi no Shikaku 
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and Yamamuro Gunpei from the Purity Society to speak on abolishing prostitution. 
Masutomi’s lecture, in particular, focused on overseas prostitutes.89 In Nagasaki, 
Masasuke visited the head of the prefectural police department and reached an agreement 
with him on JWCTU-police cooperation in abolishing local prostitution.90 In 1916, the 
JWCTU embarked on an ambitious project to expand their campaigns to abolish licensed 
prostitution nationwide. Among other activities, they implemented a plan whereby the 
JWCTU leaders from Tokyo would visit the Kyūshū main branch at least once a year, 
showing the organization’s attention to the campaigns on this island.91 
        An investigative trip to Siberia and northern Manchuria in 1919 led by three 
JWCTU members confirmed the severity of the prostitution problem in those regions and 
the role of Shimabara and Amakusa in its development.92 The JWCTU, accordingly, 
sponsored another investigative mission to Kyūshū in the same year and issued a 
pamphlet about Shimabara and Amakusa.93 It attributed the cause of overseas prostitutes 
to “uncivilized” local customs and to low levels of female education in those two areas.94  
Reports following both missions concluded that Japan’s licensed prostitution system 
should be abolished, and that programs to morally educate the women of Shimabara and 
Amakusa about the dangers and shame of prostitution was imperative. The report of the 
Siberian investigation noted, in particular, that in order to launch educational campaigns, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 “Kakuchi Tsūshin: Nagasaki,” Fujin Shinpō 219 (September 1915), cited Ibid. 
90 “Kakusei Undō no Kinkyō,” Kakusei 5: 11 (November 1915), cited Ibid, 125. 
91 “Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai Dainijūyonkai Daikai Kiroku,” Fujin Shinpō 227 (May 1916), 
cited ibid, 86. 
92 Miyagawa Shizue, “Shiberia shisatsu no Ki,” Fujin Shinpō 261(April 1919), 9-16. 
93 Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai (1),” 41-43, and Kurahashi Katsuhito, 
“‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai (2),” 91. 
94 Nunokawa Seien, “Shimabara Amakusa no Kenkyū,” Fujin Shinpō 267 (October 1919), 12-16. 
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greater cooperation between the government and social groups was needed. Public 
speeches by JWCTU members and Christians, it argued, were far from sufficient, and the 
government needed to take responsibility for moral education by revising textbooks and 
providing social campaigns with financial and political support.95  
At its annual meeting in 1919, the JWCTU decided to launch special education 
campaigns in Shimabara and Amakusa.96 Afterward, JWCTU leaders embarked on a 
speaking tour of schools in Kyūshū,97 and the Kyūshū branch sponsored an essay contest 
on overseas prostitution for all Kyūshū students.98 By 1921, the JWCTU had successfully 
launched a series of well-attended gatherings in Kyūshū and had formed close alliances 
with local authorities and social groups to support women’s education campaigns.99 
These public gatherings and the Kyūshū branch’s meetings were supported and attended 
by local government officials, social educators, and journalists.100 
The JWCTU’s expansion and its success in winning support from the state and other 
social groups cannot be fully understood without discussing the impact of World War I. 
As Sheldon Garon and Onozawa Akane correctly point out, in the new international and 
domestic political environment following World War I, the state began relying on 
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97 Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai (2),” 90. 
98 Ibid. 89. 
99 Kubushiro Ochimi, “Shakai Kaizen no Kanki,” Fujin Shinpō 291(December 1921), 5. 
100 Kurahashi Katsuhito, “‘Karayuki’ to Fujin Kyōfūkai (2),” 93. 
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women’s organizations to extend its social control;101 abolition groups, for their part, 
mobilized postwar international and “democratic” discourse to propel and enlarge their 
campaigns against licensed prostitution and for moral education and women’s rights.102 
While the JWCTU embarked on expansion in 1916, it failed to raise sufficient attention 
or support.103 The union’s substantial local development was not realized until 1921, 
when it allied with other women’s organizations.104 
The JWCTU campaigns in Kyūshū, however, illustrate that the issue of overseas 
prostitution facilitated the union’s domestic expansion. It enabled the JWCTU to win the 
support of local authorities from the mid-1910s, and to implement abolitionist campaigns 
in Kyūshū through the 1910s and 1920s. Therefore, at least in Kyūshū, in addition to the 
impact of World War I, anxiety over overseas prostitutes loomed large as an important 
driving force for the abolition movement. The JWCTU also carefully used this issue to 
raise support for its political and social agendas regarding women’s rights and moral 
education. 
 
Synopsis 
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A JWCTU member, under the pen name “T.J. in Kagoshima,” wrote to the Fujin 
Shinpo in 1920 criticizing the JWCTU’s recent investigation of Japanese prostitution in 
Siberia. “T.J. in Kagoshima” observed that the investigators never attempted to talk with 
any prostitutes, and hence had failed to understand the prostitutes’ perspective. The 
author argued that the JWCTU should not have cared about the prostitutes just because 
they were Japanese. Rather, the union should have been motivated by cosmopolitan 
compassion that transcended nation and race.105 
 As this chapter has illustrated, nationalistic ideologies and discrimination against 
prostitutes characterizes not only the JWCTU’s Siberian investigation but the entire 
prostitution abolition movement in pre-war Japan. As Ann Stoler observes in her study of 
European colonialism, “The charged debate in the late nineteenth century on nationality 
and citizenship rights for women prompted by the emigration of thousands of women 
overseas devolved into one about their needed protection against white slavery on the 
argument that European women would never willingly submit to sexual commerce with 
foreign, racially varied men.”106 In a similar way, from the JWCTU’s first prostitution 
abolition petition to the formation of the Purity Society, from the claim that licensed 
prostitution was the source of “social evil” abroad to the development of the JWCTU’s 
women’s education campaign in Kyūshū, overseas prostitution substantially shaped and 
propelled anti-prostitution campaigns in domestic Japan. The desire to become a 
civilized, thus ruling, empire was impetus and effective strategy for abolition groups, 	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gaining support from both the state and the public for their agendas to reform the social 
morality of all Japanese.  
Accordingly, the state’s occasional cooperation and paternal benevolence were 
enthusiastically celebrated by abolition groups as proof of the movement’s patriotism. 
The groups were, thus, not only constantly eager to persuade the state to support their 
agendas, but also more than ready to compromise. Such compromise had existed in the 
very beginning of the movement, long before the abolitionists’ well-known collaboration 
with the state and their concessions to licensed prostitution during the total war era of the 
1930s and ’40s.  
In reality, the prominent focus of the Japanese Salvation Army’s Dairen Women’s 
Home was not to eliminate Japanese prostitution in Manchuria per se, but the visibility of 
it. As Philippa Levine points out in her study of colonial prostitution in British Empire, 
“The brothel needed to be spectacular and secretive, vulgar and discreet, available but 
controlled, inviting but off-limits… The brothel, like the slum, was one of the impossible 
edges of modernity, a place colonialism could not do without, but that it nonetheless 
rejected.”107 After the Russo-Japanese War, the colonial government implemented the 
licensed prostitution system in Japanese Manchuria, which made the practice of 
prostitution less visible by restricting it within special locations and renaming Japanese 
brothels (kashizashiki) and prostitutes (shōgi) as restaurants (ryōriten) and hostesses 
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(shakufu), respectively.108  Recognizing the legitimacy of the licensed system, the Home 
refused to accommodate Japanese prostitutes who had escaped from the brothels and 
sought help if they “still owed a debt to their brothel owners.” 109  It, instead, targeted the 
prostitutes who did not or could no longer work for the licensed brothels due to physical 
or mental disease.110 By accommodating these women, the Home reduced the number of 
private, or “illegal,” prostitutes who were not regulated by the licensed system and thus 
more visible on the streets.111 Celebrating the “improvements” in local ethics under the 
licensed system and the efforts made by the Home, Shibata Hakuyō, in an article in 
Kakusei in 1912, happily noted that Japanese prostitutes were no longer seen on Dairen’s 
streets. They were, instead, strictly controlled inside brothels.112  
 
To some extent, the abolitionists’ dedication to eliminating overseas prostitution 
showcased their patriotic soul and, as pointed out previously, won, at least sometimes, 
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their domestic campaigns the eagerly desired endorsement and support of the state.113 
The irony is, however, that in the late 1930s, many abolition groups, Christian ones in 
particular, were either persecuted or fell victim to the state’s authoritarian regulation, 
because they, as Sheldon Garon precisely puts it, no longer belonged to the national 
orthodoxy but were labeled “antiwar and antimilitary.”114 The presence of overseas 
prostitutes, whom the abolitionists saw as the most shameful and unpatriotic members of 
the empire, proved to be more desirable than that of the abolitionists. These women 
continued to be exploited by the empire either as licensed prostitutes or as comfort 
women until the end of the Asia Pacific War.115 
This chapter has shown the ways in which the anxiety over the overseas prostitutes 
shaped Japan’s domestic abolition movement. The next chapter will further explores how 
the activities of abolishing these “bad” women abroad were carried out and how these 
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activities were closely associated with the education campaigns on Japanese women, both 
inside and outside of the empire, that aimed to mold them into desirable subjects.  
 
 
 
 
 
144	  	  
	  
Chapter 4    
Good Women for Empire 
Educating Overseas Female Emigrants in Imperial Japan, 1900-1945 
 
 In 1937, the Japanese government launched a plan to send a million households to 
Manchuria within twenty years to support the empire’s expansion and wars in East Asia. 
Mobilizing and exporting women from Japan itself was an important part of this policy.1 
Referred to as “continental brides (tairiku no hanayome),” most of these women came 
from rural Japan and were expected to foster Japanese agrarian settlement in the Asian 
continent by marrying Japanese male peasants there. They were supposed not only to 
bear and rear racially pure Japanese children and to assist their husbands in farm work, 
but also to represent Japanese female morality vis-à-vis local women.2 The project of 
continental brides, just as that of comfort women, has usually been cited by scholars to 
illustrate how gender subjugation converged with racial subjugation in Japanese empire 
at the high point of militarism and war mobilization.3  Such an imperial 
instrumentalization of women, however, was hardly an anomaly in the history of the 
Japanese empire or simply a product of the Asia-Pacific War.  As the following 	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Shutten, 2005), 211-212. 
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discussion demonstrates, between 1900 and the 1920s, the social campaigns for Japanese 
prostitution abolition in Manchuria and emigrant women’s education in North America 
jointly paved the way for the state’s mobilization of women for colonial expansion in the 
1930s.  
As early as 1912, Japanese Salvation Army leader Yamamuro Gumpei argued that 
Japanese prostitutes in Manchuria should be rescued and resettled with other professions 
for the sake of the improvement of the colony: 
    In our new colonies the number of male [settlers] far exceeds that 
of female. The shortage of housemaids is particularly serious in 
Manchuria. Meantime, in certain areas of Kyūshū and Chūgoku, it is 
customary to send daughters abroad [to work] as prostitutes. In addition 
to simply rescuing these women from the hands of evil people, we will 
introduce them to good professions to contribute to the colony’s 
operation.4 
 
On the other side of the Pacific, just four years later, Kawai Michi, the National 
Secretary of the Japanese Young Women’s Christian Association (JYWCA), attributed 
American anti-Japanese sentiment in California in part to rural Japanese immigrant 
women’s involvement with agricultural work. As she complained, “husbands and wives 
working together in the field is what Americans hate most, since it neglects housekeeping 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Yamamuro Gunpei, “Manshu no Jochū Yushutsu, ”Kakusei 2: 6 (July 1912): 32. 
146	  	  
	  
and childcare. Thus it has been impossible [for Japanese immigrants] to assimilate into 
the American society.”5 The JYWCA, accordingly, initiated a series of programs to 
educate Japanese immigrant women, particularly those from rural Japan, introducing 
them to the western lifestyle, Protestant morality, and bourgeois social manners.    
 The Japanese Salvation Army’s plan of abolishing Japanese prostitution in 
Manchuria and the JYWCA’s strategy to appease anti-Japanese sentiment on the other 
side of the Pacific emerged in different historical and political contexts. But they both 
assumed that Japanese emigrant women, most of whom were from impoverished families 
in rural Japan, would play crucial roles in the empire’s overseas expansion.6 Both 
Yamamuro and Kawai believed that after receiving appropriate tutelage and discipline 
these women could become a powerful force of Japanese settlement abroad. While 
Yamamuro Gunpei aimed to transform evil prostitutes into good women in Japanese 
Manchuria, Kawai Michi urged Japanese women in America to abandon outside work 
and stay at home for housekeeping and childcare.  
In this chapter, I examine and compare these two tutelage campaigns initiated by 
Japanese Protestant educators targeting Japanese emigrant women in Manchuria and 
California in the first two decades of the twentieth century. It draws the connections 
between Japanese colonial settlement in Manchuria and Japanese migrant experience in 	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Kai, the official journal of the JYWCA. 
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California to deepen our understanding of the nature of Japanese imperialism.  In 
particular, it shows how the ideas of sending women overseas for expansion and of 
disciplining emigrant women to maximize their service as mothers, inferior laborers, or 
symbols of racial and national progress were developed and practiced in the first two 
decades of the twentieth century. The imperial instrumentalization of women fully 
embodied in the “continental bride” project, therefore, was not a product of the total war 
era. Instead, it originated from the prostitution abolition campaigns in Japanese 
Manchuria and women’s education campaigns in Japanese communities in California one 
and two decades earlier.  
Similar to Chapter three, this chapter is concerned not so much with the agency of 
the emigrant women as with the role of middle-class social groups in shaping the nature 
of Japanese female migration. It is divided into three parts. The first looks at the 
campaign launched by the JYMCA and the Japanese Salvation Army to abolish Japanese 
prostitution in Manchuria at the turn of the twentieth century, and discusses the unlikely 
cooperation between Japanese middle-class abolitionists, brothel owners, and local police 
in maintaining the colonial order. Part two examines Japanese social leaders’ campaigns 
to educate Japanese rural women who migrated to the United States in the 1910s and 
1920s, and investigates how classist and racial struggle interacted with nationalism in this 
trans-Pacific project of tutelage and discipline. Building on the analyses in Part one and 
two, in part three, I assert that the social campaigns for Japanese prostitution abolition in 
Manchuria and emigrant women’s education in North America impacted the women’s 
education movement in domestic Japan. Further, I argue that these campaigns jointly 
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paved the way for the state’s mobilization of women to Manchuria in the 1930s. The 
chapter ends with a short account of the tragic experiences these Japanese female settlers 
had when they returned to Japan from Manchuria after the end of the Asia-Pacific War, 
along with Japan’s discursive shift from an expansive empire to a peaceful nation state.  
 
The Women’s Home and the Ethics of Japanese Manchuria 
This section explores the nature of Japanese prostitution abolition in Manchuria 
through the lens of the Salvation Army’s Dairen Women’s Home. It analyzes the close 
relationship between the Home and the Japanese military as well as the Kantō 
administration.7 By looking at how the Home rehabilitated prostitutes, it reveals the 
unexpected ways in which the Home supported the Japanese licensed prostitution system 
in Manchuria.  
The majority of Japanese overseas prostitutes in Asia ended up in Manchuria;8 the 
Japanese abolition campaign in Manchuria was also the most vocal among all overseas 
projects carried out by Japanese abolitionists. The customers of the Japanese prostitutes 
in Manchuria included not only Japanese soldiers and businessmen, but also local 	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8 According to Japanese government statistics, in 1910 there were 12203 Japanese prostitutes in 
Manchuria, comprising 36.5 % of the entire Japanese female population there. This far exceeds 
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were found. Kurahashi Masanao, Kita no Karayuki-san (Tokyo: Kyoei Shobō, 1989), 38. While 
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Chinese, Manchus and Russians. While the call to abolish overseas prostitution in order 
to maintain the pride and dignity of the race and empire had been voiced since the 1890s, 
limited financial and human resources left Japanese abolitionists unable to take effective 
action until the establishment of the Home in 1906 by the abolitionists.9  
        While celebrated by some scholars as “the light in dark night” or “Buddha in hell,”10 
the Women’s Home was closely associated with the Japanese military from the very 
beginning. The founder of the Home, the Reverend Masutomi Masasuke, went to 
Manchuria in a mission to solace Japanese soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War. This 
solace mission was carried out with cooperation between the Japanese government and 
the YMCA in Japan. Working with local American missionaries, the YMCA in Japan 
tried to replicate the American YMCA’s successful campaigns to comfort American 
soldiers in the American Civil War and the Spanish-American War. The Japanese YMCA 
members also hoped this mission would expand their work in both Japan and Manchuria. 
The Japanese government, on the other hand, aimed to use this Christian mission to show 
western powers a civilized and progressive image of the empire.11  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (1), ” Kikkan Chūkoku 11(winter, 
1987): 48. 
10 Ibid, 54. 
11 Jon Thares Davidann, A World of Crisis and Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-
1930 (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1998), 112-117. 
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       This picture shows two Japanese YMCA members providing a haircut and shave 
service to Japanese soldiers in Manchuria during Russo-Japanese War. Courtesy of 
Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Libraries.  
 
        The solace mission involved delivering speeches on patriotism and Christianity to 
the soldiers and offering them haircuts, bathing facilities and clean clothing.12 The 
JYMCA’s prostitution abolition activities, including the Women’s Home, were an 
extension of this collaboration. The military not only helped the abolitionists deport a few 
Japanese prostitutes from Manchuria to Japan but also assisted in the daily operation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ibid, 113. 
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the Home.13 Protestant officers in the army, such as Major Hibiki Nobusuke, a paymaster, 
Sano, and an army surgeon, Osaki, sometimes even delivered lectures to the prostitutes in 
the Home.14 
        Because of similar concerns, the Kantō administration offered support to the 
Women’s Home as well by providing free land and financial aid to the Home’s 
establishment and its following upgrades.15 The administration worried about the trouble 
the expatriate prostitutes might cause to Japan’s colonial rule in Manchuria, particularly 
when they were regarded with contempt even by poor Chinese.16 Thus it expected the 
Home to improve the image of Japanese women in order to reinforce the difference 
between the colonizer and the colonized.  
 The support of the military and colonial authorities to the Women’s Home also 
resulted from their concerns about the health of Japanese soldiers and male settlers. From 
the last few decades of the nineteenth century, health examinations conducted on 
Japanese military showed an increase in the number of soldiers infected with venereal 
diseases;17 the ratio was as high as approximately two to three percent of all soldiers who 
were examined in the 1910s and 1920s.18 According to an observation of American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Kurahashi Masanao, “Manshū Fujin Kyūsai to Masutomi Masasuke, ” Rekishigaku Kenkyū 
598: 10 (1989): 36-39. 
14 Ibid, 40. 
15 Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (2),” Kikan chūkoku 12 (spring 1988), 
48. 
16 Kiyama Sei “Hokushi Oyobu Manshū Dendō Kaishi Tenmatsu Ryakki,” Fukuin Shinpō (March 
4, 1937), cited from Kurahashi Katsuhito, “Manshū ni Okeru Karayuki Kyūsai Jigyō (3),” 
Kirisutokyō Shakai Mondai Kenkyū 58 (2010): 23 and note 159. 
          17 Sabine Frühstück, Colonizing Sex: Sexology and Social Control in Modern Japan (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003), 35. 
18 Ibid., 36 
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Christian missionaries, in a Japanese military hospital in Manchuria during the Russo-
Japanese War, one third of the cases were caused by venereal diseases.19 In Japan’s 
Siberian expedition from 1918 to 1920, 2,012 soldiers were infected with venereal 
diseases, far exceeding the 1,387 who were killed in the battlefield.20 As early as during 
the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese military started to manage special brothels for 
soldiers along the march to control the infection rate. All prostitutes in these brothels 
were required to receive medical examinations before they served the soldiers.21 After the 
war, from the fall of 1905 to early 1906, the Kantō administration issued a series of laws 
to regulate the booming prostitution business in the Kwantung Leased Territory, in order 
to maintain the health of Japanese soldiers and male settlers and the stability of the 
colonial community. This set of laws formed the licensed prostitution system in Japanese 
Manchuria, which not only legalized prostitution by imposing tax and age requirements 
on prostitutes but also required them to receive regular medical examinations.22 These 
regulations also made the practice of prostitution less visible by restricting it within 
special locations and renaming Japanese brothels (kashizashiki) and prostitutes (shōgi) as 
restaurants (ryōriten) and hostesses (shakufu), respectively.23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Galen Fisher, Japanese Young Men in War and Peace (The International Committee of Young 
Men’s Christian Association, 1905), 5-6.  
20 Sabine Frühstück, Colonizing Sex, 37. 
21 Fujinaga Takeshi, “Nichiro Sensō to Nihon ni Yoru ‘Manshū’e no Kōshō Seido Ishoku,” 
Kairaku to Kisei:Kindai ni Okeru Goraku no Yukue, (Osaka: Osaka Sangyō Daigaku Sangyō 
Daigaku Kenkyūjo, 1998), 72-77.  
22 Ibid, 72-77.   
23 Ibid, 72-77. 
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Japanese prostitutes waiting for customers in front of a Manchurian brothel, 
renamed “restaurant”. A cartoon in Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (July 26, 1912). 
 
While aiming to abolish Japanese prostitution in Manchuria, the Women’s Home 
responded actively to the authorities’ concerns about venereal diseases and cooperated 
with the licensed prostitution system in unexpected ways. The Home accepted Japanese 
prostitutes selectively at best. As Reverend Uemura, one of its managers, clarified, it only 
accommodated those prostitutes “who truly decided to quit prostitution and do good work 
instead.” For those who “escaped from brothels just on an emotional impulse” or “just 
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wanted to run away from their debts [to brothel owners],” the Home would either 
persuade them to return to the brothels, or consult with the Kantō administration and 
accept these prostitutes only with its permission.24 It was reported by Manshū Nichinichi 
Shinbun, a major newspaper in Japanese Manchuria, that an escaped prostitute was sent 
back to her brothel after the Home refused to accommodate her and handed her over to 
the police.25 
The Women’s Home’s accommodation capacity was limited to eight or nine 
prostitutes per month.26 Since there were several thousand Japanese prostitutes in 
Manchuria at the time,27 the Home did not cause substantial damage to the business of 
Japanese brothels. Instead, the brothel owners were more likely to welcome the Home, 
since, as historian Kurahashi Masano insightfully observes, it functioned as an asylum for 
those prostitutes who could no longer work in brothels as a result of sexual diseases or 
other physical or mental problems. In other words, the Home helped the brothels dispose 
of the dysfunctional prostitutes.28  
The Home founder Reverend Masutomi Masasuke lamented the spread of venereal 
diseases among young Japanese in Dairen and ascribed it to the existence of local 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (July 24 and 25, 1912) cited from Kurahashi Masano, “Kurahashi 
Masanao, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (1),” 55. 
25 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (August 10, 1910) 
26 According Yamamuro Gunpei, the leader of Japanese Salvation Army, from June, 1906 to 
June, 1912, the Home accommodated 620 women in total. By dividing the number of prostitutes 
by the number of months, therefore, the Home worked at the rate of eight or nine prostitutes per 
month. See Yamamuro Gunpei, “Manshū ni Okeru Fujin Kyūsai,” Kakusei 2: 6 (1912), 30. 
27 See note 20. 
28 Kurahashi Masano, Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (2),” 46-49. 
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Japanese prostitution.29 Major Hibiki Nobusuke, the main supporter of the Home in the 
military, also managed to establish the Dairen Christian Benevolence Hospital with the 
cooperation of Japanese Protestant groups and the Kantō administration.30 The hospital 
provided medical care exclusively to Japanese prostitutes infected with venereal 
diseases.31 Because the Women’s Home and the hospital were operated by the same 
group of people, the hospital could cooperate with the Home and provide treatment for 
the infected prostitutes it accepted. The Kantō administration also established special 
hospitals in cities to conduct regular examinations and medical treatment on Japanese 
licensed prostitutes. Therefore, the Home, by providing treatment to the infected 
prostitutes, actually helped the government to control venereal disease for the sake of the 
health of Japanese soldiers and male settlers.32 
Besides accommodating diseased prostitutes and providing them with medical 
treatment, the Home also supported the licensed prostitution system by decreasing 
potential private or “illegal” prostitutes. Without the Home, the prostitutes escaping from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Masutomi Masasuke, “Manshū ni Okeru Nihon Shogyōfu (1),” Yorozu Chōhō (December 8, 
1907) cited from Yuhara Kenichi, “Kyokutō Ajia e no Nihonjin Imin to Shōfu,” Aichi Ronsō 79, 
(2005): 21. 
30 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (November 22, 1907). The president of the hospital was Shibata 
Hakuyō, an enthusiastic prostitution abolitionist and a strong supporter of the Home. See Shibata 
Hakuyō, “Mankan ni Okeru Santantaru Shugyōfu,” Kakusei 1: 5 (November 1911): 47-49. 
Shibata Hakuyō, “Dairen no Fūki,” Kakusei 2: 4 (April 1912): 165.  While the hospital was 
initially established in response to venereal diseases, it later turned into a general hospital, 
providing affordable service for social grassroots in Manchuria. Shin Ketsu and Nagaoka 
Masami, eds., Shokuminchi Shakai Jigyō Kankei Shiryōshū: Manshū/Manshūkoku Hen, vol. 9 
(Kingendai Shiryō Kenkōkai, 2005), 144. 
31 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (November 22, 1907). Based on the military background and the 
Kantō administration’s support, we can assume that by providing treatment to infected Japanese 
prostitutes, the hospital also aimed to decrease the possibility of Japanese soldiers in Manchuria 
to be infected by venereal diseases via sexual contacts with the prostitutes. 
32 Kurahashi Masano, “Kyūseigun no Dairen Fujin Home (2),” 46. 
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the licensed brothels would go elsewhere, and might end up returning to the business as 
private sex workers. As a journalist from the Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun observed, the 
Women’s Home prevented those prostitutes from being “cheated by evil people and 
miring in dangerous situations.” Given that the brothels mentioned here were obviously 
under the licensed prostitution system, “dangerous situations” thus indicate prostitution 
beyond governmental and legal control.33 The Home, accommodating prostitutes who 
had escaped from licensed brothels and controlling their mobility, therefore further 
guaranteed the health of Japanese soldiers and male settlers by forestalling and limiting 
prostitution without the state’s regular medical examinations.  
The Women’s Home not only functioned as an asylum for escaped Japanese 
prostitutes but also trained and resettled them. Of the prostitutes it accepted, except for a 
small number who were deported back to Japan, the majority received professional 
training in the Home, and were resettled in Japanese Manchuria with other occupations. 
A small number of the prostitutes found jobs such as telephone operators and nurses, but 
most ended up working as housemaids.34 Housemaids became the Home’s main channel 
of prostitute resettlement for two reasons. First, housemaids did not require substantial 
professional training; therefore it was practical and manageable for the Home with its 
limited resources. Second, it echoed the dire need for housemaids in local Japanese 
communities. Before the mass agricultural migration to Manchuria in the 1930s, Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (July 24, 1912). 
34 Kurahashi Masanao, “The Salvation Army and the Women Home (1),” 53. Also see Shin Ketsu 
and Nagaoka Masami, ed., Shokuminchi Shakai Jigyō Kankei Shiryōshū: Manshū/Manshūkoku 
Hen, vol. 6 (Kingendai shiryō kenkōkai, 2005), 294. 
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settlers were mainly composed of officials in the Kantō administration, bourgeois 
businessmen, and employees of Japanese colonial companies, such as the South 
Manchuria Railway Company.35 They had both the need to hire housemaids in order to 
live a bourgeois life and the financial capacity to afford it.36  
In Japan proper, the demand for housemaids in cities could be filled by migrant 
women from the countryside. But in Manchuria, where most of the Japanese settlers lived 
in urban areas, this labor resource was very limited.37 Besides, the occupation of 
housemaid appeared far from attractive even for impoverished Japanese emigrant women 
in Manchuria. Compared with the position of a housemaid, which demanded long hours 
of physical labor at a modest wage, being a prostitute, with a payment several times 
higher, was more appealing.38 Meeting the need for housemaids thus became a major 
issue for the middle- and upper-class settlers in Japanese Manchuria. 
In addition to transforming local prostitutes into housemaids, the abolitionists 
further planned to import housemaids from Japan to replace the prostitutes. Reverend 
Yamamuro Gunpei, the leader of the Japanese Salvation Army, which had operated the 
Women’s Home from 1906, was the initiator of this plan. After his investigation and 
discussion with colonial officers, Yamamuro concluded that many women were duped 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Yanagisawa Asobu, Nihonjin no Shokuminchi Keiken: Dairen Nihonjin Shōkō Gyōsha no 
Rekishi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999), 23-26, 45-81. 
36 Citing Hiratsuka Raicho’s complaints regarding the redundancy of housework, Shimizu 
Michiko shows that it became a common practice for the newly emerged middle-class families to 
hire housemaids. Shimizu Michiko, “Jochū” Imeiji no Katei Bunka Shi (Tokyo: Sekai Shisōsha, 
2004), 77-78.  
37 Yamamuro Gunpei, “Manshū ni Okeru Fujin Kyūsai,” 32. 
38 Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun ni Yoru Manshū e no ‘Jochū’ no Yushutsu no Kuwadate,” 
Aichi Kenritsu Daigaku Bungakubu Ronshū 39 (March 1991): 21-22.  
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into believing that they would be legitimately employed, but were then sold as 
prostitutes. He contended that the prevalence of this practice debased the society and 
public hygiene in Japanese Manchuria. Meantime, the number of Japanese men there far 
exceeded that of Japanese women. Their need for housemaids and wives remained unmet. 
Therefore, in addition to passively abolishing prostitution, he argued, it would be 
effective to proactively solve the problem by sending good-natured  (zenryō naru) 
women to Manchuria.39 He suggested collaboration with a hotel in Monshi, Kinparo, 
which would recruit unmarried women in the Kyushu area and send them to the Home. 
The Home would then provide these women with the necessary training before 
introducing them to potential employers of housemaids.40 
The distinction between prostitute and housemaid provided the foundation of these 
two endeavors: the abolitionists attempted to transform the prostitutes— the shameful 
and filthy — into housemaids — the civilized and healthy — and to use the latter to 
displace the former. However, both attempts exploited the similarities of these two 
groups of women in unexpected ways. Coming from rural and impoverished areas of 
Japan, prostitutes and housemaids alike were assumed to be capable of meeting the needs 
of the Japanese male settlers, though the former was for sexual needs while the latter was 
for social needs. The interchangeability between members of the two groups in reality 
further proved the feasibility of these attempts: While some prostitutes eventually earned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 “Manshū Shugyōfu no Fukuin: Yamamuro Taisa no Dan,” Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (May 3, 
1912). 
40 Yamamuro Gunpei, “Manshū ni Okeru Fujin Kyūsai,” 32 and “Manshū Shugyōfu no Fukuin: 
Yamamuro Taisa no Dan.” 
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enough money to repay their debts to brothel owners and quit prostitution,41 many 
Japanese women in Manchuria turned to prostitution for higher wages after working as 
housemaids for a short period of time.42 Still some who migrated to Manchuria aiming to 
find jobs like restaurant waitress or housemaid ended up working as prostitutes. While 
there is no evidence so far on whether sex was involved in any case of housemaid 
employment in Japanese Manchuria, in early-twentieth-century Japan, prostitutes were 
sometimes introduced to their customers as housemaids. Housemaids were at times hired 
for both housework and sex service.43  
While Yamamuro’s maid importation plan failed to materialize due to the Japanese 
Salvation Army’s limited human and financial resources,44 the Home’s program of 
turning prostitutes into housemaid proved to be fruitful. The Home further worked as an 
agency to introduce local Japanese women to housemaid jobs and encourage them to 
continue this career path by hosting housemaid gatherings and rewarding dedicated 
housemaids.45 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Manshū Nichinichi Shinbun (October 14, 1912), (December 24, 1916), cited from Kurahashi 
Masanao, “Kyūseigun ni Yoru Manshū e no ‘Jochū’ no Yushutsu no Kuwadate,” 32, note 9. 
Based on a survey made by police, about half of the 685 prostitutes in the Sūsaki quarter between 
1925 and 1927 were able to quit prostitution by paying all or part of their debts to the brothel 
owners.  Sheldon Garon,“The world’s oldest debate? Regulating Prostitution and Illicit 
Sexuality,” Molding Japanese Minds, 95.  
42 Manshu Nichinichi Shinbun (September 28, 1916) cited from Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun 
ni Yoru Manshū e no ‘Jochū’ no Yushutsu no Kuwadate,” 20-21.  
43 Shimizu Michiko, “‘Hashutsufu’ Came in: Modification of the Image of Jochū (housemaid) 
between the Two World Wars,” The Bulletin of Kansai University of International Studies 
(March, 2003 ): 148-149. 
44 Kurahashi Masanao, “Kyūseigun ni Yoru Manshū e no ‘Jochū’ no Yushutsu no Kuwadate,” 18. 
45 Ibid, 22-26.  
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The cartoon captures the potentially problematic relationship between a master 
and his housemaid in early twentieth century Japan. The master is looking lasciviously at 
his housemaid while the mistress, unnoticed by her husband, watches angrily. Fearing an 
affair between her husband and the housemaid, she makes up her mind to replace the 
current housemaid with one that is “a more ugly and competent”.  
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“Yuwaku no ōi hashutsufu (Temporary housemaids with many temptations),” 
Shokugyō dukushi: gendai manga daikan dai hachi hen (Numerous occupations: An 
overview of modern manga, vol. 8), Chūō Bijutsusha, 1928, p. 171 
 
The Japanese social reformers’ war against prostitution was driven by a variety of 
factors, such as their religious ethics, bourgeois morality, and sympathy over the 
impoverished.46  Yet a major goal of the Home’s abolition campaign in Japanese 
Manchuria was to deal with possible trouble that the prostitutes might cause for Japan’s 
colonial regime.47 The Home accommodated the escaped prostitutes and provided 
medical treatment to those who were infected with venereal diseases. It not only helped 
brothels to manage the health of prostitutes at a lower cost but also reduced the rate of 
potential “illegal” prostitutes and hence strengthened the state’s prostitution control. 
Further, it sought to shift prostitutes in Manchuria toward careers as housemaids, who, 
they believed, were equally capable of meeting the social and sexual needs of the 
Japanese male settlers, but in a justified and civilized way. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Bill Mihalopoulos, “Mediating the Good Life: Prostitution and the Japanese Woman's Christian 
Temperance Union, 1880s-1920s,” Gender & History 21:1 (April, 2009): 21. The campaign of 
prostitution abolition and the housemaid training program was just part of the Home’s activities. 
See Shin Ketsu and Nagaoka Masami, eds., Shokuminchi Shakai Jigyō Kankei Shiryōshū: 
Manshū/Manshūkoku Hen, vol. 1 (Kingendai Shiryō Kenkōkai, 2005), 26-29.  
47 Sheldon Garon’s study on the collaboration between prostitution abolitionists and the state in 
domestic Japan provides an analytical model that can be also applied to Japan’s colonies in earlier 
periods of the empire. Garon,“The World’s Oldest Debate?” 88-114.  
162	  	  
	  
Representing a Civilized Nation and Race: Japanese Emigrant Women’s Education 
in California 
 Abolitionists of Japanese overseas prostitution did not limit their gaze to 
Manchuria but considered it a global problem for the nation. Yamamuro Gunpei, for 
example, argued that Japanese prostitutes in the United States fueled local anti-Japanese 
sentiment and sabotaged Japanese immigrant settlement there.48  Expressing the same 
concern, the JYWCA’s National Secretary Kawai Michi lamented in 1923, “It has been 
said that in the world, the United Kingdom is known for its flying national flags, China is 
known for its laborers, and Japan is known everywhere for its prostitutes.” As long as 
Japanese women were seen by the world as “toys,” Kawai reasoned, Japan could never be 
treated as a civilized nation.49 However, she further pointed out that the problem did not 
reflect only on the prostitutes, but on all Japanese women. The judgment on a nation, 
Kawai argued, was based on the position of women in society, and Japanese women’s 
current social status and education level were far behind the standard of “first-class” 
nations. It was therefore imperative for all Japanese women to receive education for the 
sake of the nation.50  
Abe Isoo, a prominent Protestant politician and advocate of women’s rights in 
Japan, further voiced the importance of exporting Japanese females to enhance Japanese 
settlement on the west coast of the United States. In order to “strengthen the ground of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Yamamuro Gunpei, Shakai kakusei Ron (Tokyo: Keiseisha Shotten, 1914), 384-392.  
49 Kaiwai Michiko, “Nihon Fujin no Sekai Hyō,”Joshi Seinen Kai 16: 3 (March 1923): 1. 
50 Ibid, 2. 
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Japanese communities,” he believed that it was imperative to encourage Japanese women 
to migrate to the United States to rescue Japanese emigrant males from “insipid life” and 
“degradation.” Exporting women to the United States, Abe continued, would also 
“inspire our [Japanese] women’s great spirit of overseas expedition.” To this end, Abe 
suggested that Japanese government both tighten its ban on Japanese prostitutes’ overseas 
travel and encourage women with “good education and morality” to go to the United 
States. He also expected Japanese social leaders and organizations both in the United 
States and Japan to provide assistance to these migrant women.51  
This section will examine the JYWCA-led education campaigns targeting Japanese 
immigrant women in California. I will discuss the ways in which Japanese immigrant 
women were disciplined for particular national and racial representations and were 
assigned to specific professions while being refused access to others.  
While the bulk of the Japanese population in Manchuria before the 1930s consisted 
of urban middle-class settlers, Japanese immigrants in California in the beginning of the 
twentieth century were mainly male agricultural laborers. Most of them were 
impoverished bachelors.52 Inter-racial marriage between Japanese and white Americans 
was legally forbidden in California. Japanese male immigrants usually could not afford to 
go back to Japan to find marriage partners, because of financial limitations and possible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Abe Isoo, Hokubei no Shin Nihon, 62-69. 
52 According to the annual census of the United States, in 1900 Japanese population in the US 
comprised 23341 males and 985 females. Yanagisawa Ikumi, “‘Shashin Hanayume’ wa ‘Otto no 
Dorei’ Datta no ka: ‘Shashin Hanayume’ Tachi no Katari o Chūshin ni,” in Shashin 
Hanayome/Sensō Hanayome no tadotta Michi: Josei Iminshi no Hakkutsu, edited by Shimada 
Noriko, (Tokyo: Akashi Shotten, 2009), 6. The gender ratio is close to 24:1. 
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military service obligations in Japan.53 Many therefore chose to ask their relatives in 
Japan to pick partners for them. After the two sides exchanged photos by mail and agreed 
to marry, the man would pay the traveling expenses for his bride, so that she could come 
to the United States to meet him and live with him. This type of marriage, which became 
increasingly popular among Japanese immigrants in the United States at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, was called “picture marriage”; Japanese women who immigrated to 
the United States through this form of marriage were called “picture brides.” 
Although scholars now commonly use the term “picture bride,” it was originally 
coined by Japanese Protestant bourgeois educators to label poor Japanese women who 
were obsessed with a good life abroad and were willing to obtain a steamship ticket to the 
United States by marrying a man they had never met.54 Like Japanese overseas 
prostitutes, these picture brides, who were mostly from rural areas and poor families, 
were criticized by Japanese Protestant educators as bringing shame on the Japanese race 
and nation because of their “inappropriate” manners and “outdated” make-up and 
dressing styles.55 Kawai Michi even attributed American anti-Japanese sentiment in part 
to the “uneducated” behavior of these women.56 Those who came to the United States 
through a picture marriage, therefore, did not feel comfortable being called a “picture 
bride” because they saw this term as derogatory.57 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Ibid, 6-7. 
54 Takanashi Takako, “Shashin Kekkon no Hanashi,” Joshi Seinen Kai 16: 4 (April, 1919), 21-24. 
55 Ibid, 21-24. 
56 Kawai Michiko, “Enjeru Shima no Ichinichi, ” Joshi Seinen Kai 12: 8 and 12: 9 (September 
1915), 50.  
57  Ishuin Hideko, “Sōkō Tayori,” Joshi Seinen Kai 14: 2 (February 1917), 30.  
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Under Kawai’s leadership, the JYWCA and its main branch in California initiated 
education campaigns to discipline picture brides so that they could represent Japan in 
more desirable ways.58 With support from local government and politicians, the JYWCA 
established an emigrant women’s school in Yokohama, providing classes on housework, 
English, childrearing, American society and western lifestyle and travel tips for the 
picture brides before they left for the United States.59 Besides training, the JYWCA 
disseminated pamphlets with similar guidance among emigrant women. The JYWCA’s 
California branch also offered accommodation and similar training to picture brides after 
their arrival.60 
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Kai 9: 9 (October 1912): 17-18. 
59 Kono Yiwa no Ue ni: Yokohama YMCA Hachijū Nen Shi (Yokohama YMCA, 1993), 10.  
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A pamphlet distributed to Japanese picture brides in the United States in 1919 by 
Japanese American Association, titled “A new guide for women migrating to the US.” 
Courtesy of Wakayama Municipal Library, Wakayama Prefecture, Japan. 
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During an investigation of the third-class cabins of a ship headed to the United 
States, a JYWCA member expressed anxiety about the impression these poor emigrant 
Japanese women would make on Americans because of their filthy and smelly luggage, 
improper body gestures and overly loud voices. Deeply concerned about “how to educate 
these ignorant rural women who know nothing and turn them into ‘ideal women’ 
quickly,” the author gave them pamphlets of guidance and urged them to go to the 
JYWCA branch when they reached the shore. She compared this solicitude for them to 
that of “a mother [who] looks at her daughters and wants her daughters to appear 
beautiful so that they will not be disliked by others.”61 
Kawai herself penned a series of articles in JYWCA’s journal, Joshi Seinen Kai, to 
instruct picture brides in preparation both for their journey to the United States and the 
investigation procedure in the immigrant bureau.62 The series is laid out as conversations 
between four fictional figures: a teacher and three students. The teacher, Mrs. Nishida 
Yoneko, is a well-educated middle-class woman married to a Japanese businessman in 
New York and familiar with western culture and society. The students are three picture 
brides: Itō Naho, Shimizu Masa and Nakamura Sei. They are from rural areas and know 
nothing about lifestyle and polite manners in the United States. Nishida is generously 
willing to give them guidance before they leave Japan. The first scene is in Nishida’s 
house, where Nishida teaches the three brides the correct ways to dress and wear makeup, 
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62 For a more detailed and comprehensive account of this series, see Tanaka Kei, “Japanese 
picture marriage in 1900-1924 California: construction of Japanese race and gender,” Ph.D. 
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as well as appropriate gestures and manner of speaking.63 The second scene is on a ship, 
when they are on their way to the US; Nishida, in attractive western clothes, comes to see 
these brides in the third-class cabin, providing guidance on how to avoid seasickness and 
warning them not keep smelly food.64 In the third and last scene, on the deck of the third 
cabin, Nishida’s tone becomes more critical. After checking the picture brides’ room, she 
criticizes them for throwing dirty things on the bed and urges them to keep the room 
clean and tidy. She also warns them not talk to men on the ship. In the end, after a few 
suggestions on what to do during the immigrant check-in procedures and on bathroom 
manners in the United States, Nishida urges them to go to the JYWCA branch in 
California for further education when they reach shore.65 
Whether it was a caring mother’s concern over her daughters’ appearance or a 
strict teacher’s warnings to her students regarding their misconduct, both the tropes of 
parenting and teaching normalized the social hierarchy between middle-class Japanese 
elites and impoverished emigrant women from rural Japan, and between Protestants (thus 
well-educated and civilized) and non-Protestants (thus uneducated and uncivilized) into 
natural categories. Social subordination and cultural tutelage of the former over the latter 
thus appeared not only justified but also necessary. Such normalized tutelage was further 
empowered in the name of nation and race. Both the investigation report and instruction 
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series ended with the expectation that these uneducated women could eventually 
represent Japan well to Americans and improve the image of the Japanese race in the 
United States.66 
The mission of disciplining rural women’s wrongdoings did not stop at correcting 
their manners in daily life but went as far as regulating their marriage and occupation. 
Owing to limitations of communication and understanding between the two sides before 
marriage, not all picture marriages ended happily. In order to find a good partner, some 
Japanese male immigrants used fake pictures to appear younger and more handsome than 
they really were. Others lied about their financial situation, claiming that they were 
successful businessmen or rich landowners, while in reality they were merely agricultural 
labors.67 As a result, many picture brides felt either disappointed or cheated when they 
faced the reality. Since there were far fewer women than men in Japanese communities in 
California, it was relatively easy for a single female to find a job and live by herself. 
Many disappointed brides thus chose divorce.68 Japanese Protestant educators and local 
Issei (first generation migrants) male leaders attributed these wife-initiated divorces to 
“the weakness of Japanese females” and “degradation of female morality.”69 They 
warned that these “degraded women” were the cause of American anti-Japanese 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See “Chihō no Tokōsha no Katagata e,” Joshi Seinen Kai, 16: 7 (July, 1919): 36 and “Tobeisha 
no Shiori” in Joshi Seinen Kai 14: 10 (October, 1917 ): 29. 
67 Yuji Ichioka, “Amerika Nadeshiko: Japanese Immigrant Women in the United States, 1900-
1924,” Pacific Historical Review, 9: 2 (May, 1980): 347-348. Also see Yanagisawa Ikumi, 
“‘Shashin Hanayume’ wa ‘Otto no Dorei’ Datta no ka,” 64-65. 
68 Rumi Yasutake, Transnational Women’s Activism: the United States, Japan, and Japanese 
Immigrant Communities in California, 1859-1920 (New York: New York University Press, 
2004), 125.  
69 Kusunoki Rokuichi, “Beikoku Kashū Engan no Dōhō,” Joshi Seinen Kai 11: 7 (July 1914): 8 
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sentiment, and urged all Japanese immigrant women to remain loyal to their husbands 
and fulfill their duty to raise children.70 Local Japanese Christian women’s homes 
sometimes even intervened and managed to prevent such divorces.71  
In responding to financial difficulties and the hardship of agricultural life, most of 
the Japanese immigrant women living in rural areas had no choice but to work in the field 
with their husbands.72 American exclusionists accused this of transgressing the normal 
gender spheres of man and woman in which a man should be the only bread-earner while 
a woman should stay at home taking care of the family. They described the Japanese 
women in the field as the slaves of their husbands, and attributed such “transgression” to 
the racial inferiority and uncivilized tradition of Japanese immigrants.73 Replicating the 
claim made by white racists, Kawai argued that if women went out to work, their 
housework and childrearing duties would be neglected. She maintained that Japanese 
female immigrants’ farm work was driven by their greed for money, and assumed it was 
a cause of American anti-Japanese sentiment.74  
I do not deny the historical significance of the JYWCA’s education campaigns as a 
collective effort of Japanese immigrants to fight for their own racial dignity and equal 
rights under American racism. Unlike the case of Japanese Manchuria, where the settlers 
enjoyed political and racial privileges protected by the Japanese colonial power, Japanese 	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73 Ibid, 77.  
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immigrants in California were at the bottom of society in terms of racial hierarchy and 
social rights. Due to the overarching white racism, they were left with few choices but to 
manipulate the discourse of race for their own survival.75 
Such white racism, however, ironically lent power to class subordination under 
Japanese nationalism within Japanese American communities. Protestant family and 
gender values, bourgeois-based ways of living and manners in daily life were carefully 
justified and taught to immigrant women in the name of nation and race. Social elites in 
both Japan and Japanese American communities supported these Protestant-based 
education campaigns and saw these immigrant women as a crucial force for promoting 
the overall image of the Japanese around the world. According to a pamphlet issued by 
the Japanese American Association in 1919, Japanese women in the United States were 
supposed to have both passive and positive responsibilities (shōkyokuteki sekinin and 
sekkyokuteki sekinin). They were not to stain the dignity of Japanese women, on the one 
hand (passive responsibility), and were to represent Japanese women as women of a first-
class nation by assimilating to American society and widening their knowledge of the 
United States, on the other (positive responsibility).76 In order to protect the Japanese 
race from American exclusion, it became a national and racial obligation for the poor and 
uneducated Japanese women to follow the tutelage of Japanese Protestant educators and 
adopt their religious value and middle-class-based lifestyle.  
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Expansionism and the Instrumentalization of Women: From Housemaid and 
Picture Bride to Continental Bride 
Both Japanese prostitution abolition activities in Manchuria and the Japanese 
women’s education campaign in California could be considered unsuccessful. The 
Women’s Home accommodated escaped prostitutes on a very limited scale and did not 
challenge the licensed prostitution system in Japanese Manchuria. The lack of financial 
and human resources thwarted the Japanese Salvation Army’s housemaid exportation 
plan. Programs for educating Japanese women in California failed to prevail against 
American exclusionism,77 since the real problem lay in white racism itself, not in how 
Japanese immigrants behaved.78 Nevertheless, as this section will show, these campaigns 
did have important social effects: they jointly drove the women’s education movement in 
domestic Japan and paved the way for the state’s nationwide project of mobilizing and 
exporting women to Manchuria in the 1930s.  
         In both campaigns the expatriated females were described not only as staining the 
dignity of the Japanese nation and race, but also sabotaging Japanese overseas expansion. 
Since Japanese overseas settlement was crucial for the empire’s development,79 
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78 For a comprehensive discussion of Japanese Americans’ racial struggles in the early twentieth 
century, see Azuma, Between Two Empires, 65-81. 
79  Japan’s colonization of Manchuria was a source of great pride for the empire, and Japanese 
prostitutes in Manchuria were blamed for impeding Japan’s “robust expansion.” Japanese 
communities in California were claimed to be the most important Japanese overseas settlement. 
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disciplining and educating these women became a national necessity. This problem of 
women abroad, in both cases, further came to serve as a powerful justification of the 
women’s education movement in domestic Japan. As Kawai Michi straightforwardly put 
it, in order to avoid the trouble caused by the degraded Japanese women in the US, it was 
imperative to promote women’s education in domestic Japan.80  
        An investigative trip to Siberia and northern Manchuria in 1919 led by three 
JWCTU members diagnosed the Amakusa and Shimabara areas in Kyūshū as the origin 
of Japanese prostitution in Manchuria.81 The JWCTU, accordingly, sponsored another 
investigative mission to Kyūshū in the same year and issued a pamphlet about Shimabara 
and Amakusa.82 It attributed the cause of overseas prostitutes to “uncivilized” local 
customs and to low levels of female education in those two areas.83 Reports following 
these missions concluded that Japan’s licensed prostitution system should be abolished, 
and that programs to morally educate the women of Shimabara and Amakusa about the 
dangers and shame of prostitution was imperative. The report of the Siberian 
investigation noted, in particular, that in order to launch educational campaigns, greater 
cooperation between the government and social groups was required. Public speeches by 
JWCTU members and Christians, it argued, were far from sufficient, and the government 	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needed to take responsibility for moral education by revising textbooks and providing 
social campaigns with financial and political support.84  
  At its annual meeting in 1919, the JWCTU decided to launch special education 
campaigns in Shimabara and Amakusa.85 Afterward, JWCTU leaders embarked on a 
speaking tour of schools in Kyūshū,86 and the Kyūshū branch sponsored an essay contest 
on overseas prostitution for all Kyūshū students.87 By 1921, the JWCTU had successfully 
organized a series of well-attended gatherings in Kyūshū and had formed close alliances 
with local authorities and social groups to support women’s education campaigns.88 
These public gatherings and the Kyūshū branch’s meetings were supported and attended 
by local government officials, social educators, and journalists.89 Through these 
campaigns the JWCTU strengthened its local branches and its cooperation with local 
government and women’s social groups in Kyūshū.90  In particular, the JWCTU 
cooperated with the Virgin Society (Shojo Kai), a state-run women’s organization, to 
conduct its women’s education campaigns in rural areas from the end of the 1910s.91 The 
Society planned to include “facilitating Japanese women’s overseas emigration” as its 
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90 See chapter three. 
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mission as early as 1918.92 Though the plan was not carried out at that time, the Virgin 
Society eventually became the government’s main apparatus for training and exporting 
women to Manchuria after 1937.93 The JWCTU itself also launched a series of 
workshops to train women before they were sent to the Asian continent during the total 
war era.94 To facilitate women’s emigration, Japanese government established the 
Overseas Women’s Association (Kaigai Fujin Kyōkai) in 1927 to encourage and guide 
Japanese women to migrate overseas and also serve as a marriage agency between 
Japanese male settlers abroad and women in domestic Japan. Kubushiro Ochimi, a 
prominent JWCTU leader in the 1920s and 1930s, was one of the association’s 
directors.95 The association later served as a key institution of mobilizing and training 
continental brides.96 
  Similarly, the JYWCA’s school for emigrant women’s training in Yokohama also 
collaborated with domestic women’s schools and even participated in poverty relief 
activities in local areas.97 Through a series of public lectures in Kyūshū and Western 
Japan, Kawai Michi addressed the problem of Japanese women in California and 
promoted the collaboration between the JYWCA and local authorities and women’s 
schools. Her speaking tour was particularly successful in Nagasaki, Kumamoto, and 
Hiroshima, the places in Western Japan that sent the largest numbers of women abroad 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Watanabe Yōko, Kindai Nihon Joshi Shakai Kyōiku Seiritsu Shi (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1997), 
109. 
93 Aiba Kazuhiko, Chen Jin, Miyata Sachie, Nakashima Jun eds., Manshū “Dairiku no 
Hanayome” wa Dō Tsukurareta ka, 291-301. 
94 Ibid, 286. 
95 Ibid, 280-283. 
96 Ibid, 280-283. 
97 “Yokohama Iminbu no Hataraki no Ichibu,” Joshi Seinen Kai 16: 2 (February, 1919): 41. 
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annually. Meeting with local governors, mayors and directors of police departments, 
Kawai stressed the necessity of establishing local JYWCA branches and enhancing 
women’s education, and won their support.98 After resigning from her position in the 
JYWCA, Kawai Michi established a private women’s college, the Keisen School for 
Young Women (Keisen Jogakuen), in Tōkyō in 1929. Besides general education, this 
school aimed to provide training in horticulture and farming skills to young Japanese 
women who planned to migrate to Japan’s colonies.99   
  This chapter has shown that in the first two decades of the twentieth century two 
transnational campaigns led by Japanese Protestant educators and social leaders not only 
laid the social, discursive and institutional ground for training female emigrants and 
sending them abroad but also formed cooperative networks between the state and social 
women’s groups. These campaigns and networks eventually enabled the state to readily 
launch the continental brides project. The idea of instrumentalizing women behind the 
governmental project of “continental brides” was not new in the 1930s. Nor was it a 
product of the total war era. In the late 1930s, when state officials went to rural areas in 
Japan to persuade young women to migrate to the Asian continent on behalf of the 
empire, they met with few expressions of misgiving and little resistance. Nationwide 
lectures and speeches by the JWCTU and the JYWCA in earlier decades had already 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Kawai Michiko, “Nagasaki Yuki,” Joshi Seinen Kai 14: 10 (November, 1917): 21-24, and 
“Kyūshū Yuki,” Joshi Seinen Kai, 14: 11 (December 1917): 24-29. 
99 Keisen Jogakuen Gojūnen no Ayumi (Tokyo, Keisen Jogakuen, 1979), 27. The school also had 
a special department for “overseas students” (Ryūgakusei Bekka) which provided training in 
housework skills and Japanese culture to nisei (second generation) Japanese Americans female 
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diffused information on Japanese overseas communities, informed Japanese women in 
the countryside about the possible opportunities to settle abroad and had convinced them 
that this would lead to a better life. 
 
While problematizing Japanese overseas women, Japanese abolitionists and social 
activists never repudiated the importance of women for the nation and race. Instead, they 
generally considered Japanese women to be the crucial resource for Japan’s overseas 
expansion. The campaigns on either side of the Pacific did not disavow the value of 
Japanese emigrant women per se, but aimed to transform bad women into good ones. On 
the one hand, the Women’s Home accommodated prostitutes and resettled them in 
Manchuria as housemaids in order to meet the need of Japanese male settlers in 
Manchuria in a civilized way; Kawai’s programs and Abe’s proposal, on the other hand, 
focused on educating Japanese emigrant women prior to their settlement in the United 
States and sending well-educated and proper women to eliminate the racial shame 
experienced by Japanese in America. 
At the core of this transformation was the debated question of how women, the 
rural and impoverished in particular, should be educated and called into service for the 
nation. Japanese Protestant educators and social moralists in both Japanese Manchuria 
and Japanese communities in the United States strived to maintain their leadership in 
local societies by connecting their class-based social and religious ethics, family values, 
and standards of cleanliness and social manners with Japanese national and racial 
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authenticity. Employing the language of patriotism, their programs of abolishing 
prostitution and enhancing female education and morality not only marginalized 
impoverished emigrant women but also disciplined them in ways that strengthened 
middle-class hegemony in Japanese overseas communities. This classist subordination 
was further conducted under the discourse of racial hierarchy and progress. These 
degraded and uneducated women became obstacles to claiming Japanese racial 
superiority over the colonized in Asia, on the one hand, and impediments to proving the 
desired equal position of the Japanese with white Americans, on the other.  
In addition to class-based subordination, the distinction between bad and good 
women and campaigns to transform the former into the latter testify to the close 
relationship between womanhood and population power as unveiled by recent post-
colonial feminist theories.100 Women’s sexuality was considered the crucial factor in 
guaranteeing the health and power of the next generation’s empire-builders; thus it had to 
be carefully controlled and monitored. To rear children and maintain racial purity and 
quality became a national duty. Nonproductive women such as Japanese prostitutes on 
both sides of the Pacific and uneducated Japanese women in California who would work 
in the field at the expense of childrearing came to be labeled as problematic and 
unpatriotic. The Japanese social reformers’ value of monogamy, their sexual and social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Anna Davin and Anne McClintock have both shown how the British Empire rationalized and 
involved motherhood and childrearing into national policy-making to secure racial purity and 
population power for colonial expansion by the next generation. Anna Davin, “Imperialism and 
motherhood.” History Workshop Journal 5: 1 (March 20, 1978): 9-66, Anne McClintock, 
Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1995), 47.  
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ethics, and their embrace of the western discourse of civilization converged seamlessly 
with the ideologies of instrumentalizing women for Japanese imperial expansion. 
Japanese Protestant social activists, too, fully sensed the usefulness of their ideologies for 
the empire, and actively utilized these ideologies to maintain their faith in the dominant 
social discourses in imperial Japan.  
Furthermore, campaigns in Manchuria and California also illustrate that the 
national and imperial instrumentalization of women went far beyond concern with 
population power. It materialized in different ways under various historical and political 
contexts. Accordingly, the category of good women in phases of Japanese expansion was 
a constantly fluid one, exemplified by the contrasting standards for what it meant to be a 
good woman in Japanese communities on opposite sides of the Pacific.101 To satisfy the 
needs of middle-class Japanese male settlers and their families in Manchuria at the turn of 
the twentieth century, the occupation of housemaid was elevated and presented to the 
impoverished and powerless Japanese women as a desirable and patriotic profession. 
Those who sought to work as housemaids were thus lauded as good women. Sharing the 
desire for expansion, Japanese prostitution abolition groups formed an unlikely alliance 
with colonial authorities and the military. The goal of their mission became to maintain 
the sexual health and hygiene of soldiers and male settlers, so only diseased and 
unlicensed prostitutes fell into their target group. The state-controlled licensed 
prostitution system itself coexisted peacefully with the Japanese Women’s Home in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 While my discussion focuses on the discourse surrounding “good” women, as we can see, 
“bad” women like prostitutes were equally, if not more, necessary for the empire, though the 
latter demand was carefully hidden by the emphasis on respectable females. 
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Manchuria until the end of World War II. On the other side of the Pacific, to foster 
Japanese settlement in the American west and prevent male emigrants from slipping into 
degradation, the exportation of female marital partners to meet their needs for sex and 
family became a national necessity. Under white racism and the class subordination 
inside the Japanese communities, all emigrant women became responsible for 
representing the progress of the Japanese nation and race. The rural and uneducated 
females were thus identified as problematic and shameful, and were assigned the national 
and racial obligation to learn to dress, speak, and live in middle-class (thus civilized) 
ways. Only those who fulfilled these obligations and stayed at home as dedicated mothers 
and wives could be called good women. Those who worked in the field to assist their 
husbands were criticized as greedy for money and irresponsible. The various roles and 
obligations assigned to the emigrant women in Manchuria and California aimed to exploit 
women in particular social conditions on the frontiers of the empire’s expansion. 
Opprobrium fell on any women that transgressed or failed to fit into the approved 
category.  
   The standards for good women were transformed into yet another version in the 
project of “continental brides” launched by the imperial state in 1937. As the 
government’s handbook distributed to female emigrant training schools in Japan stated, 
the goal of the training programs was to make sure emigrant women would serve the 
empire at three levels in the following ways: 
1. As a force to accomplish [Manchurian] frontier policies 
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a) Increase the stability of the colonial settlement in order to secure 
the national and racial resource; 
b) Secure national resource and maintain the purity of the Yamato 
race; 
c) Transplant Japanese womanhood to the continent and create a new 
culture in Manchuria; 
….. 
2. As women in village communities 
a) Take care of food, clothing and shelter, and create domestic 
culture in the frontier; 
3. As housewives in individual agricultural families in the colony 
a) Competent assistants to pioneer farmers in the field; 
b) Competent comforters in the family; 
c) Competent caretakers of children of the second generation.102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Joshi Takushokusha Teiyō, (Takumushō Takubeikyoku, 1942), 124-125. 
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     This cartoon was drawn by a Japanese colonial artist, Sakamoto Gajō, depicting 
the morning ritual of Japanese emigrant women in a continental bride training school in 
Manchuria in 1940. Shin Manshū (New Manchuria), 4, 12, December, 1940, p. 125. 
 
  To support the empire, good women now were not only obligated to assist their 
husbands with farm work in the field, but were also responsible for breeding and rearing 
children, comforting their husbands, and doing housework at home. Besides these 
physical obligations, they were further assigned the cultural duties of maintaining 
Japanese racial purity and transplanting Japanese womanhood to the continent.103  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Ibid, 124. Purity-centered racial ideology was just one discourse on race in the history of the 
Japanese empire. Recent scholars have insightfully illustrated that Japanese racism was much 
more complicated than a belief in the homogeneity of the Yamato race. 
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  The divergence in the standards of good women in Japanese Manchuria and 
Japanese America in the early twentieth century and in the “continental bride” project in 
the late 1930s was stark. For example, while continental brides were supposed to help 
their husbands in the field, the expectation regarding ideal wives in Japanese America in 
the campaign two decades earlier was exactly the opposite. Yet these three stories 
converge to reveal how women were utilized in various phases of Japanese 
expansionism.  
The standard of good women shifted again following the intrusion of Soviet troops 
into Manchuria in 1945. Russian soldiers sexually assaulted a large number of Japanese 
female settlers.104 After the end of the Asia-Pacific War, the continental brides, who were 
mobilized to migrate to Manchuria for the purpose of maintaining Japanese racial purity, 
returned to Japan only to find themselves regarded as a threat to such purity. The public 
in domestic Japan perceived these female repatriates not only as possible carriers of 
venereal diseases but also as potential bearers of mixed-race children.105 Based on the 
same anxiety, the Japanese government conducted organized examinations and sponsored 
abortions of those who were pregnant after assaults,106 despite the fact that abortion itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 The precise number of Japanese women assaulted remains unknown, but a fictionalized 
evaluation by a Japanese medical doctor, Takeda Shigetarō, in 1984 estimated the figure to be 
from 30,000 to 40,000. Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in 
Postwar Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 111. 
105 As an article in Asahi Shinbun on April 24, 1946 showed, cited from ibid, 111-112.  
106 In two major repatriation centers in Hakata and Sasebo, the numbers of abortions conducted 
were 1,200 to 1,3000 and 400 to 500 respectively. Ibid, 120. Some of these women died in the 
abortion process. Ibid, 115. Some committed suicide due to social pressure. Ibid, 116. 
184	  	  
	  
was still illegal in Japan.107  Moreover, these female emigrants, who were once 
exemplified as ideal women of the nation, in the aftermath of the war now stood on the 
opposite side of appropriate Japanese womanhood. They served as a foil to the model 
Japanese women who stayed “at home” in Japan proper during the war and thus did not 
“fraternize, willingly or not, with foreign men.”108 These repatriate women were thus 
stigmatized as Japan’s imperial past, fully carrying its moral guilt and historical trauma, 
from which the new and peaceful Japan, signified by the “real” and “unstained” Japanese 
women at home, could easily disengage.  
 
In 1952, to deal with the issue of the mix-blood children in Japan, Nagata Shigeshi, 
the president of Japanese Striving Society (JSS, Nihon Rikkōkai), an organization that 
deeply involved in different campaigns of Japanese migration to the US, Brazil and 
Manchuria from the end of 19th century to 1945, proposed to re-migrate these children to 
Brazil. He argued that there was no nation on earth that had less racial bias than Brazil 
and the Japanese communities in Brazil were also happy to accept these children.109 
Made at the wake of the new wave of Japanese overseas migration after the World War 
II, Nagata’s plan could kill two birds with one stone: it helped to maintain the imagined 
racial purity in the postwar Japan by eliminating the mix-blood children in the nation on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Abortion was not legalized in Japan until 1948, while the government-sponsored abortions 
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108 Ibid, 113. 
109 “Konketsuji o Burajiru e: Zairyū Dōhō ga Mukae Ireru,” Yomiuri Shinbun (April 29, 1952) 
(yūkan), 3. 
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the one hand, and could revive JSS’s migration networks between Japan and Brazil on 
the other hand.  
How did JSS participate in Japanese migration campaigns to different part of the 
world? How did its projects associate with those of the Japanese empire? How did its 
migration projects to the US, Brazil and Manchuria before World War II connect with 
each other? These questions will be answered in next chapter. As the final chapter, it will 
also conclude the dissertation by recapitulating the important points of the Japanese 
diasporic imperialism discussed in this study through the lens of the history of Japanese 
Striving Society.
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Chapter 5 
Japanese Striving Society and Three Phases of Diasporic Imperialism 
 
On the eastern side of the Nerima District in northeast Tokyo there resides an 
organization known as the Japanese Striving Society (JSS, Nihon Rikkōkai). Although 
only a five minute walk from the Kotake Muihara Station on the Tokyo Metro’s 
Yūrakuchō line, the organization’s headquarters are discreetly nestled in a residential area 
of winding roads, making it easy for one to get lost on the way. The JSS only has a 
couple of low-rise buildings, painted in white, the standard color of local structures. One 
may thus easily confuse them with other buildings in the neighborhood. It currently 
manages both an apartment rental business and a kindergarten for the local community. 
With this nondescript appearance and location, one would be surprised to learn the 
history of the JSS before World War II. Founded by a Japanese Christian priest named 
Shimanuki Hyōdayū in 1897, the JSS’s initial mission was to save the “spirit and body” 
of indigent students (kugakusei) by offering them moral education and working 
opportunities. Shortly after its establishment, Shimanuki started to send indigent students 
to the US as the ultimate salvation for them. The JSS’s program of migration to the US 
soon expanded to include other groups, such as common job-hunters and women who 
wished to migrate to America through marriage.  It provided training to all its members 
before they left Japan. In 1915, three years after Nagata Shigeshi became president of the 
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JSS after the death of Shinamuki, JSS already had more than 4, 600 members overseas, 
most of whom resided in the US.1  
Facing intensified Japanese exclusion campaigns in the US, shortly after Nagata took 
charge of the JSS, he began to direct JSS led emigration to other destinations. The two 
major projects conducted by the JSS under Nagata’s presidency before 1945 were the 
training and emigration of Japanese peasants (mostly from the Nagano prefecture) to 
Latin America (from the 1920s to the 1930s) and Manchuria (from the 1930s to 1945). 
From 1897 to 1945, it managed to send 30, 000 Japanese migrants to North and South 
Americas, Southeast Asia, and Manchuria.2  
   After World War II, the JSS continued to function as an agent and facilitator in the 
repatriation of emigrants from the empire’s former colonies as well as the emigration of 
Japanese peasants to South America up to 1956. In that year the Japanese government 
founded the United Association of Overseas Organizations (Kaigai Kyokai Rengōkai), 
taking over emigration related projects from all major non-governmental groups 
including the JSS. Since then, the JSS has remained its current size and managed its 
kindergarten and apartment rental service up to the present.  
 
The Three Phases of Japanese Migration to America  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For details of these members’ information and their activities, see Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon 
Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki (Tokyo: Nihon Rikkōkai, 1997), 116-117. 
2 http://www.rikkokai.or.jp/main/index.html 
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   The story of the JSS is fascinating, not only because it sent a large number of 
Japanese migrants overseas and that its two leaders, Nagata Shigeshi in particular, had 
influenced public opinion of the day on migration and national education, but also 
because the JSS's evolution in training and sending migrants overseas mirrored the 
changing trajectory of Japanese expansion. In different periods in the history of the 
Japanese empire, it was common for migration agents and organizations to emerge along 
with a particular wave of migration and then fade out soon after the campaign lost its 
public or governmental support.  The JSS, however, operated throughout Japan’s age of 
the empire. Starting from 1897, the JSS was not only involved, but to some extent led the 
major tides of Japanese overseas migration, such as the migration boom to the US from 
the late 1890s to the early 1920s, the migration wave to Brazil from the 1910s to the early 
1930s, and the mass migration to Manchuria and other parts of Asia between the 1930s 
and 40s. Consequently, the history of the JSS offers a unique lens for examining the 
intimate relationship between overseas migration and the history of the Japanese empire. 
    Through the history of the JSS, this chapter traces the evolution of the domestic 
discourse on Japanese migration to America. As this chapter will demonstrate, the 
changing discourse on Japanese American migration in domestic Japan mirrored the 
shifting trajectory of migration-based Japanese imperialism and expansionism. According 
to the changes of this discourse, the history of Japan’s diasporic imperialism is divided 
into three phases: the era of open-endedness (1868 to the 1910s), in which there was no 
unified domestic voice on whether overseas emigrants should eventually return to Japan 
or settle abroad permanently; the era of permanent settlement (the 1910s to the 1930s), 
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when, in response to anti-Japanese sentiment in the US, Japanese intellectuals and social 
leaders criticized the “sojourning mentality” of overseas emigrants and urged them to 
permanently settle abroad; and the era of homecoming (the 1930s to 1945), when the 
imperial discourse in domestic Japan called for the mental return of Japanese emigrants 
around the world and manipulated their experiences in the past to promote the state’s 
policy of mass migration to Manchuria. 
The Era of Open-endedness, 1868-1910s 
 Although the mainstream discourse on migration to America in Japan in the late 19th 
century bound the individual lives of migrants to national interest, the expectations for 
migration were open-ended and its trends were diverse. According to westernization 
ideologues such Fukuzawa Yūkichi and Ishida Kumatarō, America was not only the 
center of western civilization, where Japanese people should go and learn from, but also a 
land of wealth where poor Japanese after working for several years, could return with a 
large fortune.3 Furthermore, by finding their feet among westerners and building a "new 
Japan" in the US, the settlement of these emigrants could also win dignity for the 
Japanese nation.4 Even opponents of westernization, such as the crusader of Japanese 
national essence Nagasawa Betten, agreed that Japanese emigrants in the US, either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Fukuzawa Yūkichi, “Beikoku wa Shishi no Seishuku Nari,” “Ijūron no Ben”in Fukuzawa 
Yūkichi Zenshū, vol. 9 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1960), 442-444, 458. Ishida Kumatarō, Kitare 
Nihonjin (Tokyo: Kawakami Yoshimichi, 1886), p. 4, pp. 32-33. 
4 Ishida Kumatarō, Kitare Nihonjin, 5-6. 
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aiming for temporary work or permanent settlement, would give substantial benefits to 
the nation.5 It was in this context, that Shimanuki launched his migration campaign. 
A dedicated Christian, Shimanuki initially established the JSS to realize his ambition 
of evangelizing East Asia (Tōyō). Yet his campaign, from the very beginning, was 
religious as much as classist, as he believed that ultimately salvation should be both 
spiritual and physical. Galvanized by the severity of the poverty he observed during a 
missionary journey to Western Japan and the Korean Peninsular, he saw the alleviation of 
poverty as a precondition for the Christianization of East Asia.6 This idea led him to 
complete a thesis at the Tohoku Gakuin University’s Department of Theology, entitled 
"Christian missions in East Asia and Poverty Relief," which explained the importance of 
material salvation in evangelical missions in East Asia.7 He further reasoned that the 
mission of saving East Asia should start from Japan, since Japan was its representative. 
The first step of saving Japan, argued by Shimanuki, was to solve the problem of poverty 
in the nation.    
  Thus, one would not be surprised to discover that the organization was initially 
named the Tokyo Labor Society.8 It initially provided moral education and financial aid 
to the poor, particularly indigent students, who were considered by Shimanuki as the 
most urgent component of his mission.9 He believed that as Japan was rapidly changing 
under new ideas from the outside world, the youth was the best-positioned group in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Nagasawa Betten, “Hokubei ni Omomuku Mono,” Ajia 26 (December 1891), 17-18. 
6 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan zo ya (Tokyo: Keiseisha Shoten, 1911), 44. 
7 Ibid, 49. 
8 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 3. 
9 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan Zo ya, 66. 
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nation to take advantage of these transformations. In particular, the question was how to 
help these misfortunate young people, namely poor students who had to support their 
studies with their own hands, in successfully riding the tide of the changing era. 
Shimanuki contended that finding a solution to this dilemma was crucial to the nation's 
fate in the future.10 When the organization moved from Shimanuki's own house to a new 
building, he renamed the organization the Japanese Striving Society,11 encouraging his 
students to achieve success by enduring hardship12. 
  An investigative trip to the US soon after the establishment of the organization 
inspired Shimanuki to move his gaze from domestic Japan to America. Helping indigent 
students study in the US, he concluded, was the best way to assist them. Compared to 
their situation in Japan, in America they would be able to find part-time jobs with better 
wages and lighter workloads. This in turn would enable them spend more time on their 
studies. Studying in the US would thus allow them to have better performance in both 
their studies and self-finance.13 Based on his success in relocating these students, 
Shimanuki built a department of American migration (tobei bu) in the organization to 
further expand this program from indigent students to the common Japanese. He viewed 
the migration of people from Japan to the US as a panacea to the crises of overpopulation 
and economic stagnation in domestic Japan. 14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan Zo ya, 121. 
11 Before changing to Rikkokai, the Society’s name was changed from the Tokyo Labor Society 
to the Tokyo Diligence Society (Tokyo Seikinkai) due to a name conflict with another group. 
12 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 7. 
13 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan zo ya, 74. 
14 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 9. 
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 Yet it would be wrong to assume that Shimanuki established the JSS simply as a 
migration agent. More importantly, Shimanuki believed that relocating people to America 
was the best way to train model Japanese national subjects in the future. For him, 
American society was a fertile field where the ideal subjects of the Japanese empire could 
be produced and trained.  
Because of these aspirations, Shimanuki was not satisfied with the fact that most 
Japanese emigrants ended up as cheap contract-laborers. He argued that the emigrants 
should find more noble occupations with better wages,15 which would allow them to 
spend more time on their studies. To ensure the quality of the emigrants, instead of 
simply helping migrants navigate the logistics of migration, the JSS’s department of 
American migration conducted a rigorous system of selection and training on perspective 
migrants. It only sponsored the migration of those who passed its exam and understood 
the JSS's "mission" and the "true meaning of Japanese overseas development."16 To 
further this mission, Shimanuki also established the Japanese-American Business School 
(nichibei jitsugyō gakkō), aiming to help migrants succeed in more decent careers such as 
international trade.17 It was the high-quality emigrants, Shimanuki believed, that could 
find their feet among white people and establish a solid root for Japanese expansion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan zo ya, 133-134. 
16 Ibid, 127. 
17 Ibid, 133-134. 
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abroad.18 Whether they eventually returned to Japan or not, their success in the US was 
the key to realizing his mission of saving Japan as well as East Asia.  
  While Shimanuki's migrant training was male-centered, women, seen as assistants to 
these model subjects, also played an important role in his campaign. Shimanuki 
established the Striving Women's School (rikkō jogakkō) in 1908, aiming to train healthy 
and competent marriage partners for male Japanese emigrants. Built one year after the 
Japanese government, due to American diplomatic pressure, stopped issuing passports to 
its citizens who planned to migrate to the US mainland, the school was a direct response 
to anti-Japanese campaigns in the US. Attributing American exclusion campaigns to 
Japanese migrants' own failure in disciplining their life, Shimanuki reasoned that their 
decadent behaviors such as gambling and committing sexual crimes were caused by their 
loneliness.19 Once married, the life of these single men would be controlled and 
improved. Another reason for sending women to Japanese American communities was 
that they would give birth to a second generation of Japanese who, born in the US, would 
have American citizenship and political rights. As these American born Japanese 
increased, they may eventually be able to fight against local Japanese exclusion 
campaigns and legislation.20  
The Striving Women's School also emerged at a moment when young Japanese 
women, picture brides in particular, became a major subject of Japanese emigration to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Ibid, 180. 
19 Ibid, 138-139. 
20 Ibid, 140-141. 
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America.21 It aimed to avoid the problems of picture marriage,22 such as the uncivilized 
manners of the brides and the divorces that resulted from miscommunication between the 
two sides before marriage, fearing that such issues might harm the image of Japanese 
migrants in the US. The school only selected "those who were healthy both physically 
and mentally and were capable of assisting their future husbands in the US."23 It would 
then provide them necessary training and match them with perspective Japanese male 
migrants upon a half-year of communication between the two sides.24 Due to the high 
standards of selection, students of the school were generally urban women with a certain 
degree of education. Most of them were between 24 and 30, who had relatively decent 
jobs such as teachers in elementary schools or nurses. They were interested in marrying 
Japanese male migrants in the US because they were past the average age of getting 
married in Japan, but still had high expectations for their future partners. 25  
Shimanuki, therefore, assigned Japanese female emigrants, upon selection and 
training, the obligation of solidifying the temporary Japanese American settlements and 
allaying local anti-Japanese sentiment. They were expected to regulate the behavior of 
male emigrants on the one hand and represent the Japanese nation in more desirable ways 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Based on the Gentleman Agreement between the Japanese and American governments in 1907, 
only the family members of the existing Japanese American immigrants were allowed to migrate 
to the US. 
22 Ibid, 146. 
23 Ibid, 145 
24 Ibid, 146. 
25 “Kaigai Dokō no Fujin,” Yomiuri Shinbun (Chōkan), (May 30, 1914): 5. After the death of 
Shimanuki Hyōdayū, his wife, Shimanuki Shikako continued this training and matching program 
for several years. See “Hana Nihyaku Mei,” Yomiuri Shinbun (Chōkan) (Nov. 8 1914), 5. “Hana 
Yome Nanajū Mei no Tame Shimanuki Joshi Tomei, ” Yomiuri Shinbun (Chōkan) (April, 22, 
1915), 7. 
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on the other. However, this program was carried out only on a small scale due to 
Shimanuki's elite approach. Different from most students in the Striving Women's 
School, the majority of female emigrants of the day were rural women with little 
education or wealth. Annually, on average the school was only able to send 30-40 
perspective brides to the US. This was not an exciting number given that more than 1, 
500 Japanese women on average immigrated to the US through picture marriage every 
year between 1907 and 1920. 26 
  As another strategy for dealing with anti-Japanese sentiment in the US, Shimanuki 
decided to expand his migration campaign beyond the US. Proposing to change the JSS’s 
department of American migration into the department of overseas development in 1911, 
he planned to investigate other areas around the world as possible destinations for 
Japanese migration, such as Latin America, South and Southeast Asias, China, and even 
Europe.27 He expected this department would balance Japanese individual success and 
national interest by sending "the most suitable people to the most suitable places around 
the world." This department thus would become the pivoting point for achieving Japan's 
national development as well as the happiness of his fellow countrymen. The global 
migration sponsored by the JSS, through both its economic profit and educational value, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In 1920, the Japanese government stopped issuing passports to picture brides to appease 
intensified anti-Japanese campaigns in the US. Between 1907 and 1920, there were roughly 20, 
000 Japanese women who migrated to the US through “picture marriage.” 
http://www.pioneerhonor.jp/pioneer/us/shashin.html 
27 Shimanuki Hyōdayū, Rikkokai to wa Nan zo ya, 173. 
196	  	  
	  
would enable Japan to become a "first class nation" in the world in terms of not only 
material prosperity but also religion and morality28.  
  Shimanuki's campaign of relocating Japanese people overseas as the ultimate 
method for Japan's national salvation was a part of a much larger trend among Japanese 
ideologues and social reformers from the late 19th century to the early 20th century, who 
sought to reform Japan’s national identity through outward migration. Similar to many 
other Japanese thinkers of his day, Shimanuki embraced Western civilization as the 
ultimate path for Japan's national progress. He believed that relocating Japanese to the 
US, regardless if they eventually returned to Japan or not, would raise Japan's position in 
the global hierarchy of civilization and power dominated by the West. This open-ended 
migration pattern for Japanese Americans as well as the ideology of westernization began 
to change along with the intensification of Japanese exclusion campaigns in the US.  
 
The Era of Permanent Settlement, 1910s-1930s and the Conceptual Transition from 
殖民  to 植民  
Shimanuki died in 1913, two years after publicly proposing to expand the JSS's 
migration campaigns to other parts of the world. However, the plan was carried on by his 
successor, Nagata Shigeshi. After serving in the imperial army during the Russo-Japanese 
War, Nagata joined the JSS in 1907. He developed a close relationship with Shimanuki 
while studying at the JSS, being baptized by the latter before immigrating to the US. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Ibid, 174. 
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California, he managed the North American Agricultural Journal (Hokubei Nōhō), a 
Japanese American journal with a specialization in agriculture related information, before 
returning to Japan to take over leadership of the JSS following Shimanuki's will in 1913. 
29 
Nagata started his presidency of the JSS in a critical moment of the general history of 
Japanese migration. To mollify the increasingly intense Japanese exclusion campaigns in 
the US, the Japanese government had stopped issuing passports to Japanese citizens who 
wanted to migrate to the American mainland since 1907. This emigration restriction was 
further tightened in 1915 when the American government forbade Japanese migrants 
from entering the continental US via Hawaii.30 In response to the crisis of Japanese 
migration to America, the new president began to re-direct the JSS's migration campaign 
to Latin America in general and Brazil in particular.31 The JSS's strategy shift mirrored an 
overall directional shift in Japanese migration in the 1920s, when the major destination of 
Japanese overseas migration moved from North America to Latin America.  
  More importantly, Japanese American exclusion stimulated a discursive shift in 
Japanese migration strategy towards viewing permanent settlement as the only workable 
choice. To be sure, the call for Japanese emigrants in the US to settle permanently was 
voiced as early as the 1890s, in response to the rise of Japanese exclusion campaigns in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Nagata Shigeshi, Kumini Suru Hito (Tokyo: Rikkōkai, 1942), 61-65. 
30 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 103. 
31 Ibid, 123. 
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the US.32 However, the majority of the migration advocates and pundits, including 
Nagata, did not begin to problematize the sojourner (dekasegi) mentality of Japanese 
emigrants until the period of the intensification of the Japanese exclusion movement in 
the US from 1907 to 1924. 
  In a guidebook authored in 1916, Nagata argued, due to the mindset of eventual 
return, Japanese emigrants neither purchased land nor paid attention to assimilating into 
or contributing to the host societies. This in turn became a major cause of local anti-
Japanese sentiment. A resolution of permanent migration, Nagata argued, would not only 
allow Japanese emigrants to make long-term plans and investment overseas, laying the 
foundation for overseas communities for future generations, but also enabling them to 
further integrate into local societies, uplifting their credibility and morality.33 Under 
Nagata's lead, the JSS's programs of migration to Latin America from the 1920s to the 
1930s aimed for agricultural settlements based on farmland acquisition. 
  Developed hand in hand with the idea of permanent settlement was Nagata's 
peasant-centered migration strategy, which replaced Shimanuki's student- oriented 
campaigns. Nagata promoted the migration of Japanese peasants overseas as a solution to 
the poverty and constant cycle of depressions that plagued the Japanese countryside. 
Starting from his home prefecture of Nagano he embarked on a series of successful 
speaking tours with lanternslides in the rural areas of western Japan in 1915.34 These 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 See chapter two. 
33 Nagata Shigeshi, Shin Tokō Hō (Tokyo: Nihon Rikkōkai, 1916), 14-16. 
34 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 102-104. 
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tours disseminated information on overseas migration to Japanese peasants.35 From 1919 
to 1931, Nagata also made a few investigative tours to South America to examine the best 
methods for facilitating Japanese agricultural settlement there.36  
 
 
  A lanternslide used by Nagata in his speaking tours, showing a picture of a group of 
agricultural laborers of different ethnicities in a Japanese American farm. The caption 
reads, “Japanese colony of Garyū Mountain operated by me. The team of the watermelon 
field.”  Courtesy of the Japanese Striving Society. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 For example, a newspaper report shows a young woman from a village in Nagano Prefecture 
who was attracted by opportunities abroad after listening to Nagata’s lecture. The strong 
objections of her parents were not enough to dampen her enthusiasm for migrating overseas: She 
chose to escape from the family and went to Yokohama looking for Rikkokai. Yomiuri Shinbun 
(Chōkan) (December 24, 1916), 5. 
36 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 405. 
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  Another lanternslide used Nagata’s speaking tours. The description on the picture 
reads, “The fundamental solution to Japan’s deadlock is national expansion in the 
world.” Courtesy of the Japanese Striving Society. 
   This ideological preference toward permanent settlement in the second phase was 
marked by the shift of intellectuals’ preference on the concept of colonial migration from 
the word 殖民 to the word 植民. Both concepts were new terms invented around the 
beginning of Meiji era as a translation for the western word “colonization.” While 殖民 
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was a combination of the character 殖, literally meaning “reproducing,” with the 
character 民, literally meaning “people,” 植民 was a combination between 植,  wi t h 
t he meani ng of  “ pl ant i ng, ”  wi t h “ peopl e”  民.  As a common way of using 
characters in modern Japanese language, 殖民 and 植民, though different on one 
character, was used interchangeably by Meiji intellectuals because they shared the same 
prounanciation “shokumin.”37 It is during the period of ideological transformation from 
the open-endedness to permanent settlement that Japanese intelligentsia became sensitive 
to the difference between the two. As Nitobe Inazō made it clear in 1916, while 殖民 
meant reproducing or increasing people, 植民 indicated planting people.38  
 In print media, 殖民 was much more commonly used in the Meiji period; however, 
植民 increasingly gained popularity starting in the beginning of the Taisho period in the 
1910s.39  The change of preference from 殖民 to 植民 took place exactly at the same 
time that the domestic expectations of overseas migration turned to permanent settlement. 
The interpretation of the meaning of 植民 by Sakiyama Hisae, president of the School of 
Overseas Colonial Migration in 1928, explained well why the new concept was necessary 
for the aim of permanent settlement. He argued that the concept of 植民 was more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Nagata Saburō, “Shokumin Oyobi Shokumichi no Jigi,” Kokumin Keizai Zasshi 43:2 (August 
1927): 123. 
38 Yanaihara Tadao, Nitobe Inazō Hakase Shokumin Seisaku Kōgi oyobi Ronbunshū (Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 1943), 41. As Yanaihara mentioned in the preface, this book is a collection of 
his note on Nitobe’s seminars on colonial studies between 1916 and 1917. So we can assume that 
Nitobe made this statement then. 
39 Nagata Saburō, “Shokumin Oyobi Shokumichi no Jigi,” 123-127. 
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applicable than 殖民 because the character 植 meant “to plant”. Just like the planting of 
trees and grass involved the selection of location, and later cultivation, colonial migration, 
too, was a long-term project. Promoting the education of overseas emigrants, Sakiyama 
argued, as cultivation and selection were important in the planting of trees, so was 
education important for colonial migration. He believed that the character 植 itself had a 
significant educational value because its structure and literal meaning indicated that 
emigrants could settle overseas, build robust families and communities, and plan for 
further development. He further urged Japanese overseas emigrants to regard the meaning 
of the character 植 as their spirit.40 
 The preference of permanent settlement also transformed ideologies on how overseas 
migration was associated with the Japan’s empire building process. Shimanuki saw the 
JSS's campaign of migrating Japanese overseas as a way to achieve Japan’s national 
salvation. Anticipating the return of some overseas Japanese, Shimanuki used migration 
as a means of education to meet the ultimate end of uplifting Japan at home. Writing in 
1917, when the mainstream discourses on migration began to favor permanent settlement, 
Nagata proposed a different idea. To encourage emigrants to abandon their plans for 
returning to their homeland, he placed expansionism at the center of Japanese national 
identity. He no longer saw overseas migration as a method of upgrading the nation itself, 
but rather considered it part of the way that the nation ought to be configured. He argued 
that Japan's overseas expansion was a mandate made by Japan's first emperor Amaterasu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Sakiyama Hisae, “Shoku to Iu Ji wo Kokoro toshite,” Shokumin 7:2 (Feburary, 1928), 69-70. 
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and that the passion to explore lands overseas was already in the blood of every Japanese, 
since the very beginning of history.41 The current task for leaders was to reform general 
education to restore this national identity,42 which was unfortunately suppressed by 
internal conflicts, social corruption, and the inward-looking policies in the past. 
  The promotion of permanent settlement also altered Japanese migrant leaders' 
expectations of female migrants. The demand on women in the first phase of Japanese 
overseas migration, as illustrated by the plans of Shimanuki, was centered on improving 
the image of Japanese emigrants and combating Japanese exclusion. While these 
requirements on women remained, their obligations in the second phase also included 
helping their husbands to succeed in agriculture and cultivating the next generation of 
overseas communities. In a guidebook for Japanese migration to America that Nagata 
authored in 1916, he urged Japanese American housewives to give up their plans of 
returning to Japan and to focus on their children's education and character-building in the 
American society.43 
   This agriculture-oriented migration strategy also shifted the main targets of the 
JSS's women education from urban residents to those from the countryside. Supported by 
other thinkers on migration such as Nitobe Inazo and Soeda Shuichi, Nagata established 
the Training Center for Overseas Migrants (Kaigai dokōsha kōshūjo) as a branch of the 
Japanese Overseas Migration Association (Kaigai Imin Kyōkai) with the support of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Nagata Shigeshi, Kaigai Hatten to Wa ga Kuni no Kyōiku (Tokyo: Dōbunkan, 1917), 3-4. 
42 Ibid, 4-9. 
43 Nagata Shigeshi, Shin Tokō Hō, 365-366. 
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Japanese government in 1916. This center aimed to provide common Japanese emigrants, 
particularly picture brides, necessary training as a way to appease anti-Japanese sentiment 
in the US.44 The training center was operated at the same time as when Kawai led 
JYWCA's education campaigns on picture brides discussed in Chapter four, and was also 
supported by the latter. 45 
  While the training center was short-lived due to internal conflicts among the staff, 
the migration of women also played an important role in Nagata's campaign to re-direct 
Japanese migration from the US to South America. On the one hand, Nagata encouraged 
more Japanese women from rural Japan to migrate to South America to balance the 
gender ratio of local Japanese emigrants and to enhance their agricultural settlements; on 
the other hand, he established a women's training department in the JSS in 1926 under 
support from the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which recruited and trained domestic 
women who planned to migrate to Brazil. They also matched the women with local 
Japanese emigrants.46 No evidence shows how long this women training department last, 
but the JSS's official records indicate that a similar department was formed again in 
1931,47 shortly before the commencement of the empire's mass migration to Manchuria. 
It could be assumed that the JSS also was involved in the training and migration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 102-103. 
45 Evidence shows that some staff in JYWCA’s Yokohama branch attended the opening 
ceremony of the training center. Nihon Rikkōkai, Rikkō Gojūnen Shi (Tokyo: Nihon Rikkōkai, 
1946), 78. 
46 As in a well-known example, Shimanuki Takako, the daughter of the former president of the 
JSS, was also married to a Japanese emigrant businessman in Brazil under the introduction of 
Nagata Shigeshi. See 
 Yomiuri Shinbun (Chōkan) (July 2, 1926), 7. 
47 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 405. 
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women to Manchuria. Such campaigns were to some extent continued in the postwar era, 
when Nagata established the South Cross Association in 1960, which relocated women 
from Japan to South America as marriage partners for local Japanese male emigrants. 48 
  The strategy of permanent settlement further allowed thinkers on Japanese migration 
to conceive of Japanese Americans’ value to the empire in new ways. The Japanese 
American nisei, as American citizens with Japanese ancestry, were considered especially 
useful. Familiar with both the cultures of the US and Japan, they were expected to 
become a bridge (kakehashi) between these two Pacific powers.49 Thus in the 1920s and 
30s Japan witnessed collaborative efforts between the state and social groups to attract 
Japanese American nisei to come to Japan to receive various types of education and then 
to encourage these nisei to return to the US upon the completion of their study. The JSS, 
under the lead of Nagata, was involved in both of these movements. It offered 
accommodations to incoming nisei students as well as utilized its nationwide networks to 
send them back to America. 50 
 
The Era of Homecoming, 1930s-1945 
 The period of 1931 to 1945 witnessed the intensification of Japan's expansion and 
wars in Asia and the Pacific. In 1937, to solidify and defend the empire's expanding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Ibid, 405. 
49 For a discussion of the idea of seeing Japanese American nisei as a bridge between Japan and 
the US, see Eiichiro Azuma, “Nisei Nihon Ryūgaku no Higari to Kage,” Yoshida Ryo, ed., 
Amerika Nihonjin Imin no Ekkyō Kyōiku Shi (Tokyo, Nihon Tosho Sentā, 2005), 221-227. 
50 Nagata Shigeshi, Zaibei Dōhō to Kataru (Tokyo: Nihon Rikkōkai, 1940), 1-2. 
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territory on the Asian continent, the imperial government adopted the strategy of 
migrating a large number of the population from the Japanese home islands to Asia. The 
dominant migration discourse in this era favored two sharply contrasting but 
unexpectedly converging migration patterns. On the one hand, both the state and social 
groups mobilized for permanent migration from Japan to the Asian continent on a 
massive scale. On the other hand, government officials and advocates of migration began 
to re-appreciate the sojourning identity of the Japanese overseas outside of the imperial 
territories and celebrate their mental return to the empire in Asia. As the following 
paragraphs will demonstrate from the example of Japanese Americans, the call for the 
mental return of the Japanese overseas was ultimately aimed at promoting the empire's 
campaign of mass migration to Asia.  
  Similar to Meiji Japan's strategy of what is defined by Louise Young as "mixed 
colonization" to Hokkaidō, which extended control through both administrative rule and 
settlement,51 the mass migration policy of the imperial government in 1937 was aimed at 
consolidating Japan's colonial rule in Manchuria by establishing agriculture-based 
settlement. Common men and women in the countryside were encouraged by state 
officials and social leaders to leave their crisis-laden home for the promised land on 
Asian continent.52  They were urged to build a paradise for their new lives there. Neither 
the perception of overseas migration as panacea nor the idea of agricultural settlement 
was new in the 1930s. Both of these key elements in the Japanese government's migration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 312. 
52 Ibid, 321-334. 
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project were invented by thinkers of Japanese migration in dealing with Japanese 
American exclusion in the early 20th century. Yet the intensity of the state's involvement 
as well as the massive scale of mobilization was unprecedented. As a leading participant 
in this migration campaign, the JSS trained and exported a large number of peasants from 
Japan to Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and Southeast Asia. 53 Nagata himself also served 
the imperial government as a planner for its project of Manchurian migration. 54 
  To further mobilize peasants in Japan proper, advocates of migration integrated 
Japanese diasporic communities outside of the empire's territories into Japan's imperial 
expansion with unprecedented depth. The domestic discourse on Japanese migration to 
America, accordingly, entered an era of "homecoming," in which the migration was 
reinvented as a story with epic achievement. It was thus historicized as a glorious chapter 
in the history of Japanese expansion. This story was used to inspire peasants' passion for 
the new program of Asian migration and to convince them of its success.   
  Avoiding the much criticized term dekasegi (temporary migration), Nagata used the 
positive term ikin kikyō (or nishiki o kite kyō ni kaeru) to describe the situation of 
Japanese Americans in 1940.55 Ikin kikyō means a glorious homecoming. It was 
traditionally used to describe a man who left home for personal success eventually 
achieves his goals and returns to his home village in gorgeous dress. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 210-241. 
54 Ibid, 213. 
55 Nagata Shigeshi, Zaibei Dōhō to Kataru, 149. 
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  In 1936, the government-funded historian Iriye Toraji depicted the story of the first 
generation of Japanese emigration to America as a heroic saga. In this narrative, as the 
pioneers of the Japanese overseas expansion, the Japanese American issei had competed 
with and defeated white Americans in racial competition, so that the latter had no other 
resource but discriminatory legislation to exclude them.56 In a similar tone, Nagata 
argued in 1940 that Japanese Americans had successfully achieved their original goal of 
emigration. Over the past few decades, they had prospered in the US in their individual 
lives as well as with community building. They further contributed to Japan by both 
sending large amounts of remittance and by providing a great example for succeeding 
Japanese emigrants. 57 
  Yet just as the scenario of ikin kikyō included both the story of success outside and 
the actual scene of returning home, Japanese Americans' ideological return also consisted 
of two steps. If Iriye and Nagata’s portrayal of the successes of Japanese Americans issei 
belonged to the first step, Japanese American representatives' participation in the Tokyo 
Conference of Overseas Japanese (Kaigai Dōhō Tokyo Daikai) in Japan in 1940 
completed the plot of glorious homecoming by fulfilling the second step, the return. Both 
at the conference and in the reports of public media, Japanese American delegates were 
represented as the heroes of the national expansion in the past. In a few carefully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Eiichiro Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Development,” 1199. 
57 Nagata Shigeshi, Zaibei Dōhō to Kataru, 149-155. 
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designed ceremonies and demonstrations, they received applause and approbation from 
the government and general public as national heroes. 58 
  In the traditional story of ikin kikyō, the protagonist's glorious homecoming was to 
win himself respect from the people of his home village, for the imperial government in 
1940, however, the ideological return of the Japanese American issei was aimed at 
appropriating their story to present common Japanese with a bright future for their 
following emigration. This would hopefully mobilize more people from domestic Japan 
to migrate to Manchuria. 59 
  Although state officials and the advocates of migration were passionate about the 
Japanese Americans' ideological return, they were much less enthusiastic on Japanese 
Americans' plans for actually migrating back to Asia. The empire's expansion and wars in 
Asia in the 1930s deepened the diplomatic tension between Japan and the US, which 
further intensified existing anti-Japanese sentiment in the US based on racial 
discrimination. The favorable racial hierarchy and economic opportunities in Japanese 
Manchuria lured many Japanese Americans who were upset about their lives in the US. A 
number of them even managed to migrate to Manchuria and build a life there.60 However, 
the Japanese government and advocates of migration did not favor this return migration. 
Just as the symbolic significance of Japanese Americans was to persuade a domestic 
audience to migrate to Asia, their material significance to the empire, on the contrary, lay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Eiichiro Azuma, “Pioneers of Overseas Development,” 1206-1220. 
59 Ibid, 1206-1222. 
60 John Stephan, “Hijacked by Utopia: American Nikkei in Manchuria,” Amerasia Journal 23: 3 
(Winter 1997-98): 1-29. 
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on sustaining Japanese communities on the other side of the Pacific. Although Nagata 
considered it understandable that Japanese Americans wished to migrate back to Asia, he 
painstakingly argued that they should stay in the US for the sake of the Japanese empire. 
In addition to continuing to contribute to Japan via remittances, by cultivating the second 
and third generations of the Japanese Americans, they would further increase the 
Japanese American population and its political power in the US.61 
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Conclusion 
Japanese diaspora and the Japanese Empire 
 By demonstrating the close relationship between Japanese overseas and Japanese 
imperialism and the connection between the changing demands of the Japanese empire 
and the evolution of overseas migration, this dissertation rejects the validity of the label 
of kimin (people abandoned by the nation) to categorize overseas Japanese in the history 
of the Japanese empire. Instead of being discarded, overseas Japanese were an important 
group of subjects, being constantly called into service by the empire for different 
purposes at different periods.  
 The story of the JSS in Chapter five epitomizes the diasporic character of Japanese 
imperialism that is examined by this dissertation. The JSS's involvement in the 
migrations to the US, South America, then Manchuria challenges the existing definitions 
of the Japanese empire that are based on territorial control and political dominance. 
Caught in the intersection between narratives of the Japanese diapsora and Japanese 
imperial expansion, the history of the JSS, echoing Chapter one, demonstrates how 
Japanese migration to areas outside the formal boundaries of the Japanese empire also 
had a significant impact on Japan’s nation-making and empire building process.  
  Similar to the Japanese social leaders’ campaigns to abolish overseas prostitution 
and to educate Japanese women abroad discussed in Chapters three and four, the untiring 
efforts of both of the JSS's presidents in training and exporting women overseas illustrate 
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that Japanese expansionism involved men as much as women. They also demonstrate that 
the impulse to send the rural and poor to foreign lands came from an Malthusian anxiety 
as much as from a desire for racial reproduction; the ways in which Japanese trans-pacific 
migrations transformed Japan's domestic society were manifested through the issue of 
class as much as that of gender.  
 Chapter five further shows that the history of Japanese overseas migration can be 
divided into three phases according to the changing discourse in Japan on how Japanese 
emigrants outside of the imperial territories should be connected to the empire. More 
specifically, through the history of the JSS, this study has traced how domestic 
expectations on the development of Japanese migration to America shifted from ideas of 
open-endedness to permanent settlement, and then finally to ideological return. The story 
of the JSS, together with the intellectual debates examined in Chapter two, highlighted 
the changing role of Japanese migration to America in the construction of the Japanese 
empire.  
 To "save East Asia" was Shimanuki's ultimate goal for Japan's national salvation. 
After being saved, Japan was expected to lead Korea and China toward the same end.1 
Shimanuki believed that western civilization lay ahead of the rest of the world in the 
linear history of human progress.  As many other thinkers of the day discussed in this 
dissertation, he believed that relocating Japanese people to the US would refine Japan's 
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national identity and lift Japan's position on the international stage. It would then allow 
Japan to eventually fulfill its colonial mission in Asia.  
  As discussed in chapter two, Japanese exclusion campaigns in the US disappointed 
many Japanese ideologues, including some of the most passionate proponents of western 
civilization, such as Shimanuki's loyal follower Nagata Shigeshi, who migrated to 
California and spent several years there. Exclusion not only allowed them to criticize the 
hypocrisy of western imperialism, but also inspired them to challenge the western world 
order and seek alternative discourses for Japanese expansion. Nagata took leadership of 
the JSS also at the moment when thinking on Japanese migration to the US became 
increasingly pessimistic due to the exclusion campaigns. Shimanuki's strategy of national 
salvation through migration to the US appeared to be no longer possible. A new ideology 
was thus necessary to guide and legitimize the policy changes of the JSS's migration 
campaign.  
  Written in 1917, Nagata's proposal of migration was no longer based on an embrace 
of western civilization, but rather on a criticism of it. Attacking white racism against 
African-Americans and Asians both in the US and around the world, Nagata argued that 
the mission of the Japanese empire was to lead all people of color to overthrow white 
domination of the world. 2 To fulfill this mission, instead of migrating to the US, Nagata 
argued that the Japanese should migrate to all areas around the world except the West. In 
order to lead all colored people, it was necessary for the Japanese to have intimate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Nagata Shigeshi, Kaigai Hatten to Wa ga Kuni no Kyōiku, 21-22. 
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interactions with them. Because Japan was too small to house other people from outside 
its national borders, it was the Japanese who had to immigrate to the lands of the latter to 
meet the goal of interaction.3 The mission of Japan was no longer to bring western 
civilization to Asia as well as to the rest of the world, but rather to liberate the rest of the 
world from the rule of the West and to establish a new ideal world order. It was not based 
on "the peace of the British, the equality of the Germans, or the freedom of the 
Americans" but on the genuine peace, liberty and equality of the Japanese spirit.4 
Japanese exclusion in the US thus stimulated the second president of the JSS to create a 
new ideology for the JSS's migration campaigns that simultaneously moved toward 
alternative destinations of migrations and challenged the world order of the west.  
  Japanese mass migration to Asia ceased upon the collapse of the empire in 1945. 
Yet, the uncertainty over the length and result of American occupation and the economic 
depression of the nation in 1947 and 48 soon led to a revival of Japanese overseas 
migration.5 This uncertainty which underpinned the new migration campaign was further 
strengthened by the Malthusian concerns raised by the return of 6 million repatriates from 
the empire's former colonies and the 7.5 million new members of the population that 
were produced by the "baby boom" between 1947 and 1949.6  
 This new wave of overseas migration also emerged in the context of Japan's 
ideological transformation in the postwar era. Japanese intellectuals' efforts since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid, 21-22. 
4 Ibid, p. 32. 
5 Yukiko Koshiro, Trans-Pacific Racism and the US Occupation of Japan (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999), 124. 
6 Ibid, 126. 
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1910s in challenging western imperialism triggered by Japanese exclusion in the US were 
quickly replaced by the re-appreciation of the US-centered western civilization. Japanese 
migration to America, once again, was seen as an expressway for Japan to join the 
western world. However, similar to the pre-war era, Japan's embrace of the West could 
not be fully realized. While the US government abandoned the Immigration Act of 1924 
that excluded Japanese immigrants based on racial categories, the McCarran-Walter Act 
of 1952, although permitting Japanese to naturalize, limited their immigrant flow through 
a quota system.7 This time, instead of challenging the race-based discrimination behind 
the act, the Japanese government and public learned to acquiesce. Accordingly, with the 
consent of the US, they looked at less developed areas in the world such as Latin 
America as a suitable destination of Japanese emigration.  
  As Takashi Fujitani observes, just as Japanese Americans were assigned the role of 
the model minority in the American society, Japan sought to fit into the US-dominated 
political and racial hierarchy of the postwar world as the most advanced nation of color.8 
Japanese overseas migration was thus endowed with a cosmopolitan mission: helping 
undeveloped areas with their economic growth. With a new constitution at home based 
on pacifism and democracy, overseas Japanese were supposed to export civilization and 
concrete skills to local societies as if they were the surrogates of the West. 9 
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 Using its migrant networks in South America from the prewar era, the JSS played an 
important role in this postwar migration movement as well as the construction of the new 
image of the overseas Japanese. To plan and promote these new migration projects, 
Nagata Shigeshi was appointed by the Japanese government to conduct an investigative 
tour of the US, Brazil and Argentina in 1951.10 Based on his observations during this 
tour, Nagata concluded that the current prosperity of the American society were mainly 
because of its 4H club movement, an educational movement that aimed to develop the 
skills, leadership and responsibility of the youth in agriculture.11 He proposed to 
transplant this movement from the US to Japanese communities in Brazil in order to 
develop the leadership of the Japanese nisei in Brazilian society. If the second generation 
of the Japanese diaspora in Brazil could grow under the 4H training, Nagata believed, 
they would develop Brazil into the best nation on earth.12 To further promote the 
cosmopolitan image of Japanese migration, the JSS translated the record of the heroic 
experiences of Japanese American soldiers in the US military during World War II into 
Japanese immediately after it was published in the US. While the American government 
used the Japanese American soldiers' heroism to legitimize its inclusive racial policy,13 
the JSS, on the other hand, celebrated it as an example of Japanese people’s cosmopolitan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 337. 
11 4H stood for head, heart, hands and health, the four aspects of youth’s development. 
12 Nihon Rikkōkai, Nihon Rikkōkai Hyakunen no Kōseki, 340. 
13 Takashi Fujitani, Race for Empire, 5-7. 
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patriotism in its migrant training. All Japanese emigrants, Nagata argued, should learn to 
transplant their patriotism and national loyalty to their host societies.14 
 Overseas migration campaigns in postwar Japan were short-lived. They ceased 
around late 1950s. The economic boom of the nation since then consumed most of the 
domestic labor resources and the Malthusian anxiety vanished accordingly. Due to the 
shortage of labor, Japan even turned into an immigrant receiving country since the late 
1980s.15 However, just as overseas migration shaped Japanese imperial ideologies and 
expansion before 1945, the nation’s postwar emigration campaigns in the 1950s also 
provide clues on how overseas migration played an important role in constructing Japan's 
new national identity in the postwar era. This is a topic that requires further scholarly 
examination.  
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